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Wireless network access is gaining increased heterogeneity in terms of the types
of IP capable access technologies. The access network heterogeneity is an out-
come of incremental and evolutionary approach of building new infrastructure.
The recent success of multi-radio terminals drives both building a new infrastruc-
ture and implicit deployment of heterogeneous access networks. Typically there
is no economical reason to replace the existing infrastructure when building a
new one. The gradual migration phase usually takes several years.
IP-based mobility across different access networks may involve both horizontal
and vertical handovers. Depending on the networking environment, the mobile
terminal may be attached to the network through multiple access technologies.
Consequently, the terminal may send and receive packets through multiple net-
works simultaneously. This dissertation addresses the introduction of IP Mobility
paradigm into the existing mobile operator network infrastructure that have not
originally been designed for multi-access and IP Mobility.
We propose a model for the future wireless networking and roaming architec-
ture that does not require revolutionary technology changes and can be deployed
without unnecessary complexity. The model proposes a clear separation of oper-
ator roles: (i) access operator, (ii) service operator, and (iii) inter-connection and roaming
provider. The separation allows each type of an operator to have their own devel-
opment path and business models without artificial bindings with each other. We
also propose minimum requirements for the new model.
We present the state of the art of IP Mobility. We also present results of standard-
ization efforts in IP-based wireless architectures. Finally, we present experimen-
tation results of IP-level mobility in various wireless operator deployments.
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Public mobile and wireless IP enabled network access is becoming increasingly
heterogeneous in terms of access technologies. The access network heterogeneity
is the outcome of an incremental and evolutionary approach of building new net-
work infrastructure. The new and existing infrastructure need to coexist, some-
times for lengthy periods. The migration usually takes a number of years. For
example, it took over five years before the migration process from 2G networks
to 3G networks started properly. Today, new network infrastructure is built to
extend existing networks if there is profitable business case justifying the invest-
ment. Occasionally, the investment is also justified when there is a need to cir-
cumvent technical challenges with the existing technology. One good example
is extending the 3G network indoor coverage using unlicensed short range radio
technologies such as Wireless LANs (WLAN).
At the same time, the recent success of multi-radio mobile nodes (MN) that are
capable of using multiple radio access technologies simultaneously drive build-
ing a new infrastructure and implicit deployment of heterogeneous access net-
works. This access network heterogeneity combined with an increasing num-
ber of multi-radio mobile nodes creates an environment, where mobility between
access technologies becomes topical. For the first time end users could have truly
mobile multi-radio mobile nodes that could be most of time connected to IP net-
works through some radio access. Consequently, service providers and opera-
tors want to make use of this opportunity and offer services over any IP access
network without disruption in connectivity. Mobility between different access
networks may involve handovers within the same access technology or between
different access technologies.
Depending on the networking environment, a mobile node may be attached to
the network through multiple network interfaces, and be able to send and receive
packets through multiple interfaces simultaneously. It is also possible that one
of the network interfaces of a multi-radio mobile node maintains a connectiv-
ity through some Wireless Wide Area Network (Wireless WAN, e.g. systems
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like GPRS/EDGE), while the other network interfaces undergo more frequent
changes on their point of attachment to the network. Depending on the radio
access technology and the deployment infrastructure, the IP related information
of the interface may or may not change each time the point of attachment to the
network changes. Every time the IP subnetwork prefix of the link changes, the
interface needs to undergo the reconfiguration of IP address(es) and other net-
working related information.
Majority of the IP-based applications use the IP address of the networking node
for multiple purposes. The IP address is at the same time the location identifier of
the host from the IP routing point view and the node identity from the IP session
point of view. The IP address can also be used to identify a subscription in the
operator subscriber management systems. These are the root of the fundamental
problems in IP Mobility for networking nodes. When the IP address changes, not
only the routing of IP packets change but also the identity of the host changes.
As a result, IP-based communication breaks in most cases. A classical example is
TCP-based end to end communication.
The growth of mobile computing has initiated a development for standardized
IP Mobility solutions that are transparent to layers above the IP networking layer
(i.e., the layer-3). These solutions typically focus on enabling topologically incor-
rect routing of IP packets using some kind of IP tunneling techniques and having
a topologically stationary representative for a mobile node. The mobile node
is always reachable through this stationary representative. Recently there has
also been research on separating the location and the identity of a host. In this
approach the IP address of the host would only be used for IP routing purposes
and a separate permanent identifier would be used for identifying the host.
Security and privacy issues are considered as fundamental requirements for IP
Mobility solutions. Security issues become topical when a customer needs to
pay money for the network access and mobility services. Unfortunately, security
issues are often neglected or left for further study when designing new solutions
because of the complexity of the security area. Quality of Service (QoS) is also
an area that often gets neglected during the initial architecture design phase. In
a heterogeneous networking environment, where networks belong to multiple
administrative domains, even guaranteeing a baseline Quality of Service might
turn out the be hard, if not impossible. Furthermore, the mandatory security
requirements usually challenge the situation even more.
Traditionally incumbent mobile operators have owned all networks they provide
access and services for their customers. The operators have also controlled the
basic offering of the services. Inter-operator roaming has typically been restricted
only to international roaming cases. National roaming has been prohibited by
regulation, which has lead to overlapping network deployments by different
operators. However, the above model is slowly changing. In certain cases it
would be more beneficial for an operator to allow national roaming in order to
offer customers with a better connectivity and reachability to value added ser-
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vices. Furthermore, the cost of building reasonable coverage for each new access
technology might be too high to justify the investments. As a result, operators
need to find ways to reduce the cost of building the infrastructure. Sharing access
networks is one approach. Sharing can be handled in two ways. Either the access
network is shared in a way that each operator sees it as their own network or
the sharing is based on roaming where customers are allowed to attach to vis-
ited operators’ networks. Handovers across administrative domains are rather
new and challenging topic from IP Mobility point of view. This is mostly due the
nature of inter-operator roaming settlements and the heavy involvement of inter-
operator AAA (authentication, authorization and accounting) infrastructure dur-
ing handovers.
When investigating IP Mobility from an incumbent mobile operator point of
view there are yet few areas that differ from the idealistic pure IP approach.
Mobile operators are used to have control over the mobile nodes that attached
to their networks. In cellular technologies, such as GERAN/UTRAN, the net-
work can even instruct a mobile node to initiate a handover. When coupled with
the network access authentication it is even possible to steer mobile node’s inter-
operator roaming and target access network selection. These kind of features
are generally missing from current IP Mobility solutions. Current solutions are
more or less mobile node centric when it comes to the handover decision making.
However, mobile operators deploying large wireless network infrastructure are
looking into similar properties also on the newer IP optimized radio access tech-
nologies. Reasons for doing such mobility management and steering of roaming
can be based on commercial arrangements, optimizing the service accessibility or
then just load balancing.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
IP mobility is actually a well known area and has been studied in a number of
publications. IP Mobility in heterogeneous networks is also a research topic that
has been studied for a number of years [170]. There are even large scale cellular
network deployments utilizing IP Mobility solutions [31]. However, the previ-
ous work on these areas typically neglect commercial realities and the special
characteristics of the mobile operator deployment environment. The research has
mostly concentrated on improving the handover performance and reducing the
packet loss in simplified access network deployment scenarios that do not repre-
sent the complexity of a real mobile operator network. Issues rising from network
access restricting policies, network access authentication, operators’ obsession for
fine grained charging functionality, inter-operator roaming and inter-connection
arrangements are typically not addressed. Yet these factors contribute to the over-
all performance and functionality of the whole system, where IP Mobility is just
one part of it.
This dissertation addresses the problem of introducing IP Mobility paradigm into
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a mobile operator network infrastructure that has not originally been designed
IP Mobility related requirements in mind. For example, the introduction of IP
Mobility as an inter-technology and inter-operator handover solution into the 3G
Partnership Project (3GPP)1 requires major architectural redesign in order to meet
all goals set by All-IP requirements [8]. One of the notable challenges is the huge
installed base of old infrastructure that the operators wish to continue using, even
if new features are being developed and incrementally deployed. This disserta-
tion also addresses the problems of IP Mobility performance in managed network
deployments, where inter-operator roaming and inter-connection networks are
part of the IP Mobility framework. We approach this area from the backend man-
agement and control plane point of view. As a part of this we also challenge the
current monolithic operator role model, and how roaming and inter-connection
is realized in today’s architectures.
1.2 Research History
The author has studied these topics for several years and contributed a num-
ber of publications, standards and standard proposals in the area of IP com-
munication in mobile operator networks. The studies focused on IP Mobility
and the integration of IP Mobility in large scale mobile operator deployments
including the backend AAA infrastructure, access level authentication and tar-
get network selection. The author also studied transport performance during IP
Mobility in heterogeneous wireless operator networks. Furthermore, the author
has actively participated to the standardization process related to inter-operator
roaming aspects of non-cellular IP access technologies. These standardization
efforts include 3GPP defined Release-6 Interworking WLAN (I-WLAN) architec-
tures [1, 2] and the first ever inter-operator EAP-SIM based WLAN roaming trial
in GSM Association (GSMA)2. The WLAN roaming work led to co-authoring
WLAN roaming guideline documentation [124]. Eventually, the work started
on WLAN roaming expanded to IETF3 AAA working groups, 3GPP Release-
7 [12, 104] and International Roaming Access Protocols Framework (IRAP) [157]
roaming trials.
Majority of the work was concluded at TeliaSonera during the Innovation Pro-
totyping for Vertical Handover (VHO) TEKES funded project (fall 2002 - 2005).
The VHO project studied IP Mobility and vertical handovers in heterogeneous
network environment. The VHO project received an award from TEKES NETS
technology program. The work was continued in Multi-access Experimenta-
tions in Real Converging Networks (MERCoNe) TEKES funded project (2006 -
early 2008). The project studied and acquired practical hands-on experience and
insight knowledge of the future IP-based mobility, multi-access solutions and
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The author was involved with several publications related to IP Mobility and
transport protocol performance. The author was the first author of the Measured
performance of GSM, HSCSD and GPRS [185] and also carried out all of the per-
formance measurement data collection tasks. For the Effect of vertical handovers
on performance of TCP-friendly rate control [136] the author was responsible for car-
rying out the live network measurement data collection and handling, and con-
tributed all network topology and setup related material. The contribution of the
author in the Handover performance with HIP and MIPv6 [167] was defining the
scope of the paper, test cases as well as the live networking environment. He also
contributed networking related work including parts of the Mobile IPv6, rela-
ted work and overall analysis of the material. In the Using quick-start to improve
TCP performance with vertical hand-offs [261] the author was involved in all parts
except running the actual simulations. On a similar topic the author contributed
to the TCP Quick-Adjust by Utilizing Explicit Link Characteristic Information [312]
on all parts except running the actual simulations. The author was also involved
with co-authoring a chapter Understanding Multi-layer Mobility for the book Ency-
clopedia of Mobile Computing and Commerce [278], where he contributed IP-layer,
transport layer and network mobility related text, and analysis.
On to the network discovery, selection and generic access topic the author was the
first author of the HIP Based Network Access Protocol in Operator Network Deploy-
ments [190] responsible for the core of the paper, experimentations, analysis and
part of the implementation. The author was also involved with co-authoring IETF
Request For Comments (RFC). He was the editor of the RFC 5113 Network Discovery
and Selection Problem, which analyses different network discovery and selection
scenarios with associated identity selection problems. The author co-authored
the RFC 4739 Multiple Authentication Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
Protocol [104], which was a point solution to a specific issue in 3GPP I-WLAN
Release-7 [12] and later adopted to 3GPP Release-8 I-WLAN Mobility [20] as well
as 3GPP Release-8 Evolved Packet Core [27]. The author was the initiator of the
later standardized and adopted solution proposal. The author was the editor
and the co-author of the RFC 5149 Service Selection for Mobile IPv6 [192], which
describes a service selection solution for Mobile IPv6 and Proxy Mobile IPv6.
This work is also adopted by 3GPP Release-8.
The author also participated in co-authoring IETF efforts under the roaming and
inter-operator AAA topic. The author pioneered the RFC 4372 Chargeable User
Identity [47] that he originally documented in the WLAN roaming guideline doc-
ument GSMA PRD IR.61 [124]. This work has since been incorporated as a part
of 3GPP I-WLAN and mobile WiMAX4 [301]. The IP Mobility related AAA work
include officially adopted IETF Mobile IPv6 Diameter support drafts Diameter
Mobile IPv6: Support for Home Agent to Diameter Server Interaction [186] and Diam-
eter Mobile IPv6: Support for Network Access Server to Diameter Server Interaction
[188]. The author is the editor of previously listed IETF drafts.
4http://www.wimaxforum.org
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Related to the access networks, QoS, AAA-based roaming and general policies
for mobility services, the author co-authored IEEE 802.21 Media Independent
Handover framework services transport problem scoping RFC 5164 Mobility Ser-
vices Transport: Problem Statement. The ongoing but officially adopted IETF work
include the Diameter drafts Quality of Service Attributes for Diameter [195] and
Quality of Service Parameters for Usage with the AAA Framework [194]. This work
is also partly adopted by 3GPP Release-8.
Within 3GPP the author was most active in 3GPP I-WLAN Release-6 and Release-
7 stage-3 standardization, and contributed standards with more than 80 contri-
butions. One particular effort was driving the adoption of pub.3gppnetwork.org [6]
top level domain name in both 3GPP and GSMA. This top level domain is now
an essential part of the 3GPP I-WLAN and UMA & GAN [25] architectures.
The influence of the standardization is notable in this dissertation. The problems
and proposed solutions are always reflected as a possible input to a standardiza-
tion process and how they affect an incumbent mobile operator.
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation comprises five parts as follow: In this part, we gave a brief
overview of the challenges and motivation of IP Mobility in an incumbent mobile
operator networks. We also list the contributions of this dissertation.
In the part two we give an extensive background of the state of the art in the
field of IP Mobility. We concentrate on architectures that are supposed to scale
up to mobile operator networks with millions of subscribers. We also pay atten-
tion to the backend support systems, roaming and inter-operator interconnection
architectures that are essential from an operator point of view.
In the part three we discuss the future operator network environments, their
development directions and requirements. Future operator environment will
be a complex composition of heterogeneous access networks inter-connected via
a flexible roaming infrastructure. The existing roles of operators are bound to
change and develop towards more focused and specialized roles.
In the part four we present results of various handover measurements and eval-
uations carried out in live networks. In addition to these we present several
standardization contributions that eventually got adopted by telecom standard
organizations. We also present material from pre-commercial AAA-based roam-
ing establishments and experiences of their implementation to a telecom roaming
environment.







This chapter presents an overview of recent developments in the field of IP Mobil-
ity. We limit the scope to overall architectures and protocols that are mature
enough to be adopted by the industry. However, even for mature protocols there
are issues that do not show up until in large scale deployment such as mobile
operator networks.
2.1 Introduction
IP Mobility, where mobile nodes change their topological location in the IP net-
work, is an important requirement for multiple application domains. The topo-
logical location is not necessarily dependent on mobile node’s physical location
in the network. IP Mobility support can be divided into several layers based on
the OSI reference model and also categories depending on the nature of mobility.
In this dissertation, we consider mobility solutions and protocols starting from
the link layer and ending to the application layer (from layer 2 to layer 7 in the
OSI reference model). However, our main focus is on the layer 3.
Probably the most widely recognized host controlled network-level protocol for
mobile nodes is the Mobile IP protocol family [165,242]. Another related network-
level solution is Network Mobility (NEMO) [94], in which complete subnetworks
may move. Hosts within a mobile network move also when the network moves.
It is also possible to manage the IP Mobility completely on the access network side
without involving a mobile node. Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) [135, 198] is a network
controlled IP Mobility management solution, which reuses Mobile IP protocol sig-
naling.
Mobility can also be handled locally, typically within a well defined adminis-
trative domain. Movement within the localized mobility management domain
may not require active participation of the mobile node on mobility management
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signaling. Alternatively, the mobile node may just be assigned a local mobility
anchor node within the local mobility management domain in order to keep the
mobility management signaling local and thus trying to reduce possible delays
caused by signaling round-trip latencies. Network based Localized Mobility man-
agement (NetLMM) and Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [268] are examples of
such protocols.
It is also possible to handle mobility on the transport layer (layer 4 in the OSI
reference model). Transport Layer Seamless Handover (TraSH) [114], Datagram Con-
gestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [178, 179] and mobile-SCTP [306] are recent exam-
ples of such solutions. Yet another way of managing host mobility is Virtual Pri-
vate Network (VPN) with appropriate support for Security Associations’ address
management. MOBIKE [102] is a good example of mobility aware IPsec VPNs.
Protocols such as Wireless CORBA (WCORBA) [230] and the Session Initiation Pro-
tocol (SIP) [258] provide more fine-grained mobility than host based and they do
not assume underlying transport or network level mobility support. Mobility is
inherently tied with the way nodes are addressed in a distributed network [278].
In this dissertation, we concentrate mainly on one way to address mobile nodes
and components: addresses that serve as both host locator and identity. Another way
of addressing that has recently gained wider interest is the locator and identity
split, which is an extension of the first and used, for example, in the Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) [216, 228] and for example in the i3 overlay network [276]. There is
also a third way, content-based addressing; however, that is not in the scope of this
dissertation.
This dissertation describes a selected group of IP Mobility enabling protocols and
solutions of the available categories briefly introduced earlier. They are always
viewed from an incumbent mobile operator point of view, whose architecture
is based on 3GPP and IETF standards. We also investigate how inter-operator
roaming aspects affect the mobility.
Operator’s networking environment is often bound by commercial realities that
make the deployment of new technologies challenging. The value of understand-
ing how IP Mobility is developed further and also implemented in other architec-
tures than 3GPP should not be underestimated. There are wireless network archi-
tectures that rely on IP Mobility technologies for their terminal mobility. These
include 3GPP2 network and Mobile WiMAX architectures. Other architecturally
related important areas include inter-operator roaming, intra- and inter-operator con-
trol signaling, bootstrapping of the mobility service and security. Finally, movement
detection and handover optimization solutions are covered under the topic of mobil-
ity assisting technologies.
We also describe an evolutionary model of operator roles and how to realize inter-
operator roaming in the future heterogeneous multi-access networks. The model
builds on seamless IP Mobility and flexible inter-operator roaming arrangements.
This is realized by clearly separating the service and access operators, and the
roaming infrastructure inter-connecting different operators. The described model
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of operator roles and inter-operator roaming is targeted only on IP-based com-
munication and services. We propose a model for an inter-operator infrastruc-
ture that is deployable in foreseen future without radical changes to the existing
inter-operator infrastructure and roaming arrangements. We also present a list of
minimum requirements for the overall model.
The major challenges are not about a specific IP Mobility protocol. The control
and management plane part has not kept up with the development when it comes
to inter-operator and charging aspects that operators are interest in. Finally, IP
Mobility has impacts on the upper layer protocols. A strict layered networking
model may be unoptimal for layers above the IP layer. This dissertation addresses
IP Mobility largely on the control plane, inter-operator and cross-layer optimiza-
tions point of view.
2.2 Classification and Terminology
It is essential to define different approaches that are generally used in IP Mobility
management. Furthermore, having constant terminology and meaning for vari-
ous expressions is important. An exhaustive mobility related terminology can be
found in [202]. A host has IP Connectivity when it has some networking interface
connected to a network and in a such state that the host may send and receive IP
packets using the said networking interface. Host mobility happens when a host
relocates to a new point of attachment in a network, thereby possibly causing a
change of the IP address. Since IP addressing is tied to the topological location
in the network this may cause a fundamental change in the routing of IP traffic
to the relocated host. This host relocation is commonly referred to as a handover
or a handoff (in this dissertation we primarily use the term handover). Movement
detection is a mechanism or an algorithm that mobile nodes use to detect IP-layer
handovers. Handovers are usually divided into two main categories: horizontal
handovers and vertical handovers [170]. A horizontal handover is commonly under-
stood as a handover that takes place within the same access network technology.
A vertical handover is handover that takes place across different access network
technologies (and usually from the mobile node’s point of view between different
networking interfaces).
There are also two ways of doing the handover: break-before-make (BBM) or make-
before-break (MBB). The difference of these two approaches is whether the IP Mobil-
ity enabling protocol or the terminal implementation (in hardware or software
implementation point of view) allows creating connectivity to the new access
network or router before leaving the old access network or router. Sometimes
handovers are also classified as: forward-handovers or backward-handovers. The dif-
ference between these two is in the way a mobile node can carry out the han-
dover. In backward-handover the mobile node is still connected to the old point
of attachment to the network while it prepares the handover. Respectively, in
the forward-handover the mobile node has lost the connectivity to the old point
14 CHAPTER 2. IP MOBILITY
of attachment to the network when it prepares a handover to the new point of
attachment to the network. Forward- and backward-handovers are essentially
the same as break-before-make and make-before-break handovers.
In the context of IP Mobility session continuity refers to a functionality that allows
session oriented IP services to continue functioning regardless of handovers. IP
session continuity is a subset of session continuity. It guarantees that the IP address
seen by the transport, session and the application layers remains regardless of
handovers. The mobile node may also have several active IP addresses, which
is called multi-addressing. Multi-addressing may also be used to realize multihom-
ing, which generally means that the host is connected to two independent net-
works for increased reliability. Multihoming is also needed when several differ-
ent access network technologies are used simultaneously. Server-side resiliency
is commonly realized by connecting services to multiple network providers. This
is called site multihoming.
Mobility is host controlled or host based when the IP Mobility solution or protocol
requires active participation of the mobile node for the mobility management,
location update and handover decision making. Respectively, network controlled
mobility refers to a solution, where the IP Mobility management is handled on the
access network side without mobile node’s participation to the mobility manage-
ment and location updates. The mobile node does not even need to be aware of
mobility at the IP layer. Network controlled mobility is typically realized within
some well defined administrative domain, such as within one network operator
or access technology. Crossing the administrative domain border may not guar-
antee IP layer session mobility. The mobility may also be network assisted, which
is a combination host and network controlled mobility. However, in this case the
network provides additional guidance to the mobile prior to the handover and
may also proactively prepare network side nodes for the arriving mobile node.
Localized mobility management (LMM) is closely related to the network controlled
mobility management but there are also solutions that require mobile host partic-
ipation. The main idea of localized mobility management is to handle IP Mobil-
ity efficiently within some well defined administrative domain. Within this said
Localized Mobility Management Domain (LMM-Domain) it might be possible han-
dle the mobility completely in network controlled manner even if the mobile host
is relying on host based IP Mobility solution in general. In the localized or local
mobility context global mobility means mobility across localized mobility man-
agement domains or, as generalized, a mobility between administrative domain.
Related to the mobility, in general an administrative domain refers to a manage-
rial or business entity that is managed by one well defined operational point. This
could, for example, be an access network under control of one logical authentica-
tion, authorization and accounting (AAA) server or a cellular network controlled by
one network operator.
User mobility happens when a user changes the host device or access host, which
causes a change in the underlying physical IP address of the user’s device. The
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device characteristics may also change, for example when the user changes from
a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) to a laptop. An important subcategory of user
mobility is session mobility, which allows the relocation of user sessions from one
host to another. Session mobility is an important requirement for current and
future mobile applications such as Instant Messaging (IM), multimedia and voice.
Service or application mobility happens when a service relocates or resides on a
mobile host that moves. Service mobility may be triggered by factors not related
with a user, for example load balancing. Session mobility should not be confused
with IP Session Mobility (or IP session continuity), which at large means a possibil-
ity or mechanism to retain an IP address a mobile node, a service or an application
acquired at the beginning of the session till the end of the session. A session def-
inition then depends on the view point whose viewing it. For an application the
session lasts from the start till the end of the execution of the application. From
a user point of view one session might include multiple IP sessions and multiple
application sessions.
Finally, when it comes to different IP-based access technologies 3GPP access means
any radio access network technology specified in 3GPP [86, 146, 218]. Respec-
tively, non-3GPP access means any radio access network technology specified out-
side 3GPP, such as 802.11 Wireless LANs (WLAN) [149]. Within any access tech-
nology the home link denotes a network where mobile node’s home prefix or sub-
network is defined. The network may be virtual in a sense that it exists only as
an IP routing information.
2.3 Addressing
The addressing of mobile and stationary nodes is crucial from IP Mobility point
of view. We describe two different addressing models for mobile systems that are
within the scope of this dissertation:
Addressing that couple location and identity – this form of addressing couples
the identity of a communicating end-point to a specific location in a net-
work. For example the IP address is used in both identifying a node and
routing packets to it. This form of addressing typically uses a mediating
stationary node to represent the mobile node to any correspondent nodes,
handle the IP Mobility management and location updates for the mobile
nodes.
Addressing with locator and identity split – this way of addressing separates
the identity of a node and the location of the node. This allows more flexi-
ble mobility support since the identity may be used to lookup the physical
location of a node. For example the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) is based on
this form of addressing.
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These addressing models are not orthogonal, and may be applied on different
layers of the communications stack. Since the current Internet uses the IP protocol
it provides the baseline addressing with location and identity coupled in the IP
address. On top of that we may implement the locator/identity split using for
example HIP. In essence, for IP Mobility there is a single fixed indirection point
and for locator/identity split there is also a single indirection point. There is also
a third model of addressing, content based addressing [278], but it is out of scope of
this dissertation.
The solutions discussed in this dissertation fall mostly into the category of add-
resses with both location and identity. Well-known IP Mobility protocols, such as
Mobile IP variants, rely on a transient address (Mobile IP calls it as a Care-of
Address – CoA) that represent the current location of the mobile node when the
mobile node is away from its home link/subnetwork. The IP traffic to the mobile
node and to its stable IP address (Mobile IP calls it as a Home Address – HoA) is
tunneled to the transient address in a visited foreign network. When the mobile
node moves, either the mobile node itself or the network side node following the
movement of the mobile node updates the binding between the transient address
and the stable address in the stationary mobility management node that repre-
sents the mobile node (Mobile IP calls it as a home agent).
2.4 Host-controlled Mobility
This section describes recent developments on host controlled IP Mobility manage-
ment solutions and protocols that are or are likely to be deployed in large wire-
less network architectures. We go briefly through a number of Mobile IP variants
and mobile Virtual Private Networks (VPN). We also have a look at HIP due to the
recent lively standardization activities around it and its location/identifier split
approach to handle addressing and mobility.
2.4.1 Mobile IP
Following sections describe basic principles of state of the art of Mobile IP [248]
base protocols including Mobile IPv4, Mobile IPv6 and Dual-Stack Mobile IP.
2.4.1.1 Mobile IPv4
Mobile IPv4 [242, 270] is a well-known IETF standardized IP mobility protocol. It
has basically been available since 1996 and widely adopted by the industry. The
maturity level of the protocol is rather good and it has been deployed as an inte-
gral part of the 3GPP2 CDMA2000 [31, 32] mobile system. Recently Mobile IPv4
has been included into Mobile WiMAX [300, 301] wireless network architecture.
Mobile IPv4 is a layer-3 IP Mobility protocol for supporting mobile nodes that roam
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between IP subnetworks. Upper layer protocols and applications are unaware
of possible changes in network location and typically can operate uninterrupted
while the host moves. Mobile IP mobility support consists of the triangle of a
Home Agent (HA), a Correspondent Node (CN), and a mobile node. Mobile IPv4
architecture has an additional optional node called Foreign Agent (FA). The home
agent serves as a stationary anchor point for mobile nodes and any correspondent
node may communicate and initially reach mobile nodes through the home agent.
The foreign agent serves as a local attendant to a number of mobile nodes, and
relays all user plane traffic as well as the control plane signaling (registrations).
The basic Mobile IP routing is triangular. A correspondent node sends packets
to a home agent which then tunnels packets to the current location of the mobile
node. Finally the mobile node sends packets directly to the correspondent node.
When the Mobile IP tunnels get terminated at the foreign agent the mobile node
is operating in Foreign Agent Care-of Address mode (FA-CoA mode). On the other
hand if the Mobile IP tunnels get terminated at the mobile node itself the mobile
node is operating in Co-located Care-of Address mode (Co-CoA mode). Depending
on the foreign agent and the access network policies it possible that the mobile
node is allowed to operate in Co-CoA mode even if the foreign agent is present.
In this case the foreign agent acts as a passthrough node. In the absence of foreign
agents the mobile node just registers directly with the home agent.
In practice triangular routing is considered inefficient as it alters the natural rout-
ing of IP [250] packets. However, Mobile IPv4 standard does not define any route
optimization feature, although there has been attempts to define one [247, 305].
Triangular routing is generally also challenging due to ingress-filtering [63,109] in
access networks, which causes firewalls to drop IP packets with a topologically
incorrect source address. Furthermore, billing/charging related arrangements
and services access policies that are typical for managed mobile operator net-
works do not work properly with triangular or route optimized traffic. Mobile
IP deployments tend to force routing of all IP packets via a home agent using
the reverse tunneling [214] feature. Another deployment issue concerning Mobile
IPv4 is the Network Address Translation (NAT) due to the prevalent use of private
IP addresses in access network deployments. NAT Traversal [199] is a feature
based on UDP [249] encapsulation that allows user plane traffic of mobile nodes
in Co-CoA mode to traverse NATs. Interestingly enough, even if the NAT Traver-
sal feature is primarily intended for traversing NAT enabled access networks, it
has also shown great value for firewall traversal. For statefull firewalls building a
temporary state based on an UDP header is easier than, for example, for IP-in-IP
encapsulation [238].
The distance between the mobile node and the home agent may also be signif-
icant both topologically and geographically. Thus routing packets between the
mobile node and the home agent may cause considerable delay; for both user
plane and control plane. In order to improve the situation a home agent may also
be allocated from the visited network in a close proximity of the roaming mobile
node [70]. A similar way of optimizing Mobile IPv4 is deploying a hierarchy of
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foreign agents [112, 113].
Any larger Mobile IPv4 deployment needs a backend infrastructure support. A
typical infrastructure of a Mobile IPv4 deployment with an AAA backend infras-
tructure [241] is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The normal Mobile IPv4 protocol mes-
sages for the registration purposes are exchanged between the mobile node and
the foreign agent (Registration Request in a Foreign Agent Care-of Address mode (FA-
CoA RRQ) and corresponding Registration Reply (RRP) messages), and subse-
quent messages between the foreign agent and the home agent (Registration Request
(RRQ) and corresponding Registration Reply (RRP) messages). The AAA consti-
tutes of three parts. First, the network access authentication originating from the
radio access network. Second, a local (or visited) network typically has an AAA
proxy (AAAL) that in Figure 2.1 architecture intercepts AAA traffic originating
from the radio access network and the foreign agent. Third, subscriber’s home
network has an AAA server (AAAH) that handles both network access authenti-
cation and Mobile IPv4 related AAA protocol (e.g., RADIUS or Diameter) inter-
actions.
The benefits of properly deployed and designed backend are:
Easier service and subscriber provisioning,
Centralized AAA,
Bootstrapping of Mobility Security Associations (MSA) between Mobile IP
nodes, such as mobile nodes and home agents,
Dynamic assignment of mobility agents (e.g. home agents), and
Bootstrapping of Mobile IP related addressing information (dynamic assign-
ment of HoAs).
The details of bootstrapping and security are addressed in greater detail in the
forthcoming Chapter 3.
In managed networks the access is seldom free, thus some form of network access
control and authentication is applied. Access control may either be decoupled
from Mobile IP or implemented as part of the Mobile IP authentication and autho-
rization procedure [118]. Either way, there is a need for an identity that can be
used for identifying the mobile node and locating mobile node’s home network.
A Network Access Identifier (NAI) [40] as part of the network access authentica-
tion or Mobile IPv4 registration [72, 163] is widely adopted way of asserting the
mobile node’s identity.
The security, optional though, between the mobile node and the foreign agent
(MN-FA security) is realized using a MNFA authentication extension [242]. Fur-
thermore, the basic MN-FA security can be enhanced with MNFA challenge exten-
sion [246], which would add the replay protection. The MN-FA security func-
tionality requires distribution of authentication keys (shared secrets) between






















Figure 2.1: A generic Mobile IPv4 deployment with a foreign agent and an AAA backend
showing the control plane signaling paths
mobile nodes and all possible foreign agents that require MN-FA security. The
management of authentication keys develops rapidly into a huge management
burden, especially if MN-FA security is also required from roaming users. One
possible solution to the distribution of required security parameters is to use the
MNAAA authentication extension [246] and deploying the distribution infrastruc-
ture for authentication keys [245]. This deployment solution, however, requires
full AAA infrastructure between foreign agents and subscriber’s Home AAA
backend. If the foreign agent is located in a visited network this solution also
requires an AAA-based roaming settlement between operators.
The security, optional though, between the foreign agent and the home agent
(FA-HA security) is realized using a FAHA authentication extension. This requires,
similarly to MN-FA security, distribution of authentication keys (shared secrets)
between all foreign agents and all possible home agents that require FA-HA secu-
rity. The management of authentication keys develops rapidly into a huge man-
agement burden, if FA-HA security is also required from foreign agents located in
visited networks. The solution for this problem is equivalent as with the MN-FA
security and dynamic authentication key distribution.
The security between the mobile node and the home agent (MN-HA security) is
realized using the MNHA authentication extension [242]. A Security Association (SA)
is required to exist before the home agent is able to reply with a correct Mobile
IP registration reply to the mobile node. The easiest way to realize this is to have
a pre-configured SA between the mobile node and the home agent. However,
such solution have scalability, management and provisioning related issues. First,
those home agents whom any mobile node might attempt to register with, should
be provisioned and configured with the same information. This means replica-
tion of the same configuration information into multiple places. There are sev-
eral solutions to overcome both scalability, management and provisioning issues.
Probably the simples and also the recommended way is to make home agents to
query MN-HA security association related information from the AAA backend.
In this way all information is provisioned in one centralized place and available
for more than one home agent. Another possibility is to utilize the MN-AAA
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authentication extension and deploying the distribution AAA infrastructure for
authentication keys.
Finally, the optional security between the mobile node and the Home AAA-server
(MN-AAA security) is based on the MNAAA authentication extension. The mobile
node and the Home AAA-server in subscriber’s home network need to share a
SA. The SA includes an authentication key (i.e. a shared secret) that needs to be
distributed somehow among nodes using the key. The authentication key distri-
bution requirements are similar to other Mobile IPv4 authentication extensions.
Related to the key distribution in general, the communication within the AAA
infrastructure must at least be integrity protected and mutually authenticated
between nodes. Support for confidentially protection is also recommended. Pre-
established IPsec tunnels is one deployment option. However, in large inter-
operator roaming deployments the management of IPsec tunnels rapidly becomes
an issue itself.
Access network deployments where access authentication is always required prior
to allowing the IP access, the distribution and generation of required authenti-
cation keys can be made as a part of the network access authentication proce-
dure. Both 3GPP2 and Mobile WiMAX architectures make use of this kind of
approach. Required keys are dynamically generated and distributed between
Mobile IP entities upon successful access authentication.
We are not going to handle any Mobile IPv4 foreign agent or home agent relia-
bility, fail-over and recovery scenarios in this dissertation. Most technology ven-
dors have their proprietary solutions to handle these situations. After all, foreign
agents and home agents are typically IP routers with additional functionality.
Same solutions that are applicable for example for router redundancy can typi-
cally be applied.
2.4.1.2 Mobile IPv6
Mobile IPv6 [165] is IETF standardized IP Mobility protocol for IPv6 [89]. It has
been available since 2004 and has recently been included into 3GPP2 CDMA2000
mobile system and Mobile WiMAX. Mobile IPv6 is conceptually equivalent to
Mobile IPv4. However, it is not backwards compatible at the protocol level.
Furthermore, Mobile IPv6 does not have a Mobile IPv4 foreign agent functional
entity defined at all. Mobile IPv6 is supposed to correct most of the shortcom-
ings of Mobile IPv4, including the security, route optimization and anycast based
home agent discovery.
A generic Mobile IPv6 architecture showing all control place signaling and includ-
ing AAA backend is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The normal Mobile IPv6 protocol
messages for the registration purposes are exchanged between the mobile node
the home agent (Binding Update (BU) and corresponding Binding Acknowledge-
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ment (BA) messages). The AAA constitutes of two parts. First, the network
access authentication originating from the radio access network, which might
traverse through an AAA proxy (AAAL) in a local (or visited) network. Second,
subscriber’s home network has an AAA server (AAAH) that handles both net-
work access authentication and Mobile IPv6 related AAA interactions (between
the home agent and the AAAH). The AAA protocol is either RADIUS or Diame-
ter.
Mobile IPv6 introduces a number of new IPv6 extension options such as: Mobility
Header, Home Address Option and type-2 Routing Header. Mobile IPv6 also defines
new ICMPv6 message types: Home Agent Address Discovery Request & Reply and
Mobile Prefix Solicitation & Advertisement. Most of the further Mobile IPv6 exten-





















Figure 2.2: A generic Mobile IPv6 deployment with an AAA backend showing the control
plane signaling paths
All Mobile IPv6 signaling between the mobile node and the home agent must be
protected using IPsec SAs [55,90]. However, this requirement has been relaxed in
further Mobile IPv6 protocol extensions. Mandating the use of IPsec in all deploy-
ment scenarios has been considered computationally too expensive. The provi-
sioning of IPsec SAs has also turned out to be problematic in large deployments.
For these reason Mobile IPv6 may optionally use Mobile IPv4 like lightweight
Authentication Option (MN-Auth) for securing its mobility signaling traffic [237].
The use of authentication option also requires a mobile node to identify itself
using the MN-ID mobility option [236]. Furthermore, the static nature of Mobile
IPv6 configuration is not practical either. Recent work in IETF has addressed the
bootstrapping of Mobile IPv6 service and also developed required AAA func-
tions. The bootstrapping of Mobile IPv6 service including enhanced dynamic
home agent assignment is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
The basic Mobile IPv6 routing is triangular. A Correspondent Node sends pack-
ets to a home agent which then tunnels packets to mobile node’s current location.
Finally the mobile node sends packets directly to the Correspondent Node. A
Mobile IPv6 mobile node operates always in Co-CoA mode. Similarly to Mobile
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IPv4 the triangular routing has its known issues. Generally all routing related
reasoning and consequences are the same for Mobile IPv6 as they are for Mobile
IPv4. Mobile IPv6 standard defines a Route Optimization (RO) feature, which
allows mobile nodes and correspondent nodes to exchange IP packets directly
between each other bypassing the home agent after the initial connection setup
and the corresponding binding update. The Mobile IPv6 route optimization is
only possible with Mobile IPv6 aware correspondent nodes. Prior updating the
binding between the mobile node and the correspondent node, the mobile node
initiates a Return Routability Procedure (RRPRO). The purpose of the RRPRO is
to establish high enough trust between the mobile node and the correspondent
node that each peer is what they claim to be and not some hostile host trying to
initiate, for example, a redirect attack [226]. The RRPRO signaling is illustrated
in Figure 2.3. The mobile node initiates the RRPRO by sending a Home Test Init
(HoTi) and a Care-of test Init (CoTi) messages. The HoTi is sent to the correspon-
dent node via the home agent and the CoTi is sent directly to the correspondent
node. The correspondent node replies with corresponding Home Test (HoT) and
Care-of Test (CoT) messages. The numbers shown in the messages indicate the











Figure 2.3: The Mobile IPv6 Return Routability Procedure during the Route Optimization
- message exchange order included
Unfortunately, even if there has been efforts to develop route optimization fur-
ther [60, 243] it is still uncertain whether route optimization will ever be widely
deployed in managed networks. There are few obvious reason for operators to
discourage the deployment of the route optimization:
Operator loses the control (charging, lawful interception, QoS, etc) of the
IP session when the IP traffic bypasses the home agent. For this reason
mandating bi-directional tunneling between the mobile node and the home
agent will most probably be the deployment option choice of operators.
Operator loses the control for roaming mobile nodes. On inter-operator
roaming charging point of view commercial deployments with local break-
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outs have never been successful. There just is not enough trust between
operators.
Ensuring that every access network allows RRPRO messages to traverse fire-
walls is an issue, especially for inter-operator roaming cases [197].
Despite of the potential threats above, the operator still has the control over allow-
ing the route optimization in the first place. The operator who manages the home
agent can always silently discard return routability procedure HoTi messages and
thus prohibit the route optimization.
Up to date there is not much real large scale deployment experience from Mobile
IPv6. The first mobile architecture to deploy Mobile IPv6 is most probably the
3GPP2 CDMA2000 network. Their Mobile IPv6 architecture is heavily influ-
enced by their existing Mobile IPv4 architecture [35], which has generated excel-
lent feedback on architectural requirements for large scale Mobile IPv6 deploy-
ment towards IETF. Unfortunately, many features that are now being standard-
ized and solved in IETF, are already defined in proprietary manner in 3GPP2 for
their own architecture. While this is understandable from specification comple-
tion process point of view, it might have some unwanted side effects when other
Standards Development Organizations (SDO) want to deploy same technology but
based entirely on IETF standards. General issues of mobile architectures and rela-
ted mobility assisting functions are discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
Regarding the reliability, fail-over and recovery scenarios Mobile IPv6 has similar
situation as Mobile IPv4. However, there is recent work on graceful switching of
home agents [137] and generic home agent reliability protocol [294].
2.4.1.3 Dual-Stack Mobile IP
The migration process from IPv4 to IPv6 is known to be a challenging process. IP
Mobility does not make it any easier, on a contrary. There are a large number of
access networks, services, applications and especially terminals that are IPv4 only
and will remain such for many years to come. The existing IPv4 legacy should be
supported properly when migrating to IPv6, in a way or other.
Section 2.4.1.2 already noted that Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 are not compat-
ible protocols. This fact will potentially complicate the migration from IPv4 to
IPv6 deployments when IP Mobility is required. The situation is not helped any
further when it comes to the AAA backend functionality. The security frame-
work and bootstrapping are considerably different between Mobile IPv4 and
Mobile IPv6. Therefore, straight forward re-using of AAA backends would not
be possible. Operators either need to deploy two different mobility management
solutions or mandate one that somehow handles dual-stack configuration. Two
overlapping mobility solutions could be handled, somehow, on the network side.
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However, it does not make much sense if the operator does not have such require-
ment from the legacy network deployments.
One potential solution for IP-version migration with IP Mobility is the Dual-Stack
Mobile IP (DSMIP). There are two flavors of DSMIP depending on the underlying
mobility management protocol. DSMIPv4 [286] is an extension on top of Mobile
IPv4 that has the following characteristics:
Mobility Management is based on RFC 3344 Mobile IPv4, either in FA-CoA
or in Co-CoA mode.
Allows configuration of IPv6 HoA to mobile nodes along with IPv4 HoA.
Allows tunneling of IPv4 traffic over IPv6 only access network.
Allows tunneling of IPv6 traffic over IPv4 only access network.
Requires use of bi-directional tunneling between the MN and the HA when
1) MN is visiting IPv6 network and/or 2) MN uses IPv6 HoA.
DSMIPv6 is the Mobile IPv6 equivalent of DSMIPv4. DSMIPv6 has the following
characteristics:
Mobility is management based on RFC 3775 Mobile IPv6.
Allows (dynamic) configuration of IPv4-HoA to MNs along with IPv6 HoA.
Allows tunneling of IPv4 traffic over IPv6 only access network.
Allows tunneling of IPv6 traffic over IPv4 only access network.
Allows NAT traversal (and also discovery) when tunneling over IPv4 using
UDP encapsulation. The mobile node may be behind a NAT device (i.e.
typically have a private IPv4 address [255]). It is also possible that the IPv4-
HoA is a private IPv4 address.
Requires use of bi-directional tunneling between the mobile node and the
home agent when 1) mobile node is visiting IPv4 network and/or 2) mobile
node uses IPv4-HoA.
The requirement of bi-directional tunneling effectively prohibits the use of
Mobile IPv6 route optimization.
Integrates nicely with the existing work in Mobile IPv6 split scenario boot-
strapping [117].
Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal [199] was implemented using UDP encapsulation and
the DSMIPv6 adopts similar solution. NAT traversal has additional side effect;
firewall traversal. It is typical in managed public access networks that tunneled
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traffic other than IPsec ESP [174] (which typically also get encapsulated inside
UDP if NATs were detected during IKEv1 [140] or IKEv2 [171] negotiation) are
silently discarded. Because firewalls can easily create a statefull rule based on
UDP or ESP encapsulation, those traffic types are allowed to traverse firewalls.
This feature has led to unfortunate but useful abuse of NAT traversal. Operators
tend to force NAT traversal on all the time even if there is no NATs detected
between the mobile node and the home agent.
DSMIPv6 uses normal RFC 3948 [148] ESP UDP encapsulation on port 4500 for
the user plane traffic protection when the mobile node is behind a NAT. This solu-
tion has side effects during the handover. The binding update procedure cannot
update all required IKE and IPsec security association information for the user
plane traffic (e.g., the NATed port number) until the mobile node sends protected
user plane traffic towards the home agent or explicitly sends IKE messages to the
port 4500. In a meanwhile it is highly probable that downstream user plane traffic
does not reach the mobile node. However, this peculiar NAT issue affects only
protected user plane traffic. The protection of the user place traffic is optional and
a subject to operator’s policy.
From an operator point of view the choice of DSMIP flavor depends mostly on
the existing architecture and deployed infrastructure. If the operator already has
deployed Mobile IPv4 and has a large customer base using Mobile IPv4 technol-
ogy then DSMIPv4 may be the natural choice. When IPv6 access network deploy-
ments become more common the additional tunneling overhead of using Mobile
IPv4 over IPv6 tunnel creates a problem. Operators that do not have existing
Mobile IP deployments might find it rational to go directly to Mobile IPv6 and
handle the transition phase using DSMIPv6. Mobile network architectures such
as 3GPP Release-8 does not have the burden of legacy Mobile IP architecture.
This offers operators a good opportunity to entirely skip the Mobile IPv4 based
mobility management and directly go for Mobile IPv6 based mobility manage-
ment solution.
The value of DSMIP as a tool for IP version migration should not be underesti-
mated when compared to other migration tools that do not require IP Mobility
infrastructure. DSMIPv6 has already been chosen by 3GPP for its Release-8 archi-
tecture and Mobile WiMAX R1.5 is also likely to adopt it. However, there are
also other ways of solving the IP version migration in the access networks. An
IKEv2 IPsec solution is described in more detail in Section 2.4.3. Other possibili-
ties include re-using various existing IP transition tunneling mechanisms such as
Teredo [147], ISATAP [280] or 6to4 [75].
2.4.2 Hierarchical and Fast Mobile IP
Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [76,268] refers to a Mobile IPv6 protocol enhan-
cement that allows a use of hierarchy of home agents. The basic principle of
HMIPv6 is to allow mobile nodes to register with a local home agent within the
access network, if such exists. Mobile node still should register to their home
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network home agent at least when the mobility session begins.
The home network home agent may be located far away from the visited access
network, thus round-trip time might become an issue for all traffic that needs
traverse via the home agent. Another issue might be the inter-operator traffic that
can be much more expensive for operators and especially for users. Furthermore,
local mobility agents allow local breakout for IP traffic when mobile nodes use
locally configured IP addresses.
The local home agent, called a Mobility Anchor Point (MAP), is responsible for an
administrative area called a MAP-Domain. A MAP-Domain can span over multi-
ple IP subnetworks. The first hop access routers located within the MAP-Domain
advertise the IP address and the prefixes of MAPs in their Router Advertisements
(RA). As long as the mobile node stays within the same MAP-Domain it can do
all binding updates only with the MAP responsible for the said MAP-Domain.
The mobile node needs to update its binding with the home network home agent
only when the MAP changes. The change of MAP is usually a result of roaming
to a different MAP-Domain. Alternatively the mobile node can skip the binding
updates with the home network home agent if it wishes to communicate using
the IP address configured locally within the MAP-Domain. In this case the move-
ment within the MAP-Domain is not visible to correspondent nodes.
The HMIPv6 concept is initially slightly confusing due to the use of to different
CoAs. Figure 2.4 illustrates an example HMIPv6 architecture. The mobile node
uses two different CoAs. The Local CoA (LCoA) is the address configured on
the local access link. The mobile node registers its LCoA with the MAP using
the Remote CoA (RCoA) as its HoA, thus creating a binding between the RCoA
and the LCoA. The RCoA does not change as long as the mobile node roams
under the same MAP. The mobile node may then also register the RCoA with
its home network home agent, thus creating a binding between the RCoA and
mobile node’s real HoA. The MAP is then able to tunnel packets destined to the
RCoA to the correct LCoA. If the mobile node does not support HMIPv6 then the
mobile node always registers the LCoA with the home network home agent as
usually. HMIPv6 is fully backwards compatible with Mobile IPv6.
Mobile IPv4 also has similar hierarchical deployment possibility, which is based
on a hierarchy of a foreign agents [112, 113]. Like in case of HMIPv6 the Mobile
IPv4 mobile node must be aware of the hierarchical deployment in order to ben-
efit from it.
Even if hierarchical mobility agent architecture sounds practical for an operator
deployment, few outstanding issues have hindered its large scale adoption:
Security between mobile nodes and MAPs. There is no good and scalable
way of distributing required security association information between all
mobile nodes and MAPs, especially in inter-operator roaming cases.
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Figure 2.4: Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 Architecture
Both proposed hierarchical mobility solutions require modifications to mobile
nodes.
Both proposed hierarchical mobility solutions require modifications to all
access networks and especially to all access routers.
Some of the above issues are being addressed recently for example in IETF. These
include the dynamic bootstrapping of security associations [90, 235] and security
in general [267].
Figure 2.5 illustrates the basic architecture of Fast Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) proto-
col [33,182,311]. There is also a Mobile IPv4 equivalent protocol based on the use
of foreign agents [183, 201]. The basic idea of FMIPv6 is to allow mobile nodes
to learn and configure the new CoA on the target New Access Router (NAR) link
prior the handover. At the same time the Previous Access Router (PAR) can also
temporarily tunnel packets to the new access router for proactive buffering. Tem-
porary tunneling, buffering and delivery of buffered packets to the mobile node
aims to reduce the packet loss during the handover. The PAR and NAR may
exchange handover related information between each other using the Handover
Initiate (HI) and Handover Acknowledge (HAck) messages. FMIPv6 is fully back-
wards compatible with Mobile IPv6. If either the mobile node or the access net-
work do not support FMIPv6 functionality, they automatically fall back to basic
Mobile IPv6 procedures.
FMIPv6 handover preparation and movement detection is enhanced with prox-
ied router solicitations (RtSolPr) and proxied router advertisements (PrRtAdv). This
proxied movement detection allows the mobile node communicate indirectly with
the new access router while still attached to the exiting (previous) access router.
The mobile node may have discovered the presence of the new access router for
example through layer-2 scanning. It is also possible for network to initiate unso-
licited proxied router advertisements in order to tell the mobile node to perform a














Figure 2.5: Fast Mobile IPv6 Architecture
handover. FMIPv6 proxied router solicitations and advertisements like the whole
FMIPv6 protocol is link technology agnostic, including the used link model.
FMIPv6 supports both predictive and reactive handovers. In the predictive mode
the mobile node manages to complete the FMIPv6 signaling before performing
the link layer handover. More precisely the mobile node sends a Fast Binding
Update (FBU) and waits until it receives a Fast Binding Acknowledgement (FBack).
When attaching to a new link the mobile node just informs the new access router
by sending a Fast Neighbor Advertisement (FNA), skips the rest of the address con-
figuration, and continues immediately sending and receiving packets. In the reac-
tive mode the mobile node performs the link layer handover immediately after
the proxied movement detection. In that case the mobile node encapsulates a
FBU inside a FNA when attaching to a new link and access router.
FMIPv6 optimizations aim to reduce address configuration delay and packet loss
during the handover between two access routers. These optimizations are essen-
tial for example with real-time traffic such as VoIP. FMIPv6 as such requires a
number of security associations between different entities that from a large scale
deployment point of view is a concern. All signaling messages are either authen-
ticated using the authentication header [175], encapsulated in IPsec or using Secure
Neighbor Discovery (SeND) [59]. FMIPv6 specification and protocol does not add-
ress the required distribution and management of required key material for secu-
rity associations. The security management part of FMIPv6, or actually the lack
of it can be seen as the biggest drawback of the whole protocol. In operator net-
work deployments such security related issues must be solved before operators
even think of deploying new technology. IETF has initiated new work around
FMIPv6 in order to solve the required key distribution issues.
2.4.3 Mobile Internet Key Exchange
Mobile Internet Key Exchange (MOBIKE) [102,177] is a backward compatible exten-
sion to IKEv2 [171]. MOBIKE allows peers to update IP addresses of both IPsec
and IKE SAs. The update is possible without the re-establishment of all SAs.
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The update of the new outer IP addresses is protected using the existing IKE
SA. MOBIKE supports only tunnel mode IPsecs. The overall mobility support in
MOBIKE is rather primitive. The original intention was not to create yet another
full fledged IP Mobility protocol. For example, double-jump case is not guaran-
teed to work as there is no ’rendezvous point’ functionality specified for MOBIKE.
The basic scenario for MOBIKE is that at least one of the peers is assumed to be
stationary. However, this is only an assumption. During the handover the IKE SA
is updated with new tunnel outer IP addresses. Other protocols bound to tunnel
internal IP addresses are unaware of the outer IP addresses update and may only
experience some delay in communication during the handover.
MOBIKE is well suited for multihoming scenarios where, for example, the gate-
way needs to change its active interface for some reason. Another use for MOBIKE
is simple mobility, where a single solution provides both security and mobility
solutions. Another excellent feature of MOBIKE (and any IKEv2 IPsec) is that
the IP address versions may be different inside and outside the tunnel. The Tun-
nel outer Address (ToA) may be IPv6 whereas the Tunnel internal Address (TiA) is
IPv4. Furthermore, MOBIKE makes changing the tunnel outer IP address version
dynamically possible, which effectively solves access network IP version migra-
tion. 3GPP Interworking WLAN [1, 2, 4, 10, 169] (optionally) uses IKEv2 IPsec for
its WLAN 3GPP IP Access. For 3GPP Interworking WLAN the deployment of
MOBIKE would be an incremental software upgrade on both Packet Data Gateway
(PDG) and WLAN User Equipment (UE). MOBIKE could also be used for mobility
within the non-3GPP accesses. However, that solution would not solve handover
between 3GPP access and non-3GPP access as 3GPP I-WLAN does not support
inter-access handovers as of Release-7.
The mobile operator community has expressed rather significant interest towards
any IKEv2-based technology. There are few obvious reasons. First, IKEv2 is well
standardized without immediate interoperability challenges and also including
all essential deployment critical issues such as NAT-Traversal in the base proto-
col. Second, IKEv2 (as well as MOBIKE) allow EAP-based Initiator authentica-
tion. The mobile operator community that already distribute multi-radio mobile
devices equipped with an Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) [23] may take
advantage of EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA based Initiator (i.e. the device equipped
with a UICC) authentication. Being able to reuse mobile operators’ existing sub-
scriber management and authentication backends on non-3GPP accesses is of
great importance for operators. Third, IKEv2-based IPsec VPNs in general allow
extending established mobile operator business models to any IP-access. Fourth,
3GPP Interworking WLAN specifications have defined a good basis for interop-
erable system implementations.
2.4.4 Mobile IP and IPsec VPN Hybrids
One of the real use cases for Mobile IP has long been providing stable IP address
for Virtual Private Networks (VPN). IPsec VPNs do not typically survive the change
of the Tunnel outer IP Address (ToA). If the IPsec VPN uses the Mobile IP HoA
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as the ToA, then the ToA remains stable when the mobile node roams. There
are deployment scenarios where it is desirable to place the home agent within,
for example, the enterprise intranet. The mobile node can reach the home agent
without an IPsec VPN only inside the enterprise intranet. Networks other than
the enterprise intranet are considered insecure, thus require the IPsec VPN for the
access. Eventually, a deployment like this would benefit from a handover capa-
bility between networks with different security properties. The problem of roam-
ing between networks with different security properties has been studied [46].
The proposed solution [288] requires a deployment of two home agents, a VPN
gateway and has extensive tunneling overhead.
Using MOBIKE instead of IKEv1 IPsec VPN with Mobile IP could be a viable
solution to realize handovers between access networks of different security prop-
erties [91,119]. One example is a handover between 3GPP accesses and non-3GPP
accesses. The 3GPP access is generally considered as the secure access and the
non-3GPP is considered as the un-secure access. This kind of scenario is here-
after referred as the handover between trusted (3GPP access) and un-trusted (non-
3GPP) accesses. There could be, though, trusted non-3GPP accesses as well. Com-
bined MOBIKE and Mobile IP solution may still have double tunneling overhead
when both MOBIKE and Mobile IP get used simultaneously.
Figure 2.6 illustrates a simplified architecture combining Mobile IP and MOBIKE
for a common mobility solution for 3GPP I-WLAN. In an operator deployment
the basic idea of the solution is to use Mobile IP for the handover between the
trusted access (such as 3GPP GPRS) and the un-trusted access (such as WLAN).
The access from the un-trusted network must always go through MOBIKE gate-
way. The home agent is only accessible through the IPsec VPN or from the trusted
network. Mobility within the un-trusted network is handled using MOBIKE.
When accessing network through the IPsec Mobile IP uses IPsec tunnel inter-
nal address as its CoA. If the MOBIKE gateway has also Mobile IPv4 foreign
agent functionality then Mobile IPv4 client may also use FA-CoA mode and save
on tunneling overhead (20 to 32 bytes depending on the negotiated Mobile IPv4
tunneling option). Further tunneling overhead saving is possible with simple
deployment options. The trusted access network can be configured as the home
link for mobile nodes from the home agent point of view. In this case the mobile
node de-registers with the home agent when it is using the trusted network and
thus no tunneling is required. The combined Mobile IP and MOBIKE solution
described above has been selected as CDMA2000 3GPP2 WLAN interworking
solution [36].
One of the challenges with combined Mobile IP and MOBIKE relate to the detec-
tion of the border of trusted and un-trusted networks. One possible solution is
to verify the reachability of the home agent by trying to register directly bypass-
ing the IPsec. This is not a an optimal solution but works. There might also be
security implications. Bypassing the IPsec reveals the subscriber identity and the
enterprise internal home agent address when visiting the un-trusted network. In
general finding the current context of functioning by trying until some timer or
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Figure 2.6: Mobile IPv4 and MOBIKE hybrid deployment
counter expires is bad protocol design.
Section 2.9 describes a 3GPP I-WLAN deployment model where the IPsec VPN
gateway (i.e. the PDG) and the GGSN are connected through a GTP tunnel [13].
This is the Tunnel Terminating Gateway mode (TTG), where the PDG and the GGSN
are tightly coordinated. If the IP address allocation and PDP context [5] creations
are coordinated between the GGSN and the PDG then it is also technically possi-
ble to make the network offered via IPsec VPN also a home network to a mobile
node. This kind of an arrangement would allow avoiding MIP tunneling over-
head and foreign agents on both trusted and un-trusted networks. Unfortunately
there is no way to implement I-WLAN and GPRS handover without impacting
the terminal implementation.
2.4.5 Host Identity Protocol
Above the network-level, we have various requirements for mobility in the trans-
port and application layers. Transport-level mobility support needs to cope with
changing subnets and prevent, for example, socket errors during mobility. Host
Identity Protocol [228](HIP) [216] is located between the network and transport
layers and provides this kind of functionality by associating each socket to a pub-
lic cryptographic key instead of an IP address. The fundamental idea behind HIP
is to separate the address of a network-addressable node to two parts: the identity
and locator parts. The identity part uniquely identifies the host using a crypto-
graphic namespace, and the locator part uniquely defines the location of the node.
The former part is assumed to be a long-living identifier. The latter is typically
the IP address of the mobile node. Additional benefits of HIP are authentication
and support for Denial of Service (DoS) attacks through cryptographic puzzles in
the initiation phase of the protocol.
Multihoming and mobility extensions are being developed to HIP. For the full
mobility generally some network support is required in form of a stationary ren-
dezvous or anchor point, which is used to assist in locating the mobile node. Fur-
thermore, a stationary network side rendezvous point is also needed to support
double-jump situations, where both communicating ends are mobile.
HIP has some deployment issues in operator networks and even in Internet.
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These issues relate mostly to the fact that HIP as a protocol is young and may
require modifications to middle boxes such as NAT devices and firewalls [310].
However, the built-in security properties of HIP, its support for mobility and mul-
tihoming make it very appealing as a candidate for future networking solutions.
Also HIP is IP version agnostic, which would solve one of the pressing issues for
near future operator access network and services deployments [166, 309].
2.5 Network-controlled Mobility
Network controlled mobility has been a recent topic in IP Mobility protocol stan-
dardization and mobile network architecture development. Traditionally IP Mobil-
ity solutions have been host controlled, where mobile nodes are required to have
an active role in the mobility signaling and handover decision making. Interest-
ingly, the most widely deployed IP Mobility solution today, GPRS and its GTP-
protocol, is completely network controlled.
The main motivation is to reduce traffic over the air link that can be achieved in
the following methods:
No explicit IP Mobility management signaling is needed over the airlink.
All signaling can be done by network side nodes.
There is no additional tunneling overhead over the airlink. Depending on
the traffic type the IP Mobility related tunneling overhead could be substan-
tial so any means to reduce the overhead is important.
Another motivation is to simplify the terminal IP stack and system software imple-
mentation. Following items are immediate benefits:
Mobility support for unmodified terminals. It is typical that each Standards
Development Organization who adopts some radio technology also poses
requirements for a general terminal functionality. In the case of multi-mode
terminals it looks inevitable that there would be conflicting IP Mobility rela-
ted terminal requirements from different standards bodies. If the mobility
is completely handled on the network side then the network treats every
terminal in the same way.
IP version migration might be easier to solve entirely on the access network
side. The terminal does not need to pay attention to the IP migration, rather
it just uses the IP version available in the access network and requested by
applications. Assuming the network-controlled mobility solution and the
access network support for dual-stack terminals, IP migration should be
possible to implement transparently to a terminal.
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Local mobility management is often mentioned in the context of the network-
controlled mobility. Although these subjects are closely related they are not com-
pletely overlapping. Local mobility management may well be implemented with
host controlled mobility solutions as well. For example in Section 2.4.2 we descri-
bed HMIPv6, which is also considered as a local mobility management solution.
However, both local mobility management [172, 173, 292] and network control
may be combined to a localized network controlled mobility management. This
combination basically narrows the network controlled mobility solution into a
local well-defined administrative domain. It is not really obvious when local
mobility changes to global mobility. For some deployments the size of a local
mobility management domain is one office building, where as for some deploy-
ments the size may be a whole country. These are, after all, deployment and
architecture specific issues.
In this dissertation we do not make difference between the global and the local
mobility management unless it is clear that the protocol under discussion can be
unequivocally categorized. Typically they cannot be. The assumption is that the
local mobility management applies only within a clearly defined administrative
domain. Immediately when the border of administrative domains, for example
inter-operator roaming interface, gets crossed the mobility management trans-
forms from a local to global. The same ambiguity applies also to the network
controlled mobility management. It is not entirely clear when a mobility solution
is entirely network controlled. If terminal participation is required to complete
the handover at the IP level, we define that the mobility management solution is
terminal assisted. Otherwise, we define that the mobility management solution
is network controlled.
2.5.1 Proxy Mobile IP
Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) [135,198,296] is a network controlled IP Mobility manage-
ment protocol that re-uses either Mobile IPv4 or Mobile IPv6 signaling protocol.
Proxy Mobile IP has become one of the most important IP Mobility protocols
of recent years. It has been adopted by all next generation wireless architec-
tures including Mobile WiMAX [300], 3GPP Release-8 [27] and 3GPP2 enhance-
ments [33]. The original intention has been gaining terminal operability without
explicit operating system support, for IP Mobility.
A Mobile IP home agent serves as a stationary anchor point for mobile nodes.
Typically the first hop access router in the access network represents the mobile
node to the anchor node. In Proxy Mobile IPv6 the stationary anchor node is
called local mobility anchor (LMA), which is also the first hop IP level access router
to the mobile node. The representative for a mobile node is called proxy mobile
agent (PMA), which is co-located with the first hop access gateway (access point).
The first hop access gateway is called mobile access gateway (MAG). From now on
we do not make explicit distinction between the PMA and the MAG.
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2.5.1.1 Generic Proxy Mobile IPv6 Architecture and Solution Overview
Figure 2.7 illustrates a generic Proxy Mobile IPv6 architecture [135] that includes
components needed in a managed network deployment. The same architecture
figure also applies to Proxy Mobile IPv4 [198, 300, 301] with an addition of a for-
eign agent functionality in the ”proxy mobile agent”. Even if Figure 2.7 illustrates
only one AAA node, there are typically a hierarchy of AAA nodes in real deploy-
ments. For example, the access network may have its local AAA (AAAL), another
AAA for inbound roaming users and a home realm backend home AAA (AAAH).
AAA nodes do not only serve for the access authentication, authorization and
accounting purpose. They also have an important role in IP Mobility related
cryptographic key material distribution and the bootstrapping of Proxy Mobile
IP. The bootstrapping includes procedures such as the discovery of a local mobil-






























Figure 2.7: A simplified Proxy Mobile IPv6 initial attachment to the network
Conceptually both Proxy Mobile IPv6 and IPv4 are very close to each other. Major
differences relate to the setup of security associations and Home Network Pre-
fix (HNP) management. Proxy Mobile IPv6 uses one security association for
all mobile nodes between a mobile access gateway and a local mobility anchor
pair, whereas Proxy Mobile IPv4 does a separate security association for each
mobile node. Proxy Mobile IPv6 assigns a complete ::/64 prefix to a mobile node,
whereas Proxy Mobile IPv4 assigns a single HoA to a mobile node.
Much of the Proxy Mobile IP functionality relies on access routers that also include
NAS and DHCP Proxy/Relay functionality. Optionally the access router may also
include foreign agent functionality, and depending on the access network authen-
tication and cryptographic key management details also the local key holder
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function [66, 300]. The mobile node needs to perform network access authen-
tication before acquiring an IP address. Deployments without explicit access
authentication are technically possible, for example by implicitly authenticating
the mobile node using its link layer interface identifier. However, Proxy Mobile IP
deployments without strong access authentication are not realistic in commercial
operator networks, where functions such as proper charging and inter-operator
roaming are highly valued.
In this dissertation we will use EAP [41] as an example protocol for the network
access authentication. However, depending on the access technology there could
be other protocols and solutions. We do not specify any EAP lower layer that is
used between the EAP supplicant (i.e. the mobile node) and the EAP authentica-
tor (i.e. the NAS/MAG). Another assumption is that the EAP can be carried over
some AAA protocol such as RADIUS [42,257] or Diameter [71,103] when needed.
Below we describe Proxy Mobile IPv6 procedures in detail. As stated earlier there
is no real deployment or widely available implementation experience of Proxy
Mobile IP as of today. Therefore, we think it is beneficial to go through each
planned step of the protocol and architecture. The numbered steps match to the
numbered sequences in Figure 2.7. The example below assume prefix per mobile
link model and does not address IPv4 configuration extensions of the protocol.
1. The mobile node attaches to the access network at Layer-2 and either the
network or the terminal initiates the access authentication. This could, for
example, be an EAP exchange over some access technology specific EAP
lower layer (such as IEEE 802.1X [151], IEEE 802.16 PMKv2 [152] or even
IKEv2 IPsec [171]). The mobile node needs to provide its identity at this
point for authentication purposes. The identity could be in form of a Net-
work Access Identifier (NAI). In a case of an identity hiding the mobile node
must at least provide its home realm information. The NAS/Authenticator
has to know where to forward the authentication traffic (e.g., based on the
NAI realm).
If the authentication was successful the AAAH returns various Proxy Mobile
IP bootstrapping parameters, temporary mobile node identity and other
subscription profile information to the mobile access gateway. This infor-
mation should include the assigned local mobility agent IP address, assig-
ned mobile node’s home link prefix and assigned DHCPv6 [98] server IP
address. Also, the required cryptographic key material gets distributed
at this time for further key derivation and distribution. After a successful
authentication the mobile access gateway establishes a state for the mobile
node.
2. The mobile access gateway sends a Proxy Binding Update (PBU) towards
the local mobility anchor. The CoA is the mobile access gateway egress
interface IP address. The binding update is done against mobile node’s
home link prefix, not the configured IPv6 address. If the mobile access gate-
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way received mobile node’s home link prefix during the step 1) then that is
included in the PBU. Otherwise an unspecified home link prefix is included
in the PBU and the local mobility anchor has to assign the home link prefix
to the mobile node. The mobile access gateway should also include mobile
node identity option (the MN-ID option) [236]. The PBU may also contain
other information such as mobile node’s layer-2 interface identifier, mobile
node’s link-local address, access technology type and the type of the han-
dover.
The mobile access gateway and the local mobility anchor need to share
a security association with each other. The security association could be
based on IPsec SA [140] or even the MN-HA authentication protocol [237].
The security association may be pre-configured or set up dynamically using,
for example, IKEv2.
3. The local mobility anchor receives the PBU from the mobile access gate-
way. The local mobility anchor needs to interact with the AAAH in order
to coordinate the mobile node home link prefix allocation and to authorize
the mobile node. If everything succeeds the local mobility anchor creates a
binding (cache entry) and establishes a session for the mobile node.
4. The local mobility anchor sends back a Proxy Binding Acknowledgement (PBA)
to the mobile access gateway with the assigned mobile node home link pre-
fix. After receiving the PBA, the proxy mobile agent in the mobile access
gateway also creates the corresponding binding (cache entry) and estab-
lishes a session for the mobile node.
5. Upon receiving the PBU a bi-directional tunnel between the mobile access
gateway and the local mobility anchor is set up.
6. The mobile node may start soliciting for access routers using router solic-
itation (RS) [224]. Alternatively the mobile node may just wait for router
advertisements (RA) [224] from the mobile access gateway.
The details of this step depend on the selected address configuration and
management mechanisms. For IPv6 and specifically for Proxy Mobile IPv6
there are several possibilities: as part of the PPP [84, 266] and/or state-
less address configuration [283] or statefull address configuration using
DHCPv6 [98]. Furthermore, the home link prefix allocation may be coor-
dinated by the AAAH, the local mobility anchor or relayed to the exter-
nal DHCP server. The secure neighbor discovery (SeND) [54, 59] may be sup-
ported on the access link.
7. The mobile access gateway sends a RA back to the mobile node. The RA
contains the address configuration mode based on the operator policy. If
stateless address configuration is supported then the home link prefix assig-
ned to the mobile node is included in the RA.
8. This step is optional and only needed if statefull address configuration is
mandated by the mobile access gateway. Upon receiving the DHCP request
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the mobile access gateway, in a DHCP relay role, sets the link-address field
in the DHCP message to the address of the mobile node’s HNP. This pro-
vides a prefix hint to the DHCP server for the address pool selection. The
DHCP server on receiving the request from the mobile node, will allocate an
address from the prefix pool present in the link-address field of the request.
It is also possible to DHCP to carry other configuration information to the
mobile node during this step.
9. The mobile access gateway completes the IP address configuration with the
mobile node. The mobile node can also generate its interface identifiers
bearing in mind the relevant privacy extension [223] or based on Crypto-
graphically Generated Addresses (CGA) [62]. Finally the mobile node is ready
to send and receive IP traffic.
Figure 2.8 illustrates a simple handover case using Proxy Mobile IPv6. The actual
signaling procedures are almost equal to the initial attachment signaling shown
in Figure 2.7. When the mobile node detaches from an access link managed by
a mobile access gateway, the mobile access gateway send a PBU with a lifetime
set to zero in order to deregister the mobile node with the local mobility anchor.
Once the mobile node attaches to a link managed by a new mobile access gateway,
the new mobile access gateway sends a PBU to register the mobile node with the
local mobility anchor. Upon receiving the PBU the local mobility anchor updates
its tunnel to point at the new mobile access gateway and sends a PBA with a
relevant IP addressing information back to the mobile access gateway. Using
the received addressing information the mobile access gateway is able emulate
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Figure 2.8: A simplified Proxy Mobile IPv6 handover signaling
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2.5.1.2 Benefits of Re-using Mobile IP
The often used arguments to drive Proxy Mobile IP into wireless networking
architectures are the reuse of home agents, reuse of existing stable protocol and
synergies between different IP driven access technologies already using Mobile
IP for their macro mobility. This is partially true. Mobile IP is considered as
a mature protocol. However, the only major licensed wireless architecture that
has deployed Mobile IP is the 3GPP2 CDMA system, which uses host controlled
Mobile IPv4 for its inter-PDSN handovers.
Mobile WiMAX architecture bases all its layer-3 IP Mobility on Mobile IP. Mobile
WiMAX actually defines how to deploy host controlled Mobile IPv4, host con-
trolled Mobile IPv6 and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for their R1 architecture. Starting
from the R1.5, Mobile WiMAX wish to include Proxy Mobile IPv6. There could
be major synergies foreseen if, for example, 3GPP wants to use Mobile WiMAX1
as one of its non-3GPP accesses and realize the interworking function directly at
Mobile IP level. Abstracting different access technologies and enabling seamless
roaming between them at the IP level is definitely a good goal. Whether that jus-
tifies all the effort put into the development is not entirely clear, at least not from
an 3GPP operator point of view with an existing 3G network deployment.
Mobile IP as an operator deployment includes more than just the mobility proto-
col. The importance of the AAA backend and other access network level details
are much more than the basic Mobile IP protocol. Furthermore, requirement for
backwards compatibility and plausible IP version migration path will be chal-
lenging with Mobile IP. As discussed earlier there are different, yet incompatible,
Mobile IP protocols for IPv4 and IPv6.
2.5.1.3 Known Issues
Following list presents and discusses some of the identified issues with Proxy
Mobile IP. Most of them were solved eventually after a good analysis, and a
proper protocol and architecture design. These issues we solely a byproduct of
trying to deploy Proxy Mobile IP as a part of mobile network architecture.
High cost of deploying access network. Each access router is statefull and
needs to implement Proxy Mobile IP support. If a mobile node roams to
an access network that does not have Proxy Mobile IP support, IP session
continuity cannot be guaranteed.
DHCP proxy/relay implementations in access routers must be Proxy Mobile
IP aware, at least for IPv4 addresses.
1ITU has adopted OFDMA TDD WiMAX as official radio interface to IMT-2000
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When a mobile node configures its IPv4 settings using DHCP it also learns
the IP address of the DHCP server [96]. Upon the renewal of the DHCP
lease the mobile node sends messages directly to the DHCP server. This
might be an issue if the mobile node roamed to another administrative
domain. The DHCP server address may have changed due to the handover.
Thus mobile node’s DHCP requests may never reach the DHCP server that
is in the previous administrative domain. The result is a DHCP renewal
timeout and temporary loss of IP address connectivity. Depending on the
mobile node DHCP client implementation the break in connectivity can be
as long as 30 seconds [184].
Horizontal handovers may not trigger a DHCP lease renewal. From the
mobile node point of view there may not be a need to renew the IPv4
address after a layer-2 handover. The lack of DHCP activity may prohibit
the mobile access gateway to update the binding to the local mobility anchor
(assuming that the DHCPv4 is the used address configuration approach).
Again the mobile node experiences a loss of IP connectivity. One worka-
round for the latter issue is documented in [43]. For the first issue it could
be possible to configure all DHCPv4 servers with the same IP address. Or
then just rely on the network side FORCERENEW functionality every time
a mobile node attaches to a link [284].
Depending on the selected link model there may be substantial multilink
subnet issues [282] that need to be taken into consideration. Currently only
point-to-point links are considered for the link model, mainly to align with
the knowledge from 3GPP GTP-based mobility [298].
The management and distribution of security associations between mobile
access gateways and local mobility anchors is not trivial and poses a scal-
ability problem. The management of security associations is especially of
concern when Proxy Mobile IP entities are located in different administra-
tive domains (i.e. in different operator networks). For the similar reasons
some IP-based roaming systems have adopted proxying or hubbing mod-
els [132]. Unfortunately, the proxying and hubbing model does not help if
all security associations must be end to end and no intermediating hop by
hop security model is allowed.
Handovers are not necessarily any faster than with host controlled Mobile
IP solutions. Especially in inter-operator roaming cases authentication may
be a significant delay factor if the authentication traffic needs to be exchan-
ged with the home network AAA backend. Also if the mobility manage-
ment is solely triggered by the mobile node initiating address configuration
there might be considerable outages in IP connectivity when the mobile
node roams to a new access link. The IP and transport layers typically learn
the link change considerably later than the link layer unless there are some
cross-layer indications in place [39,78]. Finally, cross administrative domain
communication has known challenges.
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Vertical handovers are not supposed to work with Proxy Mobile IP with-
out adding new requirements to the mobile node IP stack implementation.
Proxy Mobile IP assumes that the assigned IP address remains the same
for one interface. Vertical handovers, however, would require capability in
the mobile node to switch between interfaces and still maintain the same
IP address. In general such functionality requires another abstraction layer
in the IP stack, which then would not make Proxy Mobile IP any different
from host controlled IP Mobility solution. It should be noted that it is tech-
nically possible to have both host and network based IP Mobility solution
enabled at the same time in a mobile node and in a network. Such mixed
solutions could be used to solve vertical handovers.
Handling of security parameter indexes (SPI) when performing handover bet-
ween administrative domains. This is an issue if SPIs are dynamically gen-
erated upon initial entry to the network. Basically this issue again requires
context transfer functionality between mobile access gateways, which in
multi-operator environment might not be trivial to arrange due to mobile
access gateways belonging to different administrative domains. Another
possibility is just to recalculate SPIs but that might again be a new delay
factor during the handover.
Handling of subscriber identities. As mentioned earlier Proxy Mobile IP
functionality is heavily coupled with the network access authentication.
Reducing the amount of subscriber identities for different purposes makes
sense. Current mobile systems, such as GPRS, are already overloaded with
a number of subscriber identities [7]. The same identity should be reused,
for example, for access authentication and Mobile IP registration. However,
some network access authentication methods (e.g. popular EAP-SIM/AKA
[58, 141]) change identities periodically, which in turn might cause issues if
the other applications (e.g. Mobile IP) using the same identity with different
lifetime. The end result would be synchronization issues between current
and cached identities. Another issue relate to identity privacy of authenti-
cation methods such as EAP-SIM/AKA. Intermediating nodes have no way
of learning the mobile node’s identity from the authentication traffic. In this
case the mobile access gateway has no way to associate any identity to sub-
sequent mobility signaling. In order to circumvent this issue the backend
AAA has to return a temporary identity representing the mobile node to
the mobile access gateway.
Proxy Mobile IPv6 solution is intended to solve access network side IP ver-
sion migration using DSMIPv6. In the case of overlapping private IPv4
HoAs additional information is needed to separate flows in the local mobil-
ity anchor. On possible approach is to use GRE tunneling [108] and its
GRE keys to allow further separation of tunneled private addressed IPv4
flows [219].
Address collision of link-local addressed with Proxy Mobile IPv6. If the
IPv6 mobile node is DNA [78, 220] capable there is a slight probability that
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the link local address of the mobile node and the mobile access gateway
collide as the mobile node may skip Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [224]
due DNA optimizations. Either all the mobile access gateways within one
local mobility domain share the same link local address or then the Proxy
Mobile IPv6 signaling need to carry the mobile access gateway link local
address information as part of the binding update signaling.
Most of the issues listed above have been solved. However, it should be kept in
mind that it took almost 10 years for the basic Mobile IP to reach the maturity
level it has today. Expecting Proxy Mobile IP to reach the same maturity level
immediately is not realistic.
2.5.2 GPRS Tunneling Protocol
The GPRS packet switched (PS) handover, or actually inter-SGSN Routing Area
(RAGPRS) and Location Area (LA) updates [5] can also be used for handovers bet-
ween different access technologies. This, however, requires that the other non-
3GPP access technologies appear as GPRS core nodes to the rest of the real GPRS
network and also use GTP for their user plane and control plane.
3GPP Interworking WLAN PDG is a GGSN-like node for non-3GPP accesses.
Initially the specifications tried to mandate WLAN as the only allowed access
technology. However, the WLAN 3GPP IP Access [2], which requires the use of
PDG and IPsec does not depend on the used underlying IP access technology. A
PDG is an IKEv2 capable IPsec gateway with 3GPP defined interfaces.
Figure 2.9 illustrates a possible architecture and implementation of network con-
trolled mobility between the 3GPP and non-3GPP accesses using GTP tunnel-
ing [20]. The key element of this solution is the PDG, which is operated in tunnel
terminating gateway (TTG ) mode. The PDG becomes an anchor for mobility, even
for 3GPP accesses. When a mobile node is using a 3GPP access the normal GPRS
procedures are executed during the PDP-Context setup. The PDG terminates the
GTP tunnel (Gn interface) from the SGSN and acts as a proxy-GGSN proxying
the GTP tunnel to the real GGSN.
GTP (Gn)
GTP (Gn)
        Not used








Figure 2.9: 3GPP I-WLAN in TTG mode – PDG and GGSN connected via a GTP tunnel
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In the case of non-3GPP accesses the IKEv2 IPsec tunnel is setup between the
mobile node and the PDG. In this case the PDG acts as a SGSN to a real GGSN.
A handover between the 3GPP access and non-3GPP access looks like an inter-
SGSN handover. During the handover similar procedures can be used that has
been specified for inter-SGSN handover. These procedures include all context
transfer and user plane data forwarding to ensure seamless handover.
The same IP address can be maintained on both 3GPP and non-3GPP accesses.
For 3GPP accesses the end user IP address is the normal PDP-Context IP address
assigned by the GGSN during the PDP-Context activation. For non-3GPP accesses
the PDG assigns the same IP address as the IPsec TiA. Because the 3GPP access
and non-3GPP access are two different radio bearers it is possible for the mobile
node to initiate make-before-break handovers. All PDP-Context establishments
and/or IKEv2 IPsec negotiations can be done while still using the previous radio
bearer prior the handover to the new target radio bearer. Unfortunately, the
whole GTP-based solution still requires extensive software support from the mobi-
le node.
The GTP-based mobility solution does not address the mobility within the non-
3GPP access in any way. If the ToA changes within the non-3GPP access cover-
age, the IKEv2 IPsec tunnel needs to be renegotiated. From the mobile node and
the GPRS network point of view this looks like the PDP-Context disconnected
abnormally and then got re-established again. This causes a break in the con-
nectivity and IP sessions to disconnect. A convenient solution would be using
MOBIKE [102, 177] for the mobility within the non-3GPP access.
2.6 Other Mobility Solutions
There has been a number of experimental mobility protocols and architectures.
For a reason or another they never made it into the commercial deployments,
even if some of the ideas have influenced other IP Mobility protocols. This section
lists and describes briefly some well known alternative IP Mobility protocols and
architectures.
2.6.1 Local and Micro Mobility Management Solutions
BRAIN Candidate Mobility Protocol (BCMP) [100, 176] is a micro mobility solution.
It is targeted to all-IP wireless access networks, and has support for idle mode
and paging. BCMP decouples the mobility management within the access net-
work from the rest of the core network. The mobility management is localized
and the micro mobility protocol exploit the significant ’locality’ of mobile node’s
movement.
Routes to mobile nodes are updated through access network routers within the
access network, avoiding signaling messages to network components distant from
the current location of the mobile node. BCMP uses non-hierarchical tunnels to
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route traffic towards a mobile node, thus there is no need for explicit hierarchy
for access network routers. Uplink traffic from the mobile node can be used as an
implicit update for downlink routes. This reduces the signaling load in the core
network and improves the re-routing latency. The macro mobility handles the
movement of the mobile node between BCMP capable access networks, whereas
micro mobility handles the movement within the same access network.
Once the mobile node has attached to a BCMP capable network, the same IP
address remains as long as the mobile node is connected to the BCMP capable
network. This also reduces the need for signaling. An idle mobile node does
not need to perform a location update every time its point of attachment in the
network changes. Handovers can be planned or spurious. BCMP is also inde-
pendent of macro mobility protocol. Protocols, such as Mobile IP, can be used
together with BCMP to provide macro mobility management, for example bet-
ween BCMP capable access networks, for a mobile node.
Cellular IP (CIP) [74, 290] is a micro mobility protocol that follows the cellular
network principles (paging, passive connectivity and seamless mobility are sup-
ported). The mobile node can move inside a Cellular IP domain, and maintain
its IP connectivity and reachability. The same IP address is maintained as long as
the mobile node stays within the Cellular IP domain. For a global mobility across
Cellular IP domains a global mobility management protocol, such as Mobile IP
is required. Each Cellular IP domain is managed by one gateway node on top
of the tree like hierarchy of other Cellular IP nodes. The gateway node may also
contain Mobile IP foreign agent functionality.
The Cellular IP routing nodes maintain routing caches of the mobile node’s cur-
rent location. These routing cache entries form a reverse route to the mobile node
for downlink traffic. Routing caches are updated implicitly by the mobile node
originating uplink traffic or explicitly using route update messages. Actively
communicating mobile nodes do not need to do any explicit mobility manage-
ment signaling when they roam within the Cellular IP domain. Inside the domain
the gateway node and some of the routing nodes maintain paging caches for
idle mobile nodes. The paging caches have longer life-time compared to rout-
ing caches. However, the paging caches do not necessarily contain up to date
information on the location of the mobile nodes. A mobile node may also update
paging caches explicitly. One of the major downsides of the Cellular IP is the
requirement for a completely statefull access network. Also the security part of
the solution has not been completely thought out.
Handoff-Aware Wireless Access Internet Infrastructure (HAWAII) [251–253] protocol
is a host-based micro mobility protocol that also supports paging, passive connec-
tivity and seamless mobility. HAWAII has a network topology, of a hierarchical
tree with a single gateway at the root of the tree. HAWAII shares similarities with
Cellular IP. The differences are that HAWAII depends on explicit path setup sig-
naling and that Mobile IP foreign agents are not required. Actually HAWAII has
been designed to work especially when using Co-CoA mode of Mobile IP.
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Telecommunications-Enhanced Mobile IP (TeleMIP) [88] is an intra-domain mobility
solution which uses two levels of mobility management. TeleMIP divides the net-
work into domains similar to Cellular IP, HAWAII and HMIPv6. Each domain is
further divided into a number of subnetworks. A mobile node is configured with
two CoAs at subnetwork and domain levels. The latency of intra-domain location
updates is reduced by introducing a local termination point called a mobility agent
(MA). The mobility agent is similar to a gateway foreign agent [112] and manages
one domain. Intra-domain updates are sent only up to the mobility agent, which
provides a globally valid CoA to the mobile node. TeleMIP reduces the frequency
of global update messages since the mobility agent is located at a higher hierar-
chy than subnetworks. Global updates to home agent (and correspondent nodes)
only occur when roaming between domains. The mobile node also obtains a
local CoA through DHCP or a foreign agent. The local CoA may change within a
domain and the mobile node is responsible for updating the mobility agent with
the current local CoA. The mobility agent forwards downlink packets to mobile
nodes, using regular IP routing, by using the local CoA as the destination.
2.6.2 Transport Layer Mobility
Multihoming support for transport protocols has made it possible to provide lim-
ited mobility support at the transport layer. Examples of such transport protocols
are DCCP [180] with multihoming and mobility extension [178], TraSH [114] and
M-SCTP [306]. The latter two are based on mobile SCTP [274] that is defined as
SCTP with the ADDIP extension [275, 306].
The basic idea of transport layer mobility is to maintain the end-to-end connec-
tivity at the transport layer, and solve the mobility paradigm without additional
infrastructure support at the network layer. When mobile nodes’ underlying IP
address changes, the transport layer mobility protocol needs to refresh the asso-
ciation between transport connection endpoints using some transport protocol
inherent mechanism. This approach is appealing because it does not require
additional tunneling. It also does not interfere the natural routing of IP pack-
ets. Transport layer mobility solutions are also capable of performing smooth
handovers [61].
Currently the biggest downside of the transport layer mobility is the lack of
proper mobility management. As long as only one end is mobile the proposed
solutions work. If a correspondent node needs to locate the mobile node or
both communicating ends are mobile (so called double jump problem) current
transport-layer mobility solutions most probably fail to operate flawlessly. The
lack of a stationary anchor causes easily a situation in the previously mentioned
cases, where the other does not know the location of the other end. Proposals to
solve the mobility management are still open research issues.
Research has been done in the past for enhancing TCP in mobile environments
and allowing some level of mobility without breaking the end-to-end connectiv-
ity. I-TCP [64], M-TCP [69] and MTCP [307] are examples of such TCP variants.
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However, all of them require changes to the original TCP implementations. The
addition of mobility is not completely transparent to applications and end hosts,
which effectively hinders the adoption of the solution for a widely deployed pro-
tocol such as TCP.
2.6.3 Application Layer Mobility
SIP [259] mobility support [263, 299] resembles the home agent based anchoring
mechanism used in Mobile IP. SIP mobility support is based on a home registrar
that is a rendezvous point for a particular SIP user. SIP mobility is simplest for
pre-call mobility that only requires updating the home registrar. In addition, SIP
supports mid-call mobility, which requires that the mobile node sends an INVITE
request with the new IP address to the correspondent node. SIP may also support
session mobility [264], in which media sessions can be maintained while changing
hosts. Moreover, the end-point of an active session may be changed to another
device. SIP-based mobility trades generality for ease of deployment. It is not
suitable for applications, that cannot handle re-establishment of transport layer
connections during the session.
The Wireless CORBA specification was designed to provide a minimal useful func-
tionality for mobile CORBA applications. The specification defines extensions
and protocols for applications, in which clients and servers are executed on hosts
that can move. The specification introduces a Mobile IOR (Interoperable Object
Reference) which is a relocatable object reference that identifies the access bridge
and the terminal on which the target object resides [230]. An entity called the
home location agent (HLA) keeps track of the access bridge to which the terminal
is currently connected. The Mobile IOR provides mobility transparency and con-
tains either the home location agent’s address or the last known access bridge of
the mobile host. In the former case the home location agent will provide the new
address of the mobile host. In the latter case, the last known access bridge pro-
vides the current address or forwards the invocation. Each terminal is identified
using a unique terminal identifier. The author was involved with the Wireless
CORBA standardization.
The Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3) [276] is an overlay network that aims
to provide a more flexible communication model than the current IP addressing
offers today. In i3 each packet is sent to an identifier. Packets are routed using
the identifier to a single server in the distributed system. The server, an i3 node,
maintains triggers which are installed by receivers that are associated with identi-
fiers. When a matching trigger is found the packet is forwarded to the associated
receiver. An i3 identifier may be bound to a host, object, or a session unlike the
IP address, which is always bound to a specific host.
The Robust Overlay Architecture for Mobility (ROAM) [313] builds on top of i3
and allows end-hosts to control the placement of rendezvous points (indirection
points) for efficient routing and handovers. ROAM uses trigger server caching,
trigger sampling, and supports fast handovers and multicast-based handovers
46 CHAPTER 2. IP MOBILITY
for make-before-break. ROAM supports legacy applications using a user-level
proxy that encapsulates IP packets within i3 packets and manages trigger related
operations.
Another forerunner in application and transport layer mobility solutions, or rather
mixture of the former was MOWGLI (Mobile Office Workstations using GSM
Links) [49,181]. It had an agent and a proxy approach for optimized mobile com-
puting. MOWGLI allowed applications that were aware of mobility make use of
enhanced features of the solution for any connection. Support for legacy applica-
tions was solved through extensive use of generic or application specific proxies
and agents. MOWGLI supported recovery from disconnections, application spe-
cific acceleration, and was specifically designed and optimized protocol wise for
GSM environment. The author was involved in MOWGLI research and its later
commercial development projects.
2.7 Deployment Issues and Challenges
This section discusses a number of know issues and challenges in IP Mobility
deployments from an mobile operator point of view.
2.7.1 IP Version Migration
IP version migration is a challenging issue to solve, even in current IP networks.
This is mainly due to the established business models and a lengthy transition
time when both IP versions must be supported. The existing IPv4 legacy cannot
be neglected. When it comes to IP version migration with IP Mobility, the chal-
lenges are typically even greater. Let us take Mobile IP as an example. There are
different protocol standards for Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6. The protocols are
not interoperable with each other at any level.
Dual Stack Mobile IPv6 (DSMIPv6) solves the access network side IP version migra-
tion with another layer of tunneling. A DSMIPv6 capable mobile node tunnels
Mobile IPv6 packets over IPv4 access networks using UDP encapsulation. Actu-
ally DSMIPv6 allows also using IPv4 HoA, which in IPv6 access network case
would mean tunneling IPv4 traffic over Mobile IPv6.
It is also always possible to establish some other IP transition tunneling mech-
anisms first (for example ISATAP, Teredo or 6to4) and then running IP Mobility
protocols over it. However, handover latencies would definitely increase with
this kind of loosely integrated solution.
IP Mobility solutions that are agnostic to the IP versions include MOBIKE, TraSH
and HIP. Currently it looks like, that none of them will make it to an overall IP
Mobility solution. The main reason being that in mentioned cases the IP Mobility
functionality is merely a byproduct and not the real intended use.
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Handovers across different IP versions are likely to happen. One practical exam-
ple use case is a handover between GPRS and WLAN. The GPRS and the actual
operator service are using IPv6 but the public WLAN access network supports
only IPv4. Vertical handovers are more likely between IP versions than hori-
zontal handovers. The following list collects few issues concerning IP version
migration in current IP Mobility protocols:
The IP Mobility protocol must support IP version migration. In order to
avoid excessive tunneling the migration should be integral part of the pro-
tocol.
The migration solution should provide mobility for dual stack hosts, for
both IP versions.
The actual mobility management protocol should be chosen so that it gets
used natively without any transition mechanism in most of the cases. Typi-
cally the used application defines which IP version is considered the native.
The migration solution must allow handovers between IP versions.
Yet another solution would just be to re-establish all connections after a handover.
Applications would take care of re-connecting with correct IP version. SIP [139]
based mobility [99,289,299] would be a reasonable solution in this case. After all,
majority of the future mobile operator services are envisioned to be using IP mul-
timedia subsystem [18] (IMS), which is heavily based on SIP. Of the recent mobility
and multihoming supporting protocols HIP allows also handovers between IP
versions natively.
2.7.2 Tunneling and Signaling Overhead
Tunneling overhead has usually been a concern during the protocol development.
These days it is a real concern performance wise only when using slow and band-
width constrained cellular links. There are also other tunneling aspects such as
the maximum transfer unit size that concerns all links. Most IP Mobility protocols
are based on some kind of tunneling or shim layer (such as Shim6 [229]). Mobile
nodes or their proxy representatives need to periodically refresh the bindings
with corresponding mobility anchors. Furthermore, in some (typical actually)
deployment cases mobile nodes also have to periodically refresh created states
in firewalls and/or NAT devices. This is called hole punching. A consequence
of the hole punching is additional signaling that actually has nothing to do with
the mobility. Table 2.1 shows typical tunneling and signaling overhead values for
some IP Mobility protocols [281].
Most mobility protocols allow adjusting their periodic binding refresh times. Even
if the refresh time could be in order of several minutes the existence of firewalls
and NAT devices change the situation. Typically the refresh period needs to be
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Table 2.1: IP Mobility Related Overhead
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less than 60 seconds but the exact time is subject to network operator configura-
tions. What makes the issue complicated is that there is no way for the mobile
node to know the maximum refresh period that would satisfy all intermediat-
ing devices between the endpoints. The outcome is that the refresh periods are
set rather aggressive. At the same time the operators configure the network side
devices with aggressive timeout values aiming to release unused resources as
soon as possible. The consequence is greatly increased signaling traffic. Signaling
traffic is problematic from operators point of view. They cannot directly charge
the subscriber for it, although the signaling traffic contributes to the consump-
tion of networking resources. On a related issue, periodic hole punching has a
negative impact on the energy consumption in mobile nodes. Any signaling that
is not necessarily vital for the protocol, especially when the mobile node other-
wise were idle, should be avoided at any cost. Typically, any sent or received IP
packet prevents the mobile terminal of entering the power saving modes [142].
This consumes the battery considerably faster than expected even if there is no
active communication from an user or an applications point of view.
2.7.3 Mobility Across Administrative Domains
A handover from a network to another may cause a mobile node to cross an
administrative domain boundary. An administrative domain boundary typically
equals to an operator boundary. The handover involves discovering and select-
ing a new target access network, determining appropriate identities and creden-
tials suitable for the target network. All these attachment related functions are
sources for additional handover latency. These concerns have specifically shown
up in the case of EAP-based authentication [53]. The authenticators located in
different administrative domains are hardly able (or allowed) to share any key-
ing material and/or security related state information. The mobile node may not
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have other choice than perform a full access authentication every time it performs
a handover to different administrative domain. If the mobile node has multiple
radios and adequate operating system support, it typically can perform access
authentication to the new access network while still being attached to the old
network [82].
Lately various standardization organizations (e.g. IETF [221], IEEE and WiMAX
Forum) have been developing technologies to solve issues related to access authen-
tication latency, and network discovery and selection. IEEE 802.11r [66, 154] and
Mobile WiMAX [300, 301] are examples that make use of EAP-based authentica-
tion. They have introduced local key holders in order to keep authentications
local within the access network under one administrative domain. The proposed
solutions are concentrating only to cases where administrative domains do not
get crossed, at least not at an operator level. There is emerging work on this
area mostly concentrating around IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handover (MIH)
framework [155] and its related supporting functions (such as IEEE 802.11u [153]
and IEEE 802.16g [156]).
2.7.4 Private Addresses and Network Address Translation
The shortage of public IPv4 addresses availability has contributed to a deploy-
ment of private IPv4 addresses [255] and Network Address Translation (NAT) [271,
272] devices. Private addressing and NATs have also offered network adminis-
trators address management freedom as well as simple means for hiding intranet
information from external networks. Any protocol using IPv4 addressing must
practically support NAT traversal and private addressing. Otherwise deploy-
ment scenarios for a given protocol are very limited. If true interoperability in
Internet is desired the protocol must work with ’legacy NATs’ (i.e. one cannot
assume any signaling, intelligence, state recovery from crashes and so on form
those NAT devices). NATs are just one sub-category of more general middle-box
traversal issue [273]. Firewalls are another well known sub-category of middle-
boxes and we already briefly surfaced them in Section 2.7.2.
2.7.5 Mobile IP and Dynamic Home Agent Assignment
Mobile IPv4 [242] and Mobile IPv6 [165] protocols did not originally have a proper
support for bootstrapping a home agent address. At minimum a mobile node
had to be configured with its home link prefix information. As a consequence
3GPP2 [34,35] and Mobile WiMAX architectures have defined their own dynamic
home agent assignment procedures. The assignment is part of the network access
authentication procedure in both architectures.
IETF has since revisited its specifications regarding the dynamic home agent
assignment. There is now a protocol for a dynamic Mobile IPv4 home agent
assignment [196]. Mobile IPv6 has a complete bootstrapping solution, which also
includes multiple dynamic home agent assignment solutions [80, 117, 137, 235].
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Bootstrapping would also benefit from a backend AAA support function for any
larger deployment. We discuss the role of the AAA in Section 3.2.2.
2.7.6 Mobile IP and Dynamic Home Address Configuration
The original Mobile IPv6 [165] protocol cannot configure HoAs dynamically in a
similar manner as Mobile IPv4 [242] does it during the binding update. Mobile
IPv6 specifies a way of configuring HNPs using the Mobile Prefix Discovery (MPD)
mechanism. However, at this point the mobile node must be configured with its
home agent address and should have a security association set up with the home
agent. Mobile IPv6 also implicitly assumes that the mobile node has configured
some HoA, even deprecated from the home agent perspective. Static configu-
ration is an administration burden and a provisioning challenge, and does not
scale to deployments envisioned by mobile operators. Mobile IPv4 and Mobile
IPv6 specified later NAI options [72, 236] that provide a convenient way for a
mobile node to identify itself instead of using the HoA. An obvious use case is
the dynamic configuration of a HoA or a HNP. Proxy Mobile IPv6 base protocol
already specifies a mechanism for a dynamic MN-HNP configuration.
There was still room for improvement on Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping, especially
on the dynamic security association set up. While updating the Mobile IPv6’s
IKEv1-based security specification [55] to the IKEv2-based [90], a dynamic con-
figuration of the HoA during the IKEv2 negotiation was included. Mobile IPv6
IKEv2-based bootstrapping solution [117] further extended the IKEv2 negotia-
tion and added a dynamic configuration of the HNP. The actual selection of the
HoA or the HNP may be affected by the subscription profile or the requested
service [192].
Currently, there is no IETF specification for a dynamic configuration of the HoA
or the HNP using the Mobile IPv6 authentication option [237]. There has been
some level of ambition to standardize such protocol [93]. However, the industry
and especially the operator community have shown more interest toward IKE
and IPsec based mechanisms.
The basic requirement for a dynamic address configuration is that a home agent
must have a mechanism to identify and authenticate a mobile node prior assign-
ing it a HoA or a HNP. This is the reason why Mobile IPv4, Mobile IPv6 and also
Proxy Mobile IP need the NAI option and preferably some dynamic mechanism
to set up security associations. Typically any large deployment also needs a cen-
tralized AAA support function. The role of the AAA in scope of the dynamic
address assignment is discussed in Section 3.2.2.
2.7.7 Mobile IP Home Link Operation
Mobile operators are generally keen on reducing the Mobile IP tunneling over-
head on cellular accesses. While header compression might help [168], Mobile
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IP protocol already offers tunnelless mode of operation when the mobile node is
attached to its home link. Therefore, an operator has an opportunity to reduce
tunneling overhead simply by configuring its preferred access as the home link.
In certain cellular technologies, such as GPRS, network configuration may not be
trivial. According to the GPRS standard [5] a GGSN terminates GTP tunnels for
user plane traffic and is responsible for the IP address management. The network
deployment must address this and allow placing a home agent on the same link
where the GPRS user plane traffic outputs to external networks. Furthermore,
the address management must be coordinated between the GGSN and the home
agent. Here a centralized AAA function for address management proves useful.
Even if a mobile node initially attaches to its home link, it still has to bootstrap a
security association and a mobility service with a home agent. This might appear
as an unnecessary signaling overhead. However, in the case the mobile node has
not yet configured its HoA or HNP, it does not either know its home link.
2.7.8 Dual Home Agent Case
There are use cases where a single Mobile IP tunnel routing all user plane traffic
through one home agent is not feasible. A mobile node may experience consid-
erable traffic round-trip delays when it is away from its home network. This
would have a negative impact on delay sensitive applications, such as Voice over
IP (VoIP). Assigning a home agent locally in the visited network in the close prox-
imity of the mobile node would probably reduce round-trip delays, assuming the
other endpoint of the communication is also close to the local home agent. How-
ever, certain applications in the mobile node might still require anchoring to the
home network home agent due to the policy enforcement reasons.
Assigning two home agents to a mobile node is one solution for the scenario
described earlier; a local home agent for delay sensitive applications and a home
network home agent for the rest. From the mobile node perspective two home
agents also mean two Mobile IP tunnels to manage, possibly two sets of creden-
tials and identities. The mobile node also needs cross-layer intelligence to aid
the routing of different types of traffic into appropriate output tunnels. All these
mechanisms are not part of the existing Mobile IP protocol and may not be trivial
to solve.
Another approach is just to abandon two home agents model and use a locally
acquired IP address for the local traffic without any mobility. This approach has
similar mobile node internal routing challenges as the two home agents solution.
2.7.9 Co-existence of Proxy Mobile IP and Client Mobile IP
The network controlled mobility management is supposed to be transparent to a
mobile node. At least it was the original goal of Proxy Mobile IP protocol. The
mobile node may also be using a host controlled mobility solution such as Mobile
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IP. Two overlapping mobility protocols may interfere with each other and intro-
duce unnecessary inefficiency. Although, the argument of interference is slightly
artificial, since the network controlled mobility management is supposed to be
transparent to the mobile node. However, there are deployment scenarios that
do introduce issues. Usually ’architectural optimizations’ are used as an argu-
ment to introduce features that unnecessarily complicate simple and distinct pro-
tocol solutions. The co-existence of Mobile IPv6 has been analyzed in a context of
Proxy Mobile IPv6 [92, 116]. Following aspects should be considered:
Address management – There are two deployment models that also affect how
mobile nodes’ HoAs or HNPs are managed. A Proxy Mobile IPv6 domain
could appear as a home network to a mobile node. Whenever the mobile
node roams into the Proxy Mobile IPv6 domain, it is assigned with a PMIP-
HoA as the CMIP-HoA (or the MN-HNP as the HNP for Mobile IPv6).
When the PMIP-HoA equals to the CMIP-HoA the mobile node de-registers
with the home agent and avoids tunneling overhead. Alternatively, the
mobile node could always be away from home and configure the PMIP-
HoA as the CMIP-CoA and use yet another address as the CMIP-HoA.
Home agent co-location – If the PMIP-HoA and the CMIP-HoA (or the MN-
HNP and the HNP) are the same, then the Proxy Mobile IPv6 local mobility
anchor and the Mobile IPv6 home agent need to coordinate address and
prefix management. At minimum logical coupling of Proxy Mobile IP and
Mobile IP mobility anchors is needed. The coupling could be done using a
common AAA backend or then integrating the two functionalities into the
same functional entity. The latter would require a shared binding cache in
the combined home agent – local mobility anchor node.
Interference Proxy Mobile IPv6 might assume certain behavior from the mobile
node that is used to differentiate between Mobile IPv6 and Proxy Mobile
IPv6 modes of operation. However, if the mobile node is unaware of the
Proxy Mobile IPv6 in general and implements Mobile IPv6 based on plain
IETF standards, the network side might get confused. This is an unfortu-
nate side effect trying to solve everything on the network side, and at the
same time trying to keep the mobile node side unmodified. Probably the
easiest solution is to require mobility awareness from the mobile nodes that
can attach to the network with network controlled mobility management.
The co-existence of both Proxy Mobile IPv6 and Mobile IPv6 is still considered
as a viable solution when roaming between Proxy Mobile IPv6 domains. Mobile
IPv6 would serve as the global mobility protocol. Regarding to the address man-
agement optimization described earlier, it appears that the mobile node should be
aware of the network controlled mobility management. Such requirement would,
however, defeat the desired transparency feature of Proxy Mobile IP. On the other
hand, the mobile node could then try to rationalize its use of Mobile IPv6. From
an operator perspective ease of deployment and better legacy support should
2.7. DEPLOYMENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 53
supersede slight optimizations on the overhead. This argument would favor
deployments where the PMIP-HoA is not the CMIP-HoA.
2.7.10 On Multilink Issues
A subnet (i.e. IPv6 prefix) that spans over more than one link connected by a
router breaks (or rather unnecessarily complicates) some fundamentals of IPv6
[282]. A router is supposed to decrement the Time To Live (TTL) or Hop Limit
count when it forwards packets. Several IPv6 based protocols use multicast for
their operation and depend on the All Nodes Address on link or All Routers Address
on link multicast addresses to work appropriately [145]. These link multicast
packets have Hop Limit set to 1 or 255 and the receiving host or the router checks
whether packets still belong to the same link (i.e. the Hop Limit has not changed).
The multilink subnet issues are easily illustrated with some imaginary network
controlled mobility solution, where the mobile node preserves its acquired pre-
fix even when the mobile node changes its point of attachment to the network.
The new point of attachment on the new link can be topologically more than one
hop away and have its own advertised prefixes. As a consequence IPv6 proce-
dures such as Neighbor Discovery (ND), Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [224]
and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) [81] become complicated. For example,
one physical link must be simulated by a number of networking nodes to build a
virtual link that is scattered to multiple physical links in the networking topology.
One proposed solution to solve the multilink issues in IP Mobility context is using
a prefix-per-mobile link model instead of shared-link model. The prefix-per-mobile
is essentially a point-to-point link model where each host is assigned an unique
::/64 prefix. Only two hosts can be on the same link: the mobile node and the first
hop access router. Usually it does not make sense to run DAD or ND on this kind
of links. The two hosts can agree on out of band how to generate link local add-
resses and avoid possible address collisions. 3GPP GPRS has selected prefix-per-
mobile [225] link model. Recently Mobile WiMAX has followed 3GPP’s example
and selected the same link model. One could argue that a prefix-per-mobile is a
waste of IPv6 addresses. That is definitely true but the number of available IPv6
addresses should not be an issue in the foreseen future.
There are still issues left even with the prefix-per-mobile link model, especially
when the access router is allowed to change. Even if the prefix remains the same
for both mobile node and new access router, the change of access router typically
means a change of the access router’s link local address. If the mobile host has
DNA equipped IPv6 stack [78, 220], the mobile host does not necessarily initiate
address configuration procedures (including ND, DAD, etc) if it realizes that the
new access router still advertises the old prefix. This might lead to duplicate link
local addresses between the mobile host and the new access router. Furthermore,
every time a mobile node changes the link it should be prepared for a situation
where subsequent RAs originate from a different access router with a different
link local address. There are some deployment oriented solutions such as con-
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figuring the same link local address to all possible access routers. 3GPP GPRS
avoids this issue because the access router (i.e. the GGSN) never changes during
the session.
2.7.11 Firewalls
Mobile IP deployments are challenged by operators who have a tendency to
deploy firewalls with conservative filtering rules. Mobile IPv4 NAT travesal that
encapsulates everything inside UDP turned out to be a good tool also for firewall
traversal. Mobile IPv6 lacks currently similar ’add-on’ functionality. Further-
more, the diversity of Mobile IPv6 deployment possibilities complicates firewall
traversal even further [197]. A mobile node may be behind a firewall, a corre-
spondent node may be behind a firewall, a home agent may be behind a fire-
wall or then any combination of the former three scenarios. Mobile IPv6 route
optimization is yet another deployment possibility. Such deployment heteroge-
neousity is challenging, especially when Mobile IPv6 signaling is not run over
TCP or UDP that firewalls are accustomed to build stateful rules for. Recently
discovered security threats with IPv6 Routing Headers may add more reasons to
filter IPv6 packets [38, 67]. This might also affect negatively to Mobile IPv6 that
depends on Type-2 Routing Headers as part of the protocol. In the absence of
explicit Mobile IP aware middle-box traversal solution, the best solution is trying
to influence operators who make their firewall filtering policies.
2.8 Summary
This chapter presented a state of the art of the recent developments on host and
network based IP Mobility protocols. Our main interest was in various Mobile IP
variants and their suitability in large scale mobile network architectures. We also
presented some hybrid solutions that combine several IP Mobility management
solutions.
We touched upon large scale deployment issues including bootstrapping of the
mobility services, IP version migration and the importance of the backend AAA
systems. We also had a short overview of the related past work on alternative IP
Mobility solutions such as micro mobility management protocols and transport
layer mobility solutions. The lack of a properly thought backend support sys-
tem integration is usually the area that is missing from experimental IP Mobility
solutions. Developing a protocol solution without having a clear view of the tar-
get system architecture often leads to numerous enhancements during the system
design time, which typically are not fully backwards comptible with the original
protocol anymore. This is a typical problem when trying to develop general pur-





This chapter discusses various mechanisms that complement IP Mobility proto-
cols. Our focus is on technologies for large scale wireless network deployments.
3.1 Movement Detection
The primary goal of the movement detection is to detect layer-3 handover, which
makes it an essential part of IP Mobility. Movement detection is more of a hori-
zontal handover problem. In the case of vertical handovers, the configuration of
networking interfaces is more or less separate from the handover decision bet-
ween different access technologies. When a mobile node changes its point of
attachment at layer-2, the IP layer might not have enough information whether it
needs to re-configure its IP layer configuration. If there is no need to re-configure
the interface, then executing the configuration procedure is unnecessary and may
also cause temporary disruption in IP connectivity. On the other hand, if there are
changes at the IP level, the mobile node should re-configure its interface as soon
as possible, otherwise the IP connectivity breaks.
Mobile IP standards define their default mechanisms for movement detection.
In Mobile IPv4 the movement detection is based on reception of a foreign agent
router advertisement with different FA-CoAs. In Co-CoA mode the movement
detection is not based on Mobile IP procedures but on other information gath-
ered from the network interface and the network. Mobile IPv6 bases its move-
ment detection on a reception of RAs that would cause the mobile node to con-
figure a new CoA. The movement detection may be assisted by the networking
driver. The driver may deliver events to the IP layer when a layer-2 handover or
a preparation for such takes place [39]. Upon receiving an event, the IP layer of
the stack may start soliciting for access routers instead of passively waiting for
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advertisements to arrive or waiting for the DHCP lease to expire.
Cross-layer link indications [39] also involve possible shortcomings with appli-
cation software that makes use of lower layer indications related to the link state.
There are applications that fail at the IP transport layer and at the session layer
because the application interprets all link-down and link-up indications as a loss
of layer-2 connectivity. For example in case of WLAN layer-2 handovers the
application may disconnect from the service due to the transient state change
at the layer-2 even if the mobile host is equipped with a IP Mobility solution.
There are known difficulties to detect a new network attachment accurately in
a timely manner. For example certain standards compliant DHCPv4 [96] client
implementations may not refresh their leases after a layer-2 handover. This was a
typical case when roaming between subnetworks whose IEEE 802.11 WLAN APs
advertised the same SSIDs. Recently, this particular behavior has been acknowl-
edged in the DNA work for IPv4 [43]. Furthermore, the DHCPv4 situation could
get even worse. Certain standards compliant DHCPv4 servers were observed
to return a DHCPNAK message to a wrong subnetwork when the client tried to
renew its lease by sending an unicast DHCPREQUEST to the server from a topologi-
cally incorrect subnetwork [184]. Obviously this resulted in a poor performance.
After the handover the acquisition of a new IP address was possible only after
the DHCP client retry timeout and the DHCP client going to the INIT state.
In the case of IPv6 there are similar issues and in general IPv6 movement detec-
tion is not trivial [138]. There are scenarios, for example, where the mobile node
starts unnecessarily re-configuring its interface even if the previously configured
prefix could be routable in the new point of attachment. Re-configuring the IPv6
interface might cause outages in IP connectivity as the mobile node needs to
rerun ND and DAD before it can use the newly configured IP address for the user
plane traffic. IETF’s DNA working group has worked on solutions for detecting
network attachment more reliably and especially faster [78, 215, 220]. DNA was
already discussed to some extent in Section 2.7.10. Techniques such as RA Trig-
gering and RA Proxying may be used for a quick RA acquisition schemes [79,138].
Using these Fast Router Discovery (FRD) schemes an access router or an access
point immediately sends an unicast RA to the mobile node once it attaches to the
link.
In general, after the mobile node has detected that it has changed the point of
attachment, it still needs to configure its interfaces with valid IP addresses. The
address configuration is yet another delay source, especially if DHCP is involved
in address configuration. In order to speed up the configuration, the DHCPv6 [98]
has Rapid Commit option that allows obtaining IP address and configuration infor-
mation using a 2-message exchange rather than the usual 4-message exchange.
Similar option has also been added to DHCPv4 [232]. In case of Mobile IPv4
mobile nodes may skip the DHCP completely and rely on foreign agent provided
CoAs, when foreign agents are available. The discovery and configuration of
FA-CoA can typically be made much more aggressive than the use of DHCPv4.
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Recent interest in aiding the movement and mobility has concentrated around
the Media Independent Handover (MIH) framework [155]. The MIH framework is
also know as IEEE 802.21. This technology provides a set of services that are
located remotely in the network and/or locally in the mobile node: Event Service
(ES), Command Service (CSMIH) and Information Service (IS). The mobile node may
acquire a comprehensive set of information and events related to the surround-
ing access networks and mobility in general. The MIH framework is expected
to greatly assist especially vertical handover scenarios [210]. Thus, the mobile
operators with heterogeneous access network deployments are more or less obli-
gated to investigate the MIH framework, its usefulness and deployment require-
ments. Unfortunately, the MIH framework itself is getting scattered. IEEE plans
to define native transport for 802.21 data frames over the IEEE 802.11 and IEEE
802.16 families of wireless access technologies [153, 156]. At the same time IETF
is working on protocol solutions for IP-based 802.21 data frame transport [208].
After all, independent of what technology gets applied for assisted and accu-
rate movement detection, it will require modifications to both mobile nodes and
access networks.
3.2 Bootstrapping of Mobility Service
The basics of the Mobile IP client and network side configuration requirements
were already discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. It became evident that majority of
the configuration is currently statically provisioned. Unfortunately, excessively
static provisioning becomes rapidly an administrative burden for an operator in
any larger deployment. This flaw was quickly acknowledged and addressed.
For example 3GPP2 came up with a number of protocol modifications to Mobile
IP that allow dynamic provisioning of most configuration parameters. Bootstrap-
ping of the mobility service is one of the most important features from an operator
perspective.
The bootstrapping of IP Mobility service contains the following three main func-
tions:
Dynamic discovery of mobile node’s home network addresses or prefixes such
as Mobile IP HoA,
Dynamic discovery of mobility agents, especially the discovery of anchor
nodes such as Mobile IP home agents, and
Dynamic configuration (i.e. negotiation) of required security associations
between a mobile node and corresponding mobility agents. The subsequent
dynamic key distribution and management is a also part of this function.
The existence of AAA infrastructure is typically an essential part of generic boot-
strapping solutions. In the following sections we are going to present Mobile
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IP bootstrapping solutions that are tightly integrated to an AAA infrastructure.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the integration of Mobile IP architectures with AAA
infrastructure.
Protocols such as MOBIKE already have bootstrapping implicitly defined. For
example the IKEv2 protocol provides basic functionality for configuring the Tun-
nel internal Addresses, DNS servers and so forth. The discovery of the security
gateway is typically based on either static configuration or DNS, like it is the case
in 3GPP and 3GPP2 WLAN interworking.
3.2.1 Mobile IP Bootstrapping
Mobile IPv4 standard allows a dynamic assignment of the HoA when the MN-
NAI option is present. The home agent discovery is based on subnet broadcast
and requires the mobile node to know its home link subnetwork. Presumably
this does not work when the mobile node only knows its NAI-based identity.
Furthermore, a broadcast based discovery is not considered an optimal solu-
tion as the mobile node would possibly receive multiple replies and also cause
extra load on the receiving network and home agents. Mobile IPv6 is close to
Mobile IPv4 regarding the home configuration flexibility. The discovery of home
agents uses more resource friendly IPv6 anycast [164] instead of the broadcast.
The dynamic configuration of a HoA has an equivalent mobile prefix discovery.
However, when the mobile prefix discovery is using optional ESP-based secu-
rity, the SA assumes some existing HoA already. This assumption complicates
the use of the mobile prefix discovery when the mobile node has no knowledge
of any prior HoA. The Mobile IPv6 dynamic security association establishment
uses either IKEv1 [55] or IKEv2 [90]. The updated IKEv2 protocol allows also
dynamic configuration of the HoA during the IKEv2 negotiation.
3GPP2 specified a dynamic home agent assignment mechanism where the for-
eign agent (located in a PDSN) discovers the address of the home agent using
the AAA infrastructure [118]. The mobile node indicates the need for dynam-
ically allocated home agent by using 0.0.0.0 or 255.255.255.255 address as the
home agent address and including the MN-AAA extension [246] in the registra-
tion request. The foreign agent is then able to query the home AAA server for the
assigned home agent. The NAI realm extracted from the MN-AAA extension is
used for AAA routing purposes. Some of the 3GPP2 dynamic home agent assign-
ment protocol has been brought back to IETF [196]. DHCPv4 can also convey a
home agent address [50]. However, this DHCPv4 option is hardly used in actual
deployments.
3GPP2 defined also a dynamic home agent discovery, home link prefix and HoA
configuration extensions to Mobile IPv6. The bootstrapping of Mobile IPv6 con-
figuration information makes use of stateless DHCPv6 [97] with a number of
3GPP2 specific DHCPv6 options. The required information is retrieved from
the home AAA server during the access authentication and cached in the local
access network DHCP server (in PDSN). Depending on the received bootstrap-
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ping information during DHCPv6 negotiation the mobile node may need to per-
form a home agent or a mobile prefix discovery as defined by Mobile IPv6 pro-
tocol. A 3GPP2 compliant mobile node is required to include MN-NAI [236] and
MN-Auth [237] options in the BU, although those do not really have anything to
do with the bootstrapping anymore.
IETF has worked on Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping and an integration with an AAA
infrastructure [235]. Some of the ideas originate from the preceding work and
experiences from 3GPP2 Mobile IPv4 deployments. Mobile IPv4 already has a
comprehensive AAA support based on Diameter [70]. The Mobile IPv6 boot-
strapping is divided into two different scenarios:
The Split Scenario [117] - In this scenario the Access Service Provider (ASP)
and the Access Service Authenticator (ASA) are different entities organiza-
tionally than the Mobility Service Provider (MSP) and the Mobility Service
Authorizer (MSA). The ASP provides the network access and ASA hosts
the AAA server that authenticates the mobile node for the network access.
The MSA is the entity that hosts the AAA server that authorizes the mobile
node for the mobility service and the MSP is the actual host of the home
agent. The split scenario makes use of IKEv2 and basically defines a way of
bootstrapping the mobile node home link prefix during the IKEv2 negoti-
ation. For this purpose the split scenario extends IKEv2 configuration pay-
loads with a new attribute that carries the home link prefix. The discovery
of the home agent is based on the DNS lookup.
The Integrated Scenario [80] - In this scenario the ASA, MSA and the MSP
are the same organization, thus it is possible to easily bootstrap Mobile IPv6
configuration as part of the network access authentication. Figure 3.1 illus-
trates the integrated scenario architecture with the AAA infrastructure and
its AAA proxy (AAAL) and server (AAAH) components. The integrated
scenario defines a mechanism to discover the address or the Fully Qualified
Domain Name (FQDN) of the home agent and the HNP through DHCPv6 (or
e.g., PANA or 802.1X) . When the mobile node authenticates for the network
access, the information of the home agent is returned over the AAA infras-
tructure (e.g., using Diameter protocol) to the ASP that then forwards the
information to the local DHCP server. The specified bootstrapping mecha-
nism allows also assigning a local home agent from the ASP. After discover-
ing the home agent the mobile node might need to progress to split scenario
in order to bootstrap the home link prefix.
Both split and integrated scenarios rely on the support of the AAA infrastructure
[186, 188].
From an operator and deployment point of view the split scenario is rather con-
troversial. While it provides better security and does not depend on the access
network capabilities for bootstrapping, it mandates the deployment of Mobile
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IPv6 tailored version of IKEv2. The computation requirements of IKEv2 and IPsec
may be of concern for resource constrained mobile devices. There was an alterna-

































Figure 3.1: Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping – integrated scenario
Mobile WiMAX has adopted most of the 3GPP2 Mobile IP bootstrapping prin-
ciples. The bootstrapping solutions resemble the integrated scenario. 3GPP2 has
adopted IETF’s proposal [80] for Mobile IPv6 enhancements [35]. On the other
hand, 3GPP2 WLAN interworking [36] bootstrapping solution resembles the split
scenario. Proxy Mobile IPv6 will also eventually require a bootstrapping mecha-
nism with an AAA infrastructure support [187]. Apart from the Mobile WiMAX
defined procedures for Proxy Mobile IPv4 there is no other standard.
3GPP Evolved Packet system (EPS) IP Mobility (Mobile IP based) architecture will
eventually convergence with other architectures such as Mobile WiMAX. The
current interworking solution, for example, between 3GPP pre-EPS and Mobile
WiMAX is not even able to support seamless IP level mobility [303].
There has been various, yet interesting proposals to achieve Mobile IP bootstrap-
ping. One of them is a Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) [15] based Mobile
IP bootstrapping solution proposal for 3GPP EPS [22]. Figure 3.2 illustrates Mobile
IPv6 bootstrapping architecture that leverages the GBA functionality and its inter-
faces. First, the mobile node does GBA defined bootstrapping and registers to a
Bootstrap Server Function (BSF), downloads GBA bootstrapping related informa-
tion and also Mobile IP bootstrapping information (e.g., a home agent address).
The GBA bootstrapping is only needed once in a while, not every time the mobile
node moves. Second, the mobile node does normal Mobile IP registration. Third,
the home agent retrieves Mobile IP related security material for the mobile node
authentication by contacting GBA’s Network Application Function (NAF). Fourth,
the NAF retrieves required security material from the BSF using GBA procedures
and protocols. After these steps, the home agent can authenticate the mobile node
and the Mobile IP registration can be completed.
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The beauty of a GBA-based solution would be the re-use of (U)SIM credentials
and security for authenticating the mobile node. The GBA architecture is well
specified, readily available and even deployable without further delays. These
are important aspects for operators. The downside of the GBA-based bootstrap-
ping solution is that it inherently is a 3GPP only solution and relies on the exis-
tence of UICC with (U)SIM application in terminals, which might not be an option
for all other architectures that are desired to cooperate with 3GPP EPS. Further-
more, operators would be mandated to deploy GBA which is currently an optional
feature.
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Figure 3.2: Mobile IP and Generic Bootstrapping Architecture integration
3.2.2 AAA Backend Support
Mobile operators are migrating towards IETF defined AAA protocols for their
access authentication, service authorization, accounting, cryptographic key dis-
tribution and policy provisioning solutions. The migration is not straight for-
ward. Operators have spent decades building up and optimizing their Signaling
System 7 (SS7) [19] AAA infrastructure. Charging and especially the roaming
charging is an area of great interest for operators. Hereafter, when we mention
AAA infrastructure we mean solutions based on IETF specified AAA protocols
such as RADIUS and Diameter.
3GPP architectures prior Release-6 do not have any inter-operator AAA inter-
face. Both Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) [14] and 3GPP Interworking
WLAN [2] were introduced during Release-6. They both contain either Diameter
or RADIUS interfaces that cross operator boundaries.
3GPP2 has been an early adopter for IETF based AAA infrastructure [144]. Inter-
estingly enough, their Mobile IP AAA architecture does not comply with the IETF
defined Mobile IPv4 AAA specification [70, 118]. The obvious reason is that the
IETF AAA specification is completely Diameter based whereas 3GPP2 has until
recently relied completely on RADIUS. Mobile WiMAX AAA infrastructure fol-
lows 3GPP2 approach rather closely. As for Mobile WiMAX R1, all its access and
IP Mobility related functions depend on a RADIUS based AAA interfaces.
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3GPP Release-7 Policy & Charging Control Architecture (PCC) [21] has been a widely
adopted. The architecture is based on Diameter and also includes inter-operator
AAA interfaces. PCC has been adopted by 3GPP2 and recently also by Mobile
WiMAX. IP Mobility has introduced details especially on Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) functionality that are not currently covered by the 3GPP Release-7 PCC.
Thus, enhancements are expected for both Mobile WiMAX PCC adaptation and
also to 3GPP Release-8 EPS architecture.
The common nominator for all AAA functions mentioned above is that they rely
on inter-operator interfaces. This is going to be challenging as different archi-
tectures are expected to interoperate in the future and share similar AAA infras-
tructure. The experimentation and trials in GSM operator community on WLAN
roaming showed that inter-operator AAA infrastructure is not trivial to deploy.
The experience has showed that IETF defined AAA protocols have too many
options and ’gray’ areas that are not easily resolvable only by looking at IETF
AAA documentations. More deployment oriented specification and interoper-
ability testing work is needed.
Various mechanisms for optimizing the AAA transactions originate from AAA-
based inter-operator roaming architectures. The number of round-trips and the
round-trip latencies have surprisingly huge impact on the performance of the
authentication and IP Mobility. The impact of roaming environment and AAA
infrastructure is discussed in more detail in Section 8.2. There are several solu-
tions in this problem space. Mainly what has been proposed either deal with
reducing the number of round-trips or try to localize those parts of the AAA
transactions that happen frequently. Various fast re-authentication proposals are
trying to optimize the round-trips [58,82,141,222] and, for example, IEEE 802.11r
type solutions try to exploit the locality [44, 154]. Mobile WiMAX makes use of
both. Another possibility would be a proactive preparation of target entities, for
example, prior a handover [52, 212].
3.3 Multihoming Extensions
Modern mobile terminals are increasingly equipped with multiple radios and
their simultaneous use is typically possible. IP Mobility protocols, such as Mobile
IP, assume that only one CoA is active and effectively neglect multihoming. Down-
link traffic bi-casting may be used for optimization purposes, which effectively
uses multihoming and multiple CoAs for a short period during the handover.
However, multihoming with IP Mobility in general is not a trivial problem. Mul-
tihoming has the following identified issues:
Path selection - which interface, CoA or HoA to use for a given IP flow. This
is a typical IPv6 issue.
Ingress filtering and failure detection.
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Multiple CoAs for a single HoA is not really supported, for example, by
Mobile IPv6.
Simultaneous presence in home and visited networks might be problematic
to handle, for example, from Mobile IPv6 point of view. Addresses from
other interfaces cannot be registered as CoAs for the HoA associated to the
home link.
Redirecting IP flow when a CoA changes for some reason e.g., due to renum-
bering at the home link. The redirection of a flow from an old path to a new
one may break IP session unless there are some mechanism to handle mul-
tihoming.
Mobile IP might not be the most suitable IP Mobility protocol to solve multihom-
ing issues. However, there are proposals how to modify Mobile IP to handle
multihoming [213,295,314–316]. After all, Mobile IPv6 is expected to be the main
IP Mobility protocol for the future wireless architectures. Solutions designed for
Mobile IPv6 are not directly applicable to Proxy Mobile IPv6. Thus Proxy Mobile
IPv6 base protocol contains its own simple multihoming support. An intuitive
solution is treating each interface in a multihomed mobile node individually and
maintaining a separate Proxy Mobile IPv6 binding with each one.
Protocols such as HIP or SHIM6 [229] are more suited for multihoming scenarios.
They have been designed multihoming in mind from the beginning. SHIM6 is not
really designed for mobile nodes, even if it could be used in mobility scenarios
as well. On the other hand, HIP fits well in combined multihoming and mobility
scenarios [143,227,228,308]. SHIM6 and HIP are close to each other conceptually
and SHIM6 is occasionally referred as ”poor man’s HIP”.
3.4 Summary
This chapter concentrated on technologies and procedures that are needed for
assisting IP Mobility, especially in large scale deployments. The main focus was
on bootstrapping the IP Mobility services, which allows near zero-configuration
of IP Mobility parameters in mobile nodes. The bootstrapping is identified as one
of they key requirements for a large scale deployment of IP Mobility solutions.
We introduced three solutions: split scenario, integrated scenario and a GBA-
based solution. Another key area for a large scale deployment is a fully functional
and inter-operator capable AAA infrastructure. For example, the bootstrapping
solutions depend on the existence of the AAA infrastructure.
We also discussed movement detection, network discovery and multihoming
issues on mobile nodes. Regarding the movement detection we pointed out
known issues that may cause considerable delays when it comes to handovers
and detecting movement through the normal IP address configuration approach.
Multihoming is a rather new topic when it comes to mobility. We outlined some
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known issues regarding the mobility and multihoming. Movement detection,
network discovery and multihoming, however, fall into the category of useful
enhancements rather than mandatory key requirements.
Chapter 4
Wireless Network Architectures
This chapter presents wireless network architectures that deploy network layer
IP Mobility solutions as part of their packet oriented services. We focus on 3GPP
Release-8 EPS, 3GPP2 CDMA2000 and Mobile WiMAX R1 architectures.
4.1 Introduction
Mobile operators are like other commercially driven companies that are inter-
ested in making profit and look after their owners’ interests. In addition to mak-
ing profit, there are usually also regulatory obligations from the authorities’ side
that vary from country to country. Apart from the obvious technical requirements
for the mobile operator core network (such as robustness, scalability to millions of
subscribers, clear evolution and upgrade path, and cost effectiveness) operators
have few more important functional requirements:
The system must produce exact and fine grained charging information.
The system must offer operators means to control its subscribers, services
and networks.
The purpose of the charging is obvious. However, when service use cases and
subscriber behavior changes considerably, the charging systems should adapt to
the new requirements. Unfortunately, it is hard for a subscriber to comprehend
complex service charging models, and understand where the cost accumulates.
This has led to pricing models that are fixed for a period of time or amount of
data, thus making the fine grained charging machinery partly unnecessary.
Operators’ desire for overall control originates from various sources. Charging
is probably the main reason. Another reason is the management of networks,
protecting operator’s and subscribers’ assets from unauthorized use. Regulatory
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obligations from authorities may also require operators to monitor rather accu-
rately what their subscribers are doing.
Charging and control functions are typically part of AAA protocols and related
policy control frameworks that hook into the wireless system architecture. Spec-
ifying a flexible AAA infrastructure and policy framework that would fit into
multiple network architectures is not trivial. As a result, every standards devel-
opment organization have to define their own adaptation functions and mecha-
nisms. Eventually, the home network AAA server with its subscriber databases
is the entity in the architecture that ties everything together.
4.2 3GPP2 CDMA2000 Architecture
The 3GPP2 CDMA2000 wireless system architecture [31] was the first widely
deployed system that included Mobile IP [32] for IP-based packet services. The
3GPP2 architecture also uses RADIUS based AAA infrastructure for all IP ser-
vices. The architecture has also a Simple IP service that does not offer session and
service continuity when IP level handover takes place. This section presents an
overview of 3GPP2 CDMA2000 IP Mobility architecture and solution.
4.2.1 Architectural Principles
Figure 4.1 illustrates a high level non-roaming architecture of 3GPP2 network and
its most important interfaces between networking elements. Originally the IP
Mobility support was based only on Mobile IPv4. The implementation of Mobile
IPv4 in 3GPP2 deviates from what IETF standardized, especially on the areas that
relate to the bootstrapping and integration to the AAA backend. Obviously, base
Mobile IPv4 protocol did not fulfill the requirements of a large mobile operator
deployment. 3GPP2 Mobile IPv4 implementation must support a number of IETF
Mobile IPv4 RFCs [72,83,214,238–240,244,269]. All traffic between a mobile node
and a home agent is reverse tunneled. There is no concept of Access Point Name
(APN) in 3GPP2 (in a contrary to 3GPP GPRS). The subscriber is always provided
only with the default data connectivity to external networks. The Radio Access
Network (RAN) authentication is carried over a traditional SS7 network, via a
Mobile Switching Center (MSC), towards a Home Location Register (HLR).
A Packet Data Serving Node (PDSN) is the central node in the access network
infrastructure from Mobile IP point of view. It acts as a foreign agent, a NAS
and a header compression end point. The data link layer between the mobile
node and the PDSN is PPP [265] (for both IPv4 and IPv6). During the PPP-based
access authentication (either simple CHAP or PAP) the PDSN downloads Mobile
IP and subscription profile information from the AAA server (AAAL, a RADIUS
server) possible routed through a local (or visited) network AAA proxy (AAAH,
a RADIUS proxy). Once the Mobile IP registration procedure starts, the PDSN
intercepts it in a role of a foreign agent. One of the enhancements 3GPP2 did at




























Figure 4.1: 3GPP2 CDMA2000 networking architecture with Mobile IPv4
this phase was the AAA-based dynamic home agent assignment. The PDSN is
able to insert a home agent address to Mobile IP registration requests. In addition
to the access authentication, the mobile node still needs to register and authen-
ticate to the home agent. The Mobile IP authentication is based on a pre-shared
secret. Authentication keys are distributed between home agents and the AAA
using 3GPP2 specific mechanisms. The security between a PDSN and a home
agent is based on Mobile IPv4 FAHA authentication extension, again using pre-
shared secrets. Additional security may be provided using an IPsec tunnel bet-
ween the PDSN and the home agent.
Mobile IP based handovers are only needed when the mobile node roams bet-
ween PDSNs. In other cases the mobility is handled within the radio access net-
work. A home agent is an anchor for mobility and a gateway to external net-
works. The home agent may be located either in the home network or in the
visited network (if the allocation of local home agents is supported). In the case
of simple IP service, there is no need to use Mobile IP or forward traffic through
the home agent.
3GPP2 architecture has a generic IPv6 support, including Mobile IPv6. The use
of Mobile IPv6 tries to mimic the security model of Mobile IPv4. That was not the
original intention of the Mobile IPv6 standard. 3GPP2 Mobile IPv6 implementa-
tion must support a number of IETF Mobile IPv6 RFCs [165, 236, 237]. However,
3GPP2 implementation of Mobile IPv6 security uses the authentication option
[237] instead of IPsec.
Recent work around 3GPP2 IP Mobility include the introduction of WLAN inter-
working and EAP-based authentication [36]. WLAN interworking introduces
a Packet Data Interworking Function (PDIF) which is actually a Mobile IP aware
IKEv2/MOBIKE IPsec gateway. Other enhancements include allocation of local
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home agents [34], Mobile IPv6 enhancements (bootstrapping) [35], Fast Mobile
IPv6 support [33], and PPP-less i.e. EAP-based access authentication [37].
The value of 3GPP2 Mobile IP deployment experience has been significant.
Although all solutions have not been the most elegant, those have fed valu-
able practical knowledge and experience of large Mobile IP deployment chal-
lenges. Especially the integration of Mobile IP and IETF defined AAA proto-
cols to mobile operator backend has provided valuable information. Also the
deployment experience has driven further development on Mobile IP bootstrap-
ping, Mobile IPv6 enhancements and hybrid IP Mobility solutions [36, 91]. The
influence of 3GPP2 architectural solutions are clearly visible in the forthcoming
Mobile WiMAX architecture.
4.3 Mobile WiMAX Architecture
Fixed WiMAX architecture resembles a typical DSL deployment architecture [302].
Mobile WiMAX [300] enhances fixed WiMAX architecture by adding IP Mobility.
There is mobility at two layers, in the radio access network between base stations
within one Access Service Network (ASN) (so called ASN anchored mobility) or bet-
ween ASNs. Mobility between ASNs is called Connectivity Service Network (CSN)
anchored mobility or R3 mobility (both at IP level).
Mobile WiMAX inherits a great deal of 3GPP2 CDMA2000 architecture when it
comes to realization of the IP Mobility solutions. It can be argued whether it is
a positive or a negative issue. Since the beginning Mobile WiMAX standardiza-
tion has been influenced greatly by the same vendors and operators that were
involved with 3GPP2 CDMA2000. Mobile WiMAX IP Mobility is likewise based
on Mobile IP. It also has the concept of Simple IP that only contains ASN anchored
mobility.
4.3.1 Architectural Principles
Figure 4.2 illustrates a roaming architecture of a Mobile WiMAX network. Mobile
WiMAX IP Mobility solution is entirely based on Mobile IP. The Release 1.0 (here-
after R1) provides basic Client Mobile IPv4 (CMIPv4), Client Mobile IPv6 (CMIPv6)
with authentication option based security [237] and Proxy Mobile IPv4 (PMIPv4).
The Release 1.5 (hereafter R1.5) will add Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [135] and
replace CMIPv6 with DSMIPv6. User plane traffic between a mobile node and a
home agent is reverse tunneled (when Mobile IP is applied).
Like in 3GPP2 CDMA2000, Mobile WiMAX does not have a concept of an APN.
The subscriber is always provided only with the default IP connectivity to exter-
nal networks. WiMAX link model is point-to-point, although the underlying
technology provides point-to-multipoint and connection oriented delivery of data
packets [200].
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Figure 4.2: Mobile WiMAX networking architecture with Mobile IP
The Access Service Network Gateway (ASN-GW) is the central node in the access
network infrastructure from Mobile IP and AAA point of view. It acts, for exam-
ple, as a foreign agent, PMIP client, a NAS, an authenticator for EAP-based authen-
tication, key holder, header compression end point and a termination point of
the logical point-to-point tunnel originating from the mobile node. The AAA
infrastructure is similar to that of 3GPP2 CDMA2000 that was shown in Figure
4.1. Mobile WiMAX has also adopted 3GPP Policy Control and Charging framework
(PCC) [21] with its Policy & Charging Resource Function (PCEF), Policy & Charg-
ing Enforcement Function (PCEF) and Subscriber Policy Repository (SPR) functions.
Mobile WiMAX has enhanced 3GPP PCC to its own needs (PCC for example lacks
policy enforcement function relocation).
Mobile WiMAX mandates EAP-based authentication (unlike fixed WiMAX that
also supports RSA-based authentication). There are two types of authentica-
tion procedures: device authentication and user authentication. They can be done
as two separate EAP-authentications (the double-EAP mode) or as a single EAP-
authentication (the single-EAP mode). Supporting device authentication is not
mandatory and subject to operator’s policy. The used EAP-method must export
a Master Session Key (MSK) and generate an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)
[41]. For example EAP-TLS [45], EAP-AKA [58] and EAP-TTLS [115] are well-
known and widely implemented key generating EAP-methods. Each WiMAX
terminal is pre-provisioned with a X.509 [159] certificate that makes the use of
certificate based EAP-methods easy. The deployment of single-EAP is unlikely,
mainly because it is a WiMAX specific. Both device and user authentication can
still be executed with one EAP-negotiation using EAP-TTLS. The outer method
authenticates the device and the inner method authenticates the user (however,
the EAP-TTLS first needs to be revised to support cryptobinding between the
outer and inner methods).
The EAP-authentication has a central role in Mobile WiMAX security. All subse-
quent key material for ASN anchored mobility, DHCP security and especially for
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CMIP & PMIP signaling security are derived either from the MSK or the EMSK
generated as a result of the EAP-based network authentication. Tight integra-
tion with the EAP solves provisioning and distribution of mobility related key
material but on the other hand makes integrating Mobile WiMAX ASN directly
to other non-WiMAX backends challenging. EAP might not be an integral part of
other networking systems and architectures.
The bootstrapping of Mobile IP including the dynamic allocation of home agents
and HoAs is close to that in 3GPP2 architecture. Mobile WiMAX distinguishes
between different flavors of Mobile IP signaling traffic using dynamically but
deterministically generated SPI codes in Mobile IP control messages. Mobile
WiMAX uses DHCP as a trigger to enable PMIP (i.e. the clientless network based
mobility support). In the case of CMIP a WiMAX terminal is not expected to initi-
ate DHCP, which is not actually the case with all commercially available 3rd party
CMIP stacks.
Mobile IP based handovers are needed only when the mobile node moves bet-
ween ASNs. In other cases the mobility is handled within the radio access net-
work. A home agent is the anchor for mobility and a gateway to external net-
works when Mobile IP is used. In the case of simple IP service, there is no need to
forward all traffic to the home agent. A tight integration of IP Mobility functions
to both EAP-framework and lower layers are expected to enable seamless mobil-
ity and handovers that meet real-time traffic requirements. For example, in the
ASN anchored mobility or when the mobile node roams within the same Network
Access Provider (NAP), the EAP-authentication does not need to go past the local
key holder. Therefore the latencies originating from AAA protocols and the full
EAP-authentication with the CSN AAA backend can be avoided. As long as the
ASNs are under the same NAP, ASN-GWs may well perform context transfers as
specified for Mobile WiMAX.
Mobile WiMAX R1.5 introduces Proxy Mobile IPv6. Other new features that
impact IP Mobility include Multicast Broadcast Services (MBS). The MBS also spec-
ifies how the multicast and broadcast traffic should be handled when all traffic
from the mobile node is supposed to be reverse tunneled to the home agent [77].
There is also an attempt to migrate the AAA infrastructure from RADIUS to
Diameter.
There are chances that Mobile WiMAX ASN could be attached, for example,
directly to future 3GPP architecture as any access network technology. However,
the existing R1.0 interworking solutions with other mobile architectures have a
loose integration approach [303, 304].
4.4 3GPP Evolved Packet System Architecture
3GPP GSM/GPRS is the most deployed wireless architecture. Currently there
are over two billion subscribers worldwide, which is several times more than
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all other systems together. 3GPP GPRS introduced packet switched services (i.e.
IP-based services) to GSM architecture. The IP Mobility and session continuity
is completely handled on the network side using the 3GPP defined GTP proto-
col. The 3GPP Evolved Packet System (EPS)1 for Release-8 introduces IP layer han-
dovers to a number of different non-3GPP access technologies. The technology
of choice is Mobile IP, actually several flavors of Mobile IP. The 3GPP EPS must
support Mobile IPv4 in FA-CoA mode, DSMIPv6 and Proxy Mobile IPv6. For
example, there is a strong push from industry to tightly integrate Mobile WiMAX
ASN to 3GPP Release-8 Evolved Packet Core (EPC) as any other native RAN.
4.4.1 Architectural Principles
Figure 4.3 illustrates a basic non-roaming architecture of the 3GPP Evolved Packet
System with its core networking nodes and interfaces between nodes. The archi-
tecture and the development has been divided into two tracks. From incumbent
GSM operators point of view GPRS enhancements for Enhanced-UTRAN [28]
is obviously very important part. Attaching any other access technology to the
EPC is part of the architecture enhancements for non-3GPP access [27]. Although
the GPRS enhancement EPC part relies mostly on the evolution of the exist-
ing 3GPP technology, some rather fundamental changes are introduced protocol
wise. Diameter protocol should replace SS7-based MAP [19] between the Mobility
Management Entity (MME) and the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and Proxy Mobile
IPv6 should replace GTP between the Serving Gateway (SGW) and the Packet Data
Network Gateway (PDN-GW). These changes, that at the first sight look minor,
have a huge impact on inter-operator roaming arrangements and agreements.
Currently all GPRS roaming is MAP and GTP-based (excluding 3GPP Interwork-
ing WLAN that took first steps towards AAA-based roaming). The transition
phase is expected to last years. This probably gives a reason to develop a number
of interworking functions that try to overcome the transition phase issues, such
as Diameter to MAP conversions or GTP to Proxy Mobile IPv6 interworking. The
fact that the architecture is not capable to handle transition as part of the archi-
tectural design is not a sign of solid architecture. However, operators are partly
to blame as they want smooth evolution path, not larger revolutions.
3GPP EPS has several key nodes. HSS is the central database regarding sub-
scriber and session information, and PDN-GW terminates all user plane traffic
and serves as the IP-layer mobility management anchor. The AAA server could
actually be integral part of the HSS, although it has now been logically separated.
The SGW is mainly used in roaming situations and can also serve as a mobility
anchor for local breakout. In non-roaming cases the SGW and the PDN-GW can
be collapsed into one node. The MME is only part of signaling plane and has to
some extent a similar role that legacy SGSN used to have. The Policy and Charg-
ing Control (PCC) is divided to PCRF (the policy decision function) and PCEF
(the policy enforcement function). Usually a PCRF is located in the IP Mobility
1Evolved Packet System was previously called System Architecture Evolution (SAE) and these
terms may safely be used interchangeably
















































Figure 4.3: 3GPP Evolved Packet System networking architecture based on Mobile IP and
AAA interfaces
anchor (such as the PDN-GW). As a result of local breakouts and the use of SGW
in roaming cases, there needs to be two instances of PCEFs. Similarly the decision
making must be divided between home and visited network PCRFs. Such a com-
plex arrangement is justified by overall architectural decisions and an alignment
with other architectures (such as Mobile WiMAX).
The intended 3GPP EPS is intensively heterogeneous when it comes to IP Mobil-
ity protocols and authentication methods. The GPRS enhancements deploy AKA-
based authentication and the non-3GPP can use anything that is available in the
access network. If the non-3GPP access is part of the EPC then the authentication
is typically EAP-based. All the AAA is supposed to be Diameter based. Earlier
architecture releases allowed both RADIUS and Diameter on multiple interfaces.
That has turned out to be hard to maintain and caused postponing of Diameter
deployments.
The IP Mobility is supposed to be an overlay on top of the whole 3GPP EPS.
However, the intended deployment model for Proxy Mobile IPv6 is driving the
architecture to a direction where both access networks and terminals must actu-
ally be fully aware of the IP Mobility solution. Therefore, it is not really adequate
to talk about an overlay. Operators who wish to detach the access network part
from the services part may find this architectural development going to a wrong
direction. A host based solution (e.g. DSMIPv6) for IP Mobility without any arti-
ficial coupling with the access network provider still allows better separation of
operator roles. Unfortunately, host based IP Mobility is not mandated on terminal
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side. Another controversial issue in the 3GPP EPS architecture are the definitions
of trusted and untrusted networks. These definitions cannot be decided by the
architecture but rather by operators when they roll out networks. A network that
appears as a trusted for one operator might be untrusted for another operator.
Creating an architecture that manages a tight integration with both 3GPP2 net-
work and Mobile WiMAX ASN is far from trivial. Due to multiple diverse ambi-
tions from infrastructure vendors as well as operator community, the completion
of the 3GPP EPS architecture has taken longer than anyone envisioned. Therefore,
there is a market need for a midterm IP Mobility solution that does not require
full Release-8 EPS functionality and can be deployed prior completion of Release-
8 products [20]. Such solution is going to be built on extending 3GPP Interwork-
ing WLAN. ePDG, the evolution of Interworking WLAN PDG already provides
access from any IP network, securely and using EAP-based access authentication
over IKEv2. The mobility will be handled with DSMIPv6. The home agent may
either be part of the GGSN (emphasis on smooth evolution towards the PDN-
GW) or a standalone node behind the GGSN and the ePDG (easy to deploy). Fur-
thermore, the DSMIPv6 security and bootstrapping are based on IKEv2 [90, 117].
Thus, it is not really necessary to deploy ePDG for security reasons. The Inter-
working WLAN mobility solution would actually be a true overlay over all IP
access technologies without the burden of the PCC architecture and other tight
integration. The IKEv2 bootstrapping even allows preserving the APN concept
over DSMIPv6 connections using exactly the same methods that were specified
for Interworking WLAN [12, 104]. It is fair to question the need for Release-8 IP
Mobility if an operator deploys the Interworking WLAN based simpler IP Mobil-
ity solution.
4.5 Inter-operator Roaming for IP Services
One of the success factors of GSM is said to be that it works practically every-
where. Naturally, large deployment base has contributed to the expansion of the
coverage. A global coverage can hardly be expected from a single mobile opera-
tor and this is the situation where an inter-operator roaming gets into the picture.
GSM Circuit Switched (CS) services and GPRS Packet Switched (PS) services pro-
vide well defined roaming capabilities. Consequently even small regional mobile
operators can offer their subscribers a global scale service offering through roam-
ing contracts with other operators. This section introduces one of the roaming
environments that has been designed for IP-based services.
4.5.1 GPRS Roaming Exchange
A GPRS Roaming Exchange (GRX) [132] is a commercial and an Inter-service Pro-
vider IP network that offers guaranteed QoS in a secure environment. The GRX
is mainly used in within the GSM community to handle 2.5/3G PS roaming traf-
fic [121] late 1990s. It was originally meant to transport only GTP and DNS traffic,
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and intended to serve only core network nodes. Today, dozens of GRX providers
inter-connect hundreds of GSM operators and serve their roaming needs. Today
GRX is not only for GPRS traffic but also for Multimedia Messaging (MMS) [122],
IMS [127] and AAA traffic. The evolution of the GRX is called an IP Exchange
(IPX) [132]. The IPX is similar to the GRX but meant to carry any kind of IP-
based traffic, includes hubbing and proxying services (for example IMS and MMS
Hubs/Proxies for easier inter-connection). The IPX also allows non-GSM oper-
ators to join the IPX roaming environment. Figure 4.4 illustrates the base line
architecture.
In the future 3GPP PCC will also utilize GRX/IPX as its roaming and intercon-
nection IP backbone. It is also foreseen that any Mobile IP based roaming could
be moved over to the GRX/IPX. This could cover all 3GPP EPS/LTE, 3GPP2
CDMA2000 and Mobile WiMAX mobile system architectures’ roaming needs.
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Figure 4.4: The GPRS Roaming Exchange / IP Exchange – the roaming network used by
a number of operators for their IP-based roaming and inter-connection traffic
GRX is a closed IP network isolated from the Internet. Due to its business critical
role in the GPRS roaming, there are a number of restrictions and rules defined
for the GRX. Operators and GRX providers are obligated to adhere those. The
GRX uses public IP addressing, although the routes are not advertised by the
Internet routing system. Similarly, none of the routes advertised in the Internet
are advertised by the GRX routing system. The GRX has its own DNS hierarchy
and a root DNS [129]. The DNS is completely isolated from the Internet and
tailored to serve 3GPP operators. The GRX DNS has, for example, following
top level domains: .grx, .gprs and .3gppnetwork.org. The last top level domain is
meant to deprecate all the others in a long run. Each GRX operator and mobile
operator have their own DNS servers. All these DNS servers are under the GRX
DNS hierarchy. A separate service provider outside GRX providers takes care of
running the root DNS service.
Recently, IP-based services have started to require that terminals using the Inter-
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net side IP addressing also participate in a services’ gateway discovery. In most
cases the discovery involves DNS. It became evident that parts of the GRX DNS
namespace must also be visible in the Internet. As a result, GSMA and 3GPP
came up with pub.3gppnetwork.org [6] top level domain that is provisioned only in
the Internet DNS. It allows a discovery of gateway nodes that are located in bet-
ween the GRX and the Internet. Furthermore, the 3gppnetwork.org domain is also
provisioned in the Internet with a sole purpose of catching leaked DNS queries
from GRX and offloading traffic from the Internet root DNS servers. Another
recent addition to the GRX DNS is ENUM [107] support that is needed by IMS
services.
The closed structure of the GRX allows provisioning of QoS [123] and hopefully
with a better success than in the heterogeneous Internet. The GRX also has other
restrictions that aim to make QoS provisioning possible. One of those is that no
more than two GRX providers are allowed between two operators that wish to
roam with each other. The objective for such requirement is that it would be
easier to enforce end to end QoS requirements through Service Level Agreements
(SLA) [126] and actually have possibility manage such QoS enabled environment.
The QoS is based on the Differentiated Services and the marking uses commonly
agreed on Differentiated Service Code Points (DSCP) [68, 120].
The GRX is also considered a secure and trusted environment. Due to its closed
nature there are no security threats originating from inside the GRX. Similarly,
attacks originating from the Internet never reach the nodes within the GRX. As
a result, for example, all GPRS traffic between operators is transported without
any VPN technology for further security [131].
4.5.2 Extensible Authentication Protocol Based WLAN Roaming
WLAN roaming was the driver for AAA-based roaming in the GRX. GSM Associ-
ation2 (GSMA) ran a number of WLAN roaming trials that concentrated on EAP-
SIM/AKA [58,141] roaming over RADIUS. These roaming trials gave GSM oper-
ators valuable practical insight on overall AAA-based roaming and interworking.
These trials and related activities produced and contributed to a number of doc-
uments [1, 47, 56, 124, 125, 133, 157, 285].
The WLAN roaming trials brought up few issues that may sound minor, but
became crucial from deployments perspective. The management overhead of the
realm based AAA routing will develop to a burden. The realm routing entries
need to be managed manually due to the lack of ”AAA routing protocols”. Fur-
thermore, the current model of roaming using bilateral agreements tends to real-
ize as a mesh of VPN tunnels between each roaming partner. The ”mesh” model
has obvious management and scaling challenges. The first issue of the realm
based routing could be solved with Diameter. Diameter allows provisioning of
realm information into the DNS. Providing realm routing information in the GRX
2http://www.gsmworld.com
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DNS would solve the management and provisioning issue in majority of cases for
operators when using Diameter.
A practical short term solution is WLAN Roaming Proxies hosted by each GRX
provider. An operator would simply forward all their roaming AAA traffic to
their preferred GRX provider’s roaming proxy. The proxy would then take care of
the routing. Roaming proxies also help with the VPN issue. Instead of setting up
a VPN per roaming partner the operator would only configure a single (logical)
VPN to its preferred GRX provider’s roaming proxy. GRX providers take care of
forwarding the roaming AAA traffic to a correct receiver.
Another issue that was of a great importance relate to the charging. It was real-
ized that existing methods for transferring billable user identities between net-
works using either User-Name or Class RADIUS attributes were not adequate.
User privacy and the fact that EAP-methods may have different inner and outer
identities led to the development of Chargeable User Identity (CUI) [47]. The visited
network needs a stable identity for all charging that the home network charging
system could easily map to an actual roaming subscriber. Since then the CUI has
been adopted by several architectures that utilize EAP-based authentication.
GSMA defined WLAN roaming is not the only WLAN roaming architecture.
Organizations such as Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA) and roaming aggre-
gators such as iPASS have a well established footprint in the WLAN roaming
business. Until recently all these organizations have been distinct. The EAP-
based roaming is also emerging outside GSMA, and it has become evident that it
would benefit all if these different roaming architectures could inter-operate.
4.6 Interworking between Wireless Architectures
The introduction of multi-mode mobile terminals has enabled roaming in dif-
ferent wireless network architectures using a single terminal. This has created
a pressure of creating interworking functions between different architectures.
There are two basic approaches to solve the interworking:
Tightly coupled interworking, where originally different architectures get
integrated as a whole, one monolithic architecture. For example, 3GPP2
CDMA2000 radio access network would be made as one of 3GPP radio
access network technology. This kind of interworking is typically hardest
to achieve.
Loosely coupled interworking, where interworking is implemented only at
a service level. For example, 3GPP PS services were accessible via 3GPP2
CDMA2000 radio access network, although the architectures were other-
wise completely separate. This kind of interworking can be implemented
using roaming and application level interworking.
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Yet another way of solving the interworking between different wireless network
architectures is completely putting aside all system specific interworking func-
tions and treat all accesses as any IP access. IP Mobility solution would be con-
sidered as an overlay on top of all different access systems and wireless architec-
tures. This would be a form of complete separation of access and service operator
models. The service operator would be an ”overlay operator” using any IP access
and having only a roaming relationship with all different access operators. The
only requirement for this kind of IP Mobility enabled, access system independent
services deployment would require the ”overlay operator” to deploy an IP Mobility
anchor and an AAA backend for the subscriber management.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter we gave an overview of three major wireless network architec-
tures: 3GPP Release-8 Evolved Packet System, 3GPP2 CDMA2000 and Mobile
WiMAX R1.0. All the mentioned architectures use Mobile IP protocol variants for
their macro mobility. We identified some of the essential commonalities and dif-
ferences between these architectures. 3GPP Evolved Packet System architecture
is the architecture of the most interest and actually is capable of providing inter-
working with both Mobile WiMAX and 3GPP2 access systems. Currently it looks
like the 3GPP Release-8 may develop to the dominant architecture that eventu-
ally suspends further next generation development on other currently existing
mobile architectures.
We also described briefly the existing GRX/IPX inter-operator roaming environ-
ment between GPRS operators for IP-based services. We discussed the AAA-
based roaming in a mobile operator context that was driven by the attempt to
establish WLAN roaming re-using SIM-based authentication. The WLAN roam-
ing attempts served as a good trial for the future AAA-based roaming infrastruc-
ture that will serve various wireless and fixed network architectures in the future.
We identified several charging and deployment issues with rather simple AAA-
based roaming arrangements that required further standardization efforts to ful-
fill requirements of commercial roaming networks. The forthcoming transition
to all IP-based roaming and interconnection networks that serve multiple mobile
and fixed access technologies will develop new research problems as a result of
increasing complexity and diversity of networking architectures, and the grow-
ing requirement of configuration agility on roaming network arrangements.







Model for Operation in
Multi-Access Networks
The existing inter-operator roaming model is largely based on the circuit switched
voice roaming. The rather recent deployment of packet switched roaming, such
as the GPRS roaming, has shown that the old fashioned bi-lateral, operator to
operator roaming model is indeed a managerial burden, and conservative to
any infrastructure changes. Furthermore, most roaming communities are either
focused to limited number of access technologies, authentication methods or just
exclude respectable operators and providers based on non-technical merits. This
chapter discusses inter-operator roaming in future heterogeneous multi-access
networks and presents a model with a number of requirements that are foreseen
for efficient deployment of seamless multi-access roaming and IP Mobility.
5.1 Current Model and Challenges
Public access to mobile network access is gaining increased diversity, both in
terms of the types of access technologies, in terms of the diversity of the offering
with a clear separation of roles between access and service providers. This diver-
sity has been compounded by increasing number of multi-access capable termi-
nals equipped with IP technologies, and of operator-provided multi-technology
mobile connection software. Overall, this creates a complex roaming environ-
ment, where the mobile node might not have enough information or even the
possibility to make an intelligent handover or an inter-operator roaming deci-
sion. In fact, handover decisions and inherent target network selection is not
necessarily anymore based on access availability but further depends on policies
and commercial roaming arrangements on access network level, access provi-
der level and service provider level. Furthermore, the information required for
an intelligent target network selection might change periodically with such a fre-
quency that maintaining all knowledge and intelligence in the mobile node might
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not be viable anymore. Some of this information is only available for network
elements at various levels on the provider hierarchy. Actual mobility protocols
are decoupled from the handover decision making process, unless handovers are
only reactive in form of movement detection.
Handovers across administrative domains are not explicitly prohibited by the
existing IP Mobility enabling protocols, but at the same time these protocols are
not designed or optimized for such cases. Also a general network controlled
triggering mechanism for a handover from an administrative domain to another
does not currently exists. Some initial work in this direction has been introduced,
for instance, in Media Independent Handover framework (MIH) [155] and Handover
Keying (HOKEY) [82] work.
Another topical issue in a multi-access roaming is the lack of configuration agility.
A roaming infrastructure and operators’ configurations are very static. For exam-
ple, in GPRS roaming that uses GRX inter-operator IP backbone, any change in
the infrastructure of the participating operators require rather time consuming
procedure updating various management databases that actually may have lit-
tle to do with the actual technical part of the roaming [130]. Updates to DNS
and AAA routing tables within one operator domain might have whole roam-
ing infrastructure wide side effects, thus those need to be coordinated centrally.
Within the original GRX concept even protocols that were routed over the inter-
operator IP backbone required central coordination procedure [132]. In the worst
case introducing a new service requires standardization efforts in one or more
SDOs [7, 129]. On some arrangements, where a mobile node side software is
required for roaming management (e.g. various phone or service books), the config-
uration of relevant gateway information may be as low-level as IP addresses or
FQDNs. These are not centrally coordinated. In a case like this general configu-
ration management becomes a real issue.
Roaming consortiums or roaming infrastructures also were selective on operators
and providers who were accepted to join. Similar treatment was also applied to
different access technologies, authentication and accounting methods. For exam-
ple, GRX was originally meant only for GSM/GPRS operators. Within GRX some
of these strict restrictions are now being relaxed along the introduction of IPX
inter-operator IP backbone concept [132]. The former constraints and lack of con-
figuration agility does not favor rapid development of new IP-based services,
introduction of new technologies, and deployment of new access technologies
with equivalent inter-operator roaming and inter-working capabilities. After all,
global roaming and guaranteed interworking was one of the success factors of
GSM. Too much conservatism on the infrastructure side leads, in a long run,
to increased heterogeneity as operators and providers seek alternative, and less
restrictive deployment possibilities. Yet, coordinated inter-operator roaming and
inter-connection infrastructures have their benefits as discussed in Section 4.5.1.
Evolving operator business models are also setting new requirements to inter-
operator roaming and inter-connection infrastructure. First, the fixed network
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public Internet as such has demonstrated to be a platform for spontaneous and
innovative new services development. Second, the whole services environment
in the Internet has different mentality. Users are accustomed to seemingly free
network access and services billing models that are predictable. Third, service
providers in the Internet side are typically regulated from authorities side com-
pletely differently or not at all compared to telecom operators. One could argue
that this kind of treatment is unfair towards operators. However, one could also
argue that the situation is due to slow reaction from authorities’ side. Regulative
issues are bound to change when new players from the Internet side enter the
areas that used to belong to telecom operators.
It is naive to assume that slowly reacting traditional monolithic operators could
compete against players on their own main services area that do not want to play
with same rules and restrictions operators have. Typically, service providers treat
any access as a bit-pipe without any added value. Probably traditional opera-
tors should simply accept that, adapt to the new situation and move on rather
than trying to fight against it. This development also drives the separation of an
access operator and a services operator in the traditional operator world. With a
clean separation of roles there are no artificial bonds and charing models between
accesses and services. Additionally, the separation supports easier establishment
of virtual operator model, where an operator at bare minimum is only responsible
for its subscribers management and collecting charging data. There is no need
to invest to the deployment of access network infrastructure or auction of radio
spectrum. Recently Universal Mobile Access (UMA) [279] demonstrated that it is
possible to enter established markets as a challenger without a need to invest on
access infrastructure (UMA enables GSM/GPRS calls over any IP access, such as
residential WLANs connected to consumer xDSL lines). Virtual GSM operators
and wireless data access providers do already exist. However, it is typical in the
existing arrangements that the virtual operator is bound to access providing oper-
ators’ subscription management and coverage. For example, the virtual operator
could just actually be ”reselling” a part of some existing operator’s subscription
space. Furthermore, the virtual operator is restricted to its only access provid-
ing operator’s network coverage and roaming contracts. These approaches do
not guarantee the desired flexibility from the virtual operator point of view and
cause unnecessary management overhead to the access providing operator.
However, the situation should not be that desperate for traditional operators.
Assuming that authorities catch up with regulations on all telecom-like services,
independent of the type of the service provider, then existing operators have the
advantage of already gone through the regulatory issues and investments of set-
ting up their infrastructure . The same also applies to subscriber management,
service provisioning and delivery logistics, global roaming and inter-connection
infrastructure with QoS capability. Furthermore, at least 3GPP operators have
well defined security architecture in place including smart cards (i.e. UICC cards)
with security features delivered to every subscriber. Also, mobile operators have
the most efficient and capable charging systems. The charging system used by
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3GPP operators is able to provide cost efficient micro payment services as part of
the general mobile billing even for people that do not have access to credit cards.
When considering the separation of the access and services, it is commonly not
admitted by free access advocates that any network without professional man-
agement saturate at some point. This is especially true when out of sudden the
services provided over these seemingly free accesses get highly popular and start
generating traffic at high rates. Building managed networks is also an economi-
cal and management burden for operators. This has resulted to access operators
to think of sharing the access networks, thus also sharing the costs. 3GPP net-
work sharing [30] was one of the first and already deployed solutions in this field.
Mobile WiMAX has taken this aspect into consideration from the beginning and
has standardized NAP sharing as part of the R1 architecture.
One of the recent developments on the mobility front relate to the general abil-
ity to negotiate policies for various services. These policies include but are not
limited to QoS definitions for certain types of traffic flows, traffic restrictions and
various definitions of events based on service and access related actions. 3GPP
has defined rather complex policy architecture called Policy and Charging Con-
trol framework (PCC) [21] for their Release-7 and onwards architectures. PCC
includes both push and pull QoS modes, and tight integration to IP Multimedia
Subsystem (IMS) [18] based services. The overall implementation of PCC to 3GPP
SAE architecture was already shown in Figure 4.3.
Other SDOs outside 3GPP have also expressed their interest towards PCC (such
as Mobile WiMAX R1.5). Since then the framework has been reworked to be
more access technology agnostic (it was way too GPRS centric) and also to allow
relocation of Policy & Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) if IP Mobility anchors
need to be relocated. Another issue relates to classifying and identifying traffic
flows based on types of traffic. Due to the wide use of IPsec technologies, access
and service operators have little chances to find out the real traffic type accurately.
In many cases the guess is probably wrong anyway. Thus, it is questionable to
invest to complex policy engines and deep packet inspection technologies. It
would make more sense to concentrate in coarse classes for policing and QoS
control, and neglect the fact that some traffic types within the classified flow are
incorrect intentionally.
5.2 Proposed Deployment Model
In this dissertation we propose a model for roaming and inter-connection, and the
separation of operators’ roles. The following sections discuss the issues related to
the inter-operator roaming and interworking in a future multi-access and multi-
operator networks.
5.2. PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT MODEL 85
5.2.1 Separation of Operator Roles
Separation of the operational roles could be one approach for (mobile) operators
to focus on their key expertise and business areas. One possible separation of
roles and a conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The separation and
its requirements are described in the following sections. In this dissertation we
describe a model where the traditional mobile operator world is divided into:
Services domain – contains a number of service and virtual operators concen-
trating only on providing value added services to their end users subscribers
and customer. Operator in this domain owns the subscription.
Roaming and inter-connection domain – contains a number of Internet Service
Provider IP network backbone providers that work in highly controlled,
regulated and possibly isolated environment. All their customers are other
roaming and inter-connection providers, service and access operators.
Access domain – contains operators that concentrate on providing basic network
(IP) access over any access technology. Their customers are service opera-
tors and the access networks are inter-connected via the roaming and inter-
connection domain.
Each domain is preferably operated by a distinct set of operators but the model
is not limited to it. Access providers and service operators connect to a roaming
and inter-connection infrastructure using their edge AAA and gateway nodes (a
gateway node is here intentionally loosely defined, and it may participate to both






































Figure 5.1: Future roaming environment for multi-access and virtual operator model, and
presenting the separation of operator roles – presented from a virtual/service operator
point of view
The basic idea behind the separation is that the service and virtual operator on
services domain forms an overlay over any IP network using any possible access
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technology. The service operator defines the level of the security and quality of
service requirements that the accesses have to fulfill. There is no need for service
operators to invest to access network infrastructure deployments or auctions for
regulated radio spectrums. This will be beneficial for service and virtual opera-
tors when they enter new well established market areas in a challenger’s role. It
is even possible to develop chargeable telecom services that are accessible from
insecure free hotspots. Secure accesses from these insecure networks can be vir-
tualized to be part of the service operator’s safe roaming connections using IPsec
technologies as, for example, described in 3GPP Interworking WLAN [2, 3].
The service operator owns the end user subscription. The service operator may
also be responsible for all value added services for subscribers or then just act as
a broker towards 3rd parties offering services. The access operator on its side
provides access to any service operator that is willing to pay for the roaming
traffic and conforms to supported network access authentication and accounting
solutions. The roaming and inter-connection providers act as a glue between
service and access operators taking care of endpoint (i.e. operator) and service
discovery, routing various types of traffic flows (mainly control plane traffic but
also user plane depending on the service), and when required enforcing services
related policies between domains. Other roles might include acting as roaming
aggregator and providing transcoding services at least for control plane traffic.
The whole model will end up into one or more roaming relationships between a
service operator and access operators (bi-lateral roaming agreement). Alternatively
roaming and inter-connection providers may hide the roaming relationship mesh
from a service operator and just offer one contract towards the service operator
(multi-lateral roaming agreement and a roaming aggregator role). Figure 5.2 shows
a bi-lateral roaming agreement model from the service operator point of view. It
can also be the other way around from the access operator point of view. Figure
5.3 shows the same but using multi-lateral roaming agreement model.
One operator may operate on multiple domains. However, if an operator is, for
example, running both access and services there is tendency of assuming that
services or accesses are there for granted without proper competition. That will
at some point of time lead to biased attitude, treatment and charging of in-house
partners.
The model proposed in this dissertation is specifically crafted towards service
operators. The assumption for the service operators is that they have a relation-
ship with at least one 3GPP operator or that they posses 3GPP compliant authen-
tication backend (i.e. HLR and/or HSS). This assumption is purely for subscriber
management and authentication purposes as the most wide spread wireless IP
access technology is, after all, 3GPP defined GPRS.
The service operators are in a position of asking for the best access from any
access operator they have a roaming relation ship established, either bidirection-
ally or through a roaming aggregator. If an access operator does not fulfill service
operator’s requirements, the service operator can always switch to another with
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minimal effort. As networks are becoming increasingly heterogeneous, the over-
lapping of different access networks and access operators also become more com-
mon. One reason for this is that access operators try to improve their overall net-
work coverage and to increase the capacity on hotspots using multiple radio tech-
nologies. Another reason is that several operators want to benefit from the busy
hotspot locations. This development on the other hand gives service operators a
possibility to choose among multiple access operators within certain limited geo-
graphical area and use the access operator that fits best to their current service
needs. As a consequence, the service operators also require more from the mobil-
ity than just seamless handovers and session continuity at IP layer. They also
need precise policing of mobility decision making and efficient target network
selection. Some of these functions are to be implemented into their subscribers’
mobile terminals that should then be assisted from the network side (i.e. from the
service operator) in real-time.
The controlling of mobility and target network selection from network side is also
called steering of roaming (SOR) [128], which currently is weakly supported, if not
existing at all, in IP-based services. Steering of roaming as such is widely used
among GSM operators for circuit switched voice calls. However, the way steering
of roaming is enabled in GSM is far from optimal in performance and signaling
overhead point of view. The current approach is based on failing the network
attachment at the SS7 signaling level [128] in the home network when a mobile
terminal attempts to attach to a non-preferred operator network. This approach
is clearly inefficient due to large default timeout values, retransmission and also
because it generates significant amount of unnecessary signaling. For the future
roaming and inter-connection networks steering of roaming for IP-based services
should be handled in more efficient way.
The proposed model does not only favor service operators. If an access operator
is able to remain neutral to any service operator, there is no reason why the access
operator would not share its access with as many service operator as possible.
The access operator could also host a number of gateways for service operators
that wish to minimize network infrastructure investments on their side. Acting
as a IP mobility anchoring (such as Mobile IP home agents or Proxy Mobile IP
mobility anchors) operator is one possible form of provided gateway services.
The anchor operator could also be considered some form of aggregator on the
access network side.
5.2.2 Access Operator Domain
An access operator concentrates only on providing network access and focus-
ing to excel at that. One access operator may provide access over a number of
access technologies, including fixed networks. The access operator may or may
not (preferably) have any of its own end user subscribers. In the model proposed
in this dissertation, the access operator has minimal infrastructure outside net-
working entities required for access itself, relaying authentication and accounting
information, enforcing policies and connecting to a roaming and inter-connection











Figure 5.2: Service operator with bi-













Figure 5.3: Service operator with multi-
lateral roaming connections with an
aggregator that then handless further
connections to access operators
infrastructure. The access operator may also provide IP mobility supporting ser-
vices such as Media Independent Handover (MIH) [155] framework services and
local AAA services. The access operator should also have means to advertise its
access networks and roaming relationships to potential inbound roamers, prefer-
ably prior the attachment to the access network. Outside cellular networks, such
as 3GPP access networks, Mobile WiMAX has native support for network adver-
tisement. Similar network advertisement support should be available on any sup-
ported access network technology.
One of the key functions of the access operator is relaying the access authentica-
tion to the corresponding service operator via the roaming and inter-connection
infrastructure. The access operator acts as a pass-through authenticator during
the access authentication procedure. Depending on the access and authentication
technology it may also need to provide local cryptographic key holder function
for subsequent re-authentications [82, 154, 300]. The access operator does never
need to know the real identity of the user accessing its network. The inbound
roaming user is allowed to use the access network resources when the following
conditions are met:
There is a roaming relationship between the inbound roamer’s service pro-
vider or the roaming aggregator representing the inbound roamer and the
service operator.
The service provider accepts the network access authentication from the
said network access operator.
The service provider supplies a temporary user identity that the access
operator can use for roaming charging representing the inbound roaming
user, if and when the true identity of the user is hidden [47].
From the access operator point of view every mobile terminal in its network is
an inbound roaming user (assuming the operator does not have its own end user
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subscribers). It would be desirable that independent of the network access tech-
nology the access authentication technology could be unified. EAP [41] was an
attempt to achieve this. Regardless of the wide adoption of EAP, not all globally
deployed network access technologies support EAP. 3GPP 2G/3G has one of the
most deployed authentication methods that does not use EAP.
In general the access operator remains free of deploying any service platform
related infrastructure if it so wishes. However, policy enforcement may be tied
closely to the service the roaming user accesses through the access operator. For-
tunately, the policy enforcement can be made service agnostic from the access
operator point of view as long as the required signaling between domains is in
place. Of course the access operator takes part in the policy negotiation in order
to ensure that policies stay within agreed-on bounds. The mentioned ”bounds”
depend on the roaming agreements and service level agreements with service
operators, and with the roaming and inter-connection providers. The policy gets
downloaded at least during the access authentication procedure (in order to min-
imize signaling steps it should be piggy-backed with the actual authentication
signaling). Policies may also be changed dynamically mid-session. The change
of policies may initiate from the access network or from the service operator.
If the access operator has multiple access networks and possibly access technolo-
gies within the same geographical area it makes sense to deploy a local mobility
anchor and local breakouts for IP traffic. A local handling of the user plane traffic
would allow more natural routing of IP packets, reduce unnecessary and expen-
sive signaling and user data transmission over the roaming connection as well as
enable deployment of local breakouts for IP traffic. The allocation of the local IP
mobility anchor or allowing local breakouts is of course dependent on the service
specific policy negotiation between the access operator and the service opera-
tor [188]. However, most foreseen services do not require routing user plane over
the roaming and inter-connection network to the service operator network. Either
the services function adequately with the unpredictable Internet QoS or are more
efficiently handled locally; thus use of local breakouts and anchoring should be
preferred whenever possible. Favoring local handling of the user plane traffic in
access operator domain would also mean less pressure on traffic capacity invest-
ments in the service operator domain.
5.2.3 Service Operator Domain
A service operator is an entity that owns and manages end user subscriptions.
The service operator concentrates on offering services or brokering 3rd party ser-
vices to its subscribers. The service or rather the virtual operator provides ser-
vices over any (IP) access technology its subscribers are able to attach to and
roam into. Ideally, the service operator is an access technology agnostic overlay
on top of networks operated by a number of access operators. As a result, the ser-
vice operator does not need to deploy any concrete access technology or access
network. For the service operator every connection from an access network is a
bi-lateral or a multi-lateral roaming connection. The service operator pays to access
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operators, roaming and inter-connection providers for their services based on the
usage.
The service operator may host platforms for various value added services. Ide-
ally, the service platforms are access technology agnostic as long as they interop-
erate with service operator’s subscribers’ devices. One example of a well defined
service platform that has been designed especially for mobile operators is IMS.
An inherent part of any service platform is the subscriber management, authenti-
cation and accounting backend. For a smooth integration towards existing 3GPP
defined system and to maximize the independency from actual access operators
the service operator should also deploy HLR and HSS nodes along with the AAA
servers (such as RADIUS [257] and Diameter [71] servers). A flexible authentica-
tion, accounting and subscriber management backend promotes access technol-
ogy agnostic service platforms. Consequently, it also minimizes the dependency
on the access operator services other than plain (IP) access. As mentioned ear-
lier, the independency from access networks give service operators an advantage
when they enter new markets.
Some service deployment scenarios might need to rely on 3rd parties for the actual
service and subsequent service authorization. Hosted data solutions for enter-
prises and acting as a generic service aggregator are examples of such. GPRS
already supports service scenarios like this [16]. Unfortunately, the solution is
specific to GPRS access. 3GPP has defined similar functionality for 3GPP Inter-
working WLAN as well [17], which is not actually specific to IEEE 802.11 WLAN
in any way.
The service operators may deploy their own IP Mobility anchor nodes. As a
result, the service operator does not need to use any access operator as an anchor-
ing operator (i.e. the access aggregating operator) just to be able to provide seam-
less mobility at IP layer. The downside is that the service operator then needs
to invest to and deploy anchoring part of IP Mobility infrastructure. At the end
both modes of operation are supported, however, currently it seems that benefits
of deploying IP Mobility anchors justify the required investments for the service
operator. After all, it would give the service operator the total power of defin-
ing policies for services when IP Mobility is enabled and when not. It should be
noted that the IP Mobility discussed here relates to a global mobility. Access oper-
ators are still free to deploy their local IP Mobility anchors. Depending on the IP
Mobility solution, the use of local IP Mobility anchors may require authorization
from the service operator (as it is the case with host based Mobile IP).
As discussed briefly in Section 5.1 policies are of importance to operators. The
service operator is the entity hosting the Policy Decision Point (PDPQoS) that is the
highest in the hierarchy of policy related functional nodes. Section 6.4 will discuss
more about issues that are related to generic policy framework simplifications. In
a scope of the model described in this dissertation, there is one new feature that
needs more clarification, namely the steering of roaming for IP-based services. The
service operator should have a way to influence the target network selection of
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its subscribers. There must also be a possibility to initiate a new target network
selection mid-session (i.e., force a handover) from the service operator. From the
service operator point of view the justification for this functionality is to have a
method of influencing dynamically and in real-time the terminal’s inter-operator
roaming decisions. Selecting the best roaming partner in a certain location may
have a huge roaming tariff impact. The steering of roaming functionality could
be part of the network access authentication and general policy framework pro-
cedures. Another logical place to implement steering of roaming is part of the
MIH framework’s [155] Command Service (MICS) that will be discussed in more
detail in Section 6.4.5.
For the record, 3GPP compliant devices with UICC cards already have a prior-
itizeable list of roaming partners [23]. However, the updating of roaming and
target network selection related information in real-time has not been addressed
too well [24], so 3GPP has had to revisit its network selection principles [9]. Sub-
sequently they also have started to pay attention to non-3GPP access network
technologies [26] for the future releases of the network architecture.
5.2.4 Roaming and Inter-connection Provider Domain
A roaming and inter-connection provider is a special kind of Internet Service Provi-
der (ISP) that has specialized to offer services only for interconnecting other oper-
ators. Within this dissertation by ”other operators” we mean mobile operators,
fixed network operators and such that are somehow involved with telecom busi-
ness. The roaming and inter-connection or a group of them should be compliant
with any IP access technology and respective operator. This means that the roam-
ing and inter-connection infrastructure must also be compliant with GMS/GPRS
operator roaming [129, 132] and related restrictions. Actually, a good starting
point for a roaming and inter-connection infrastructure would be the evolved
version of GSMA defined GRX and IPX. However, ideally the roaming and inter-
connection network does not make any distinction of the access network operator
and its access technology type. The only real requirement is that the operator join-
ing the roaming and inter-connection network complies to general rules there are
for the whole environment, in a similar way there is currently for IPX.
The roaming and inter-connection infrastructure and namely its providers have
the following fundamental services to offer to both service and access operators:
Routing of traffic – secure and efficient IP and application level routing of traffic.
Application level routing refers to AAA and SIP traffic.
Naming and identity System – the roaming and inter-connection domain may
need to provide its own naming system functionality for various purposes
(as it is today with GRX based on private DNS hierarchy). The aim is to
avoid static configurations based in IP addresses and rather let everything
be based on identities that can be deterministically generated by network-
ing nodes connected to the roaming and inter-connection network (e.g.,
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hashes or FQDNs). The underlying infrastructure must then provide a
mechanism for resolving these pre-configured or dynamically generated
identities in timely manner to valid node addresses.
AAA – roaming will be more dependent on inter-operator AAA signaling than
ever. The roaming and inter-connection infrastructure provides functional
AAA proxy or relay network that allows routing of AAA traffic (such as
Diameter) between operators and the roaming and inter-connection net-
work providers.
Inter-working function – when heterogeneous access and mobile architectures
get inter-connected, the heterogeneity of e.g., SIP and AAA protocols pro-
files is inevitable. The inter-working function provides modifications bet-
ween different profiles via various application specific proxies. These roam-
ing proxies are value added services that roaming and inter-connection net-
work providers offer to their operator customers.
QoS awareness – the roaming and inter-connection network does not really take
part in the QoS and policy related negotiation between service and access
operators. It rather bases its traffic treatment to pre-established SLAs bet-
ween the service operators and the access operators. However, the whole
roaming and inter-connection network must be QoS aware.
Aggregation – a roaming and inter-connection provider may also act as a roam-
ing aggregator i.e. offer multi-lateral roaming agreements towards service
and access operators. The provider may also act as an accounting aggre-
gator, a clearinghouse and a 3rd party verifier of inter-operator user plane
traffic amount numbers.
Networks provided in the roaming and inter-connection domain are assumed
to be secure and isolated from public networks. Only inter-operator traffic is
allowed in there. Using IPsec for additional security is possible, but should not
really be required. On the other hand, tunneling may be needed for other reasons
such as handling of overlapping private address spaces. GRE [108] is often used
for such purposes. Roaming and inter-connection networks are primarily meant
for control plane (i.e., signaling) traffic. User plane traffic between operators may
also be transported over the roaming and inter-connection networks. However,
there is no way to prohibit service and access operators from using other net-
works, such as the Internet, for their user plane traffic. In some use cases using
other available networks is even encouraged. For instance, it does not gain any-
thing to route geographically local plain web-surfing traffic through the roaming
and inter-connection network.
The roaming and inter-connection provider can also provide tools for easier con-
figuration management. For example allowing Dynamic DNS updates [291] is
one approach of doing dynamic configuration management of operator network-
ing nodes, for example when there is a need to renumber, add or remove servers.
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This kind of configuration should be possible for operators to do without involv-
ing any other peer when doing changes. However, Dynamic DNS is known not to
be the most agile for distributing changes. Section 6.3 describes another method
of doing dynamic configuration in the said environment without causing even a
temporary inconsistency.
5.3 Multi-Access Roaming Requirements
The previous sections have described one possible deployment model for the
future multi-access operator networks, and concentrating on how to arrange roam-
ing and inter-connection within that model. We aim to summarize the proposed
model into a set of the most important requirements. The requirements have been
divided into three categories. The first category, that has not actually been dis-
cussed in great detail so far, deals with regulatory issues. The regulatory issues are
issued by the local authorities, and are subject to local, national and e.g., Euro-
pean Union laws. The second category concentrates on the infrastructure require-
ments. These requirements involve all service operator, access operator, and espe-
cially roaming and inter-connection network providers. The last category is of
service and access requirements and are specific to the service and access operators.
5.3.1 Regulatory Issues
The regulatory issues are for all service operators, access operators and roaming
and inter-connection providers:
R1 Location Awareness – Operators and providers may span multiple countries.
Especially service and virtual operators may not even have physical pres-
ence in countries they operate in. Regardless of this, local authorities must
have a way to ”hook into” the operator functions on ”need to” basis. The
operators as well as the roaming and inter-connection providers must be
aware of the location (at least in country level) where their customers oper-
ate in or connect from.
R2 Lawful interception – authorities must have feasible means to hook into oper-
ator functions for interception purposes. This must be possible even if the
virtual operator equipment or platforms are not physically present in some
country where the authorities wish to intercept the traffic. The lawful inter-
ception responsibilities are essentially on the service operator, and assisted
by the access operator.
R3 Emergency call support – any managed access network that is used to pro-
vide either circuit switched or packet switched (i.e. VoIP) voice call services,
must also provide emergency call support. It must be possible to initiate an
emergency call without valid subscription (which is especially the case for
roaming users).
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5.3.2 Infrastructure Requirements
The general infrastructure has a number of requirements that are mostly targeted
to the roaming and inter-connection networks and providers:
R4 Dynamic routing and forwarding – the traffic routing within the roaming
and inter-connection network should be dynamic. In case of AAA routing,
dynamic discovery of AAA agents (includes proxies and servers) based on
realms should be possible, as it is the case for DNS-based Diameter agent
discovery and request message routing.
R5 Flexible naming and service discovery system – the infrastructure wide nam-
ing system should allow frequent updates and rapid distribution of updated
information. Relying on centralized databases and information storages
should be actively avoided. The naming system should also support effi-
cient handling of identifiers that are not FQDNs such as E.164 numbers
[161] or International Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSI) [7]. Furthermore,
the naming system should allow discovery of services and gateways (such
as mobility anchors) of any operator based on some commonly agreed on
identifier convention. Last, the naming system should support making dif-
ference between country and operator boundaries, allowing the name space
management distribution based on regulatory grounds.
R6 Guaranteed QoS – the providers have QoS guarantees, even if the traffic tra-
verses more than one providers’ network. This could be achieved by reg-
ulating the number of networks and providers attaching to peering points,
and making sure that no traffic traverses through more than a pre-defined
number of networks.
R7 Implicitly secure environment – the roaming and inter-connection networks
should be secure by default and allow operators to form efficiently (even
dynamically) trust to trust relationships. This basically means that the roam-
ing and inter-connection networks form a virtually or even physically iso-
lated private network between selected parties. The connection between oper-
ators and roaming and inter-connection networks may need to be secured
with existing widely deployed security mechanism (such as IPsec).
R8 No traffic type restrictions – the roaming and inter-connection network sho-
uld not restrict the type of IP traffic transported over it as long as it is IP.
5.3.3 Service and Access Requirements
Following requirements mainly concentrate on a services deployment environ-
ment and what should be viewed as the bare minimum:
R9 Consistent charging models and predictable charging – end users should be
able to estimate rather accurately their roaming costs. In the model pro-
posed in this dissertation most, if not all, network connections are roaming
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connections. The current commercial roaming charging models vary signif-
icantly between access types and locations, thus rendering the whole roam-
ing charging completely unpredictable for the end users. Consequently, this
lowers the end user’s data usage significantly.
R10 National roaming – there should not be any restrictions for roaming users
of doing national roaming at access network operator level. The model pro-
posed in this dissertation relies heavily on roaming. The service and virtual
operator does not benefit in any way from artificial roaming restrictions.
R11 Unified AAA mechanisms – managing different authentication types will
be a management and operational burden for service operators. It will also
be deployment burden for access operators and device vendors to support
multiple distinct technologies. Furthermore, it should be possible to auto-
mate the authentication step completely and require no end user interven-
tion during the whole authentication process.
R12 QoS support – support for explicitly requested traffic QoS treatment should
exist. However, instead of complex 3GPP PCC type frameworks, a simple
downloading of one or more QoS profiles for different use cases (e.g., one
profile for interactive traffic and one profile for everything else) during the
network access authentication should serve as the minimum requirement
[194, 195].
R13 Network control for mobility – the service operator (and in some cases also
the access operator) should have a mechanism to initiate or rather suggest
mobile terminals to handover from their current point of attachment to a
new point of attachment [209]. This could be, for instance, implemented as
a part of the generic AAA or MIH framework. Also the same functional-
ity could be used to implement steering of roaming for IP-based services.
Ideally, the steering of roaming would take place during the target network
selection, not after the attachment.
R14 Use of locality – any signaling over the roaming and inter-connection infras-
tructure should be minimized and if just technically possible handled locally
whenever possible. Furthermore, the same applies for the user plane traffic
and mobility management as well. Local mobility anchors and local break-
outs for the user plane traffic are one way of exploiting locality. The use of
locally provided ”services” are of course subject to inter-operator policies
that need to be verified real-time when starting up services.
R15 Generic advertisement capability – for efficient target network selection dur-
ing handovers the access networks should have some mechanism to adver-
tise roaming partners and connections they have. Preferably it should be
possible for mobile nodes to query roaming information prior attempting
to authenticate to the network.
R16 privacy – a pure access operator does not need to know inbound roaming
users’ true identities. It should be enough for the access operator to know
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the service operator (for example based on the realm) and a service operator
provided temporary identity corresponding to the inbound roaming user.
The temporary identity should be usable for both charging and end user
session management. Also, location privacy of an inbound roaming user
should be supported.
5.4 Discussion
The presented requirements do not concern the management of the information
itself. The storage, caching and attribution of actual information is outside of
the scope of the model described in this dissertation. However, the roaming and
inter-working network could have an important role proving fundamental assist-
ing services for efficient information networking. These services could include
caching, naming, identity and discovery services.
The intention of the presented requirements is not to encourage continuing with
the existing rather closed data roaming model established in the mobile comput-
ing. However, the expected migration phase from the existing model to evolved
model is expected to take considerable amount of time, it is imperative that the
old model can coexists with the evolved one. The balance between closed sys-
tem and openness is also hard to define. Both have their advantages. Eventually,
the intention is to allow enhanced deployment flexibility and still preserve the
operator role in the whole business, in a way or another.
The actual deployment level solution and signaling between different actors in
the model described in this dissertation is still an open research topic. In the
following chapters we will discuss one possible solution model based on overlay
networks and the concept of localized autonomous administrative domains. The
overlay network approach would serve as a base for the future roaming and inter-
connection architecture. The local domains would provide signaling and traffic
management optimizations, even for roaming subscribers once the subscription
profile has been downloaded and cached in the local domain. At the lower layers
below the described conceptual model, existing protocols could be re-used to a
large extent. For example, at the end the subscription related signaling could be
implemented using Diameter.
5.5 Related Work
European Union (EU) funded Sixth Framework Program research project Ambient
Networks has also defined similar future networking concepts for multi-access
and heterogeneous networks as described in this dissertation. The main differ-
ence is basically that the concept and roles for different domains in the Ambient
Networks [256] are far more complex and require rather massive evolution step,
especially on the openness of the whole system, before the proposed concept is
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usable. The similarity of Ambient Networks concept and the model proposed
in this dissertation is surprisingly close, even if both are developed separately in
different projects by different people.
One of the key ideas in Ambient Networks’ concept is a network composition [51].
The function that has been introduced for it resembles largely to the role that
was planned for the roaming and inter-connection domain in this dissertation.
Actually, both of them assume rely on the existence of GRX or its future evolved
versions. Network composition has already been studied to some extent in 3GPP
as a solution for possible future releases of 3GPP architecture [29]. Figures 5.4
and 5.5 show examples of network composition as it was planned by Ambient
Networks and in their concept.
The model that was proposed in this dissertation takes a rather minimalistic
approach to achieve its goals and tries to find ways for an evolution path that is
deployable based on the existing infrastructure in a reasonable aggressive time-
frame. The model in this dissertation does not, for example, make any distinction
between mobile terminals, moving networks and personal area networks. The list
of requirements for the roaming and inter-working model in the future heteroge-
neous multi-access networks were discussed in more detail in Section 5.3. Inter-
estingly, it appears that the requirements are a subset of that defined in Ambient



























































Figure 5.5: Network Composition of
different types of access networks with
a core network
5.6 Summary
This chapter outlined a possible model for the future operator networking archi-
tecture including the inter-connection and roaming aspects. We proposed a strict
separation of the operator roles into three domains: an access operator domain, a
service operator domain, and an inter-connection and roaming provider domain.
The intention of this model is to allow each domain as independent evolution
98 CHAPTER 5. MODEL FOR OPERATION IN MULTI-ACCESS NETWORKS
path as possible. The proposed model attempts to avoid artificial binding of ser-
vices and end user subscriptions to access network deployments by promoting a
virtual service operator model, allowing agile configuration of inter-connection
and roaming connections, and encouraging an access network sharing. We also
listed the minimum set of the requirements for each domain.
We took intentionally an evolutionary approach on how to reach the proposed
model from the existing architectures. After all, the proposed model is more of
a conceptual change than a technical revolution. Finally, we also compared the
proposed model to Ambient Networks’ Network Composition concept. The main
differences are the openness of the whole system and the clearer separation of
operator roles in our proposed model.
Chapter 6
Enhancing Mobility in Future
Operator Networks
The future networking environment including service domain, access network
domain, roaming and inter-connection domain would benefit from several small
improvements on the generic architecture and how each domain interact with
each other. In previous chapters we have touched upon some enhanced fea-
tures that should be there in the future roaming and inter-connection network-
ing model. Next we are going to discuss selected areas for enhancements that
include:
Target network selection,
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting,
Configuration Management,
Policies and Cross Layer or Cross Domain Interaction,
Media Independent Handover Framework, and
Steering of roaming.
In this dissertation we are not only concentrating on IP Mobility protocols and
their enhancements. Within one access technology access authentication and the
discovery of a suitable target access network will most probably be the domi-
nant ’problem area’ to solve. IP level handovers within the same access tech-
nology should be rare, unless the handover is between administrative domains
and in those cases common optimizations such as pre-registrations [182] and con-
text transfers are unlikely to work in any case. On the other hand, vertical han-
dovers in most cases involve also multiple radios within one terminal. Therefore,
assuming that multiple radios can be used simultaneously, make-before-break
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handovers are achievable without any advanced mobility protocol optimizations.
It is not even entirely clear from an operator perspective, whether the IP level
mobility support gains anything over mobility aware application solutions. Yet,
the main ’problem area’ seems to be the discovery and selection of a suitable tar-
get access network.
In the context of IP Mobility in operator networks local breakouts have been dis-
cussed extensively. Actually, local breakouts were already part of the 3GPP GPRS
from the beginning. However, due to the lack of trust between operators the
visited network GGSN feature has been seldom enabled. The proposed model in
this dissertation, however, makes an assumption that service operators must trust
access operators on their accounting. The trust here is more on contractual level.
The home operator should trust the charging data provided by the visited oper-
ator. If the user plane traffic is routed through the roaming and inter-connection
networks, then the providers in that domain may offer 3rd party verification ser-
vices on the reported data traffic numbers.
6.1 Target Network Discovery and Selection
Cellular networks, such as 3GPP 2G/3G, include advertisement of operator infor-
mation as part of the design. That greatly helps mobile devices on their target
network selection. Similar functionality is also desired for other network tech-
nologies. However, the target network discovery and selection along with the
associated identity selection has turned out to be a difficult issue in heteroge-
neous multi-operator network environment [53].
There has been several attempts to solve the issue of network discovery and selec-
tion in a way that a mobile node would be able to make an intelligent target net-
work selection. The selection criteria could be based on discovered roaming part-
ners, desired QoS and availability of required services or network capabilities. In order
to to minimize the cost of erroneous selection, the selection should preferably
take place before the actual access authentication and IP-layer configurations.
For seamless mobility and service continuity in a future heterogeneous multi-
access networks a mechanism to assist the mobile node in making intelligent,
and a prompt target network and access technology selection is essential. An
erroneous target network selection most probably leads to undesired disruptions
in service, for example, the wanted service is not anymore reachable through the
new network or access fails due to incompatible polices and QoS requirements.
3GPP Release-6 and onwards defined for their Interworking WLAN an EAP-
based [48] system for advertising realms of roaming partners after a failed authen-
tication attempt [4]. The authentication may also be failed by purpose (which gen-
erates a lot of unnecessary signaling, especially in the AAA infrastructure) if the
mobile node wants to learn all supported roaming partners. The idea of embed-
ding realm information into EAP-Response/Identity message has not gained too
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much acceptance among mobile terminal vendors. However, Microsoft Windows
Vista R© is known to implement the EAP-based method.
Mobile WiMAX has also defined its own technology specific way to advertise
networks (NAP discovery and advertisement) and available roaming connec-
tions (NSP access discovery and advertisement) by the NAP [301]. Both unso-
licited and solicited modes are supported. For a mobile system such as Mobile
WiMAX, the network discovery and selection is an important feature as NAP
sharing among operators is one of the fundamental ideas.
IEEE has defined yet another network discovery and selection method for their
802.11 technologies . IEEE 802.11u [153] specification provides Generic Advertise-
ment Service (GAS). Actually, GAS is an IEEE 802.11 media dependent transport
for IEEE 802.21 MIH framework and its MIIS/MIES/MICS services, and the net-
work discovery and selection is just a subset of the MIH functionality. The gen-
eral idea of advertising network capability information without the mobile node
needing to attach to the network has proved to have potential [190]. The adver-
tisement feature allows the mobile node to discard those access networks directly
that are not able to offer required services for the mobile node. For example, the
mobile node with ongoing IPv6 services can discard those networks, before initi-
ating an IP level handover, that do not offer IPv6 connectivity and required IPv6
Mobility support.
Clearly all mechanisms described in this section are dependent on the access tech-
nology and thus are not sufficient alone. Though, the EAP-based method is not
dependent on the access technology but it has other issues that make it undesired
as an overall solution. It becomes evident that a mobile node needs yet another
layer of abstraction and decision making on top of all accesses. Actually, the new
layer needs to have an overall view of the whole networking stack (OSI reference
model is assumed here), in order to be able to make the best selection based on the
available information of networks and policies defined by various services, user
and operator.
Steering of roaming concept will benefit from the network discovery functional-
ity. The mobile node has always the most up-to-date knowledge of the surround-
ing networks in its vicinity. It is highly unlikely that different network access
operators would share the information of neighboring networks with each other.
If the mobile node communicates its network knowledge with the (home) net-
work mobility or policy management entities there is a better chance for more
intelligent network driven mobility.
6.2 Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
The model in this dissertation proposes that all accesses are roaming connections
for a service operator. Most access systems also require periodic re-authentication
in order to refresh the used keying material. This means significant amount of
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inter-operator AAA signaling if authentication related AAA traffic needs to go
all way back to the home service operator every time. Table 6.1 shows AAA
signaling overheads for one mobile node using RADIUS and EAP-SIM1. Also
every hop through some AAA proxy increases the packet size as each proxy node
might want to add some attributes of their own (such as Proxy-State).
Assume that there are 100000 concurrent mobile users, re-authentications are
requested every 10th minute, every 8th authentication including the initial one
is a full authentication and no NAK procedure is used. This generates approxi-
mately 2.4Mbit/sec of pure authentication traffic when divided evenly over one
hour period. The traffic figure is actually downscaled. It represents only the basic
access authentication excluding accounting, policy profiles and possible autho-
rization signaling. If a local authentication method aware proxy/keycache would
reduce inter-operator AAA signaling traffic, that should be deployed. For exam-
ple, with a local keycache for EAP(-SIM), RADIUS signaling cases 2) and 4) in
Table 6.1 could be avoided. That would reduce the load on the roaming and
inter-connection network, service operator backend and allow faster authentica-
tion procedure on the access network. One more reason to avoid inter-operator
signaling is the fact that operators are typically charged for the signaling traffic
over the roaming and inter-connection networks. On the other hand, service and
access operators cannot really charge end users for signaling traffic that is part of
the infrastructure.
In operator networks one of the first things that a mobile node needs to do when
attaching to a network is the access authentication. Networking protocols have
traditionally a layered design where each layer is functionally independent. A
demand for security in wireless communication and the current layered design
has created a situation where, in the worst case, each networking layer executes
similar authentication, authorization and configuration steps independently of
each other [57]. This is clearly inefficient, especially in managed operator net-
working environment where all separate authentications and authorizations tend
to end up in the same AAA backend. Furthermore, each layer typically needs to
bootstrap and configure their connectivity services. The same applies to appli-
cation level services if they also require authentication and authorization each
time a new service session gets established. All this combined with the mobile
node making frequent handovers between different access networks may greatly
impact handover latencies and also increase the load of the AAA backend. One
solution would be, for example, piggy-backing services bootstrapping [80] and
QoS [194,195], and other configuration information during the access authentica-
tion. Thus reducing the separate AAA interaction steps would be possible. The
impact would be a significantly reduced number of AAA round-trips over the
inter-operator AAA interfaces and naturally then faster overall AAA signaling
procedure.
The last AAA related enhancement discussed in this section relates to the evolu-
1Traces taken from TeliaSonera’s EAP-SIM capable WLAN deployments
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Table 6.1: AAA overhead example using EAP-SIM over RADIUS
Nro EAP-SIM Flavor RTTs Bytes Remarks
1 Full Auth 3 1964 Includes downloading triplet(s) from a HLR
2 Fast Re-Auth 3 1838 Only between the authenticator and the EAP-Server
3 NAK + Full Auth 4 2463 Includes downloading triplet(s) from a HLR and one extra
NAK RTT due to EAP-server proposing EAP-TTLS first
4 NAK + Fast Re-Auth 4 2445 One extra NAK RTT due to EAP-server proposing EAP-
TTLS first and only between the authenticator and the EAP-
server
tion of AAA protocols. One of the first steps on enhancing AAA would be wide
deployment of Diameter instead of RADIUS. Diameter solves many known short-
comings of RADIUS (such as the lack of natural bi-directional operation of the
protocol) and is designed for large heterogeneous deployments, although along
years it has become clear that several concepts of Diameter were left unclear.
Especially, the design and definition of Diameter applications has turned out to
be problematic [106] and has design issues [105].
Yet, from the overall infrastructure point of view aspects such DNS-based Diam-
eter agent discovery and capability negotiation would greatly improve the scal-
ability and operational aspects of large inter-operator AAA deployments. How-
ever, large proxy networks with dynamic agent discovery present an AAA rout-
ing related issue. In general, a Diameter session that is comprised of multi-
ple message exchanges and requires intermediary proxy functions, will require
explicit routing for all request messages within that session. When a session is
composed of several request/answer exchanges it is possible that each request of
the session takes different paths towards the home Diameter server. For exam-
ple, for billing purposes some proxies may need to be stateful. Currently Diam-
eter lacks required functionality for explicit request routing [287] that could be a
useful tool for roaming and inter-connection network providers.
6.3 Configuration Management
In the future heterogeneous multi-access and multi-operator networking envi-
ronment it is assumed that the roaming partners information is not as static as
it is today. New operators come and go frequently. Also the frequency of intro-
ducing new IP-based services will increase and their expected lifetime may not
be long. New services may also require deployment of new service nodes (i.e.
proxies, hubs and gateways) into the roaming and inter-connection networks and
operator infrastructures. Furthermore, new services might also generally require
more dynamicity from the naming infrastructure if a mobile node has a new IP
address for each new session. As it was mentioned in Section 5.1 current roaming
and inter-connection infrastructures are not designed to handle dynamically (and
frequently) changing configuration information. These operational requirements
depend greatly on the abilities of the used naming infrastructure, such as DNS.
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Dynamic DNS [291] would seem to become an essential tool for operators and
allow them to update DNS naming in real-time. Additionally, DNS support for
ENUM [107] and Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS) [203–207] would
increase the general usefulness of DNS as a generic naming and service discov-
ery infrastructure. Overall DNS delegation should be handled in a way that the
roaming and inter-connection network is only responsible of finding appropri-
ate DNS server in a correct country and operator. Provisioning of any other more
sophisticated or detailed information should be avoided in the roaming and inter-
connection network, if it requires configuration outside service or access opera-
tors’ infrastructure.
Hierarchical DNS infrastructure might not be the final solution for a naming sys-
tem that also needs to support frequent joining and leaving of nodes. Also DNS
might not be the best solution to handle other types of namespaces than FQDNs
(such as IMSIs, E.164 numbers, cryptographically generated identities and so on).
Dynamic Hash Table (DHT) [254, 277] based peer-to-peer overlay networks have
been proposed to either assist or completely replace conventional DNS as the
naming and service discovery technology [65, 297]. DHTs could be deployed in
the roaming and inter-connection networks as an overlay network to assist the
discovery of services and especially to provide the desired configuration agility
for various operators. Each operator would join to the peer-to-peer network with
their edge nodes that are also DHT capable. Operators would need to feed the
information to the DHT they wish to enable their business. Ideally there would
not be any other need for centralized management in the peer-to-peer roaming
and inter-connection infrastructure than verifying who can join it. A naive solu-
tion would require a roaming and inter-connection network to offer at minimum
a Certificate Authority (CA) function as a managed 3rd-party trusted service. An
operator would only need a valid certificate that then would allow the use of the
infrastructure from security point of view. Certificates could have a wide variety
of other uses. For example, they could be used to embed information defining
the profile of the operator.
Figure 6.1 shows an example architecture of DHT-based solution. It should be
noted that DHTs would not probably replace DNS as a generic name to IP address
resolving, because in that area DNS still does fairly well compared to DHT [85,
162, 231]. Even with DHT-based or assisted naming and services discovery sys-
tem a unified naming scheme would be required as it is today, for example, with
3GPP’s DNS based systems [6]. However, as the names are only meant to be
machine readable, the tradition of using human readable names should be aban-
doned and instead use names that are efficient for machines to parse and store.
End users will not see those names anyway.
The main benefits of the DHT-based naming and service discovery system within
the roaming and inter-connection infrastructure can be summarized as:
Automated and agile configuration of operators’ information about joining
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or leaving the roaming and inter-connection infrastructure.
Automated and agile configuration of services information joining or leav-
ing the roaming and inter-connection infrastructure.
Completely distributed database of services, servers and identifiers without
a single point of failure.
No central management of any namespace or repository is needed.
Better handling of identifiers that are not FQDNs or hierarchical.
The main hindering factor against DHT or any other new solution in the roaming
and interconnection space is that the current system still works reasonably well







































Figure 6.1: Roaming and Inter-
connection infrastructure using DHT
for naming system and peer & service
discovery. Each operator joins to roam-
ing and inter-connection ’peer-to-peer
community’ with their DHT-capable
edge nodes that then act as a gateway
to operators’ internal infrastructure
nodes and hosted information. Peer-to-
peer ’community’ acts as a completely
distributed database of operator infor-
mation and available service nodes
(such as AAA servers and SIP proxies)
6.4 Cross Layer and Cross Domain Interaction
The fundamental problem or rather the fundamental feature of all widely accepted
and standardized IP mobility enabling technologies is that they are mobile node
centric, operating on top of the link layer and lacking proper dialogues about the
network condition and policies of an operator or the mobile node with the rele-
vant remote network nodes [193]. This section discusses these areas of improve-
ment.
6.4.1 Heterogeneous Networks and Terminal Mobility
Due to the growth of various wireless technologies, different access radios over-
lap, providing mobile users a heterogeneous wireless access environment. How-
ever, the characteristics and capabilities of these different access networks differ
106 CHAPTER 6. ENHANCING MOBILITY IN FUTURE OPERATOR NETWORKS
considerably, for example in terms of available bandwidth, latency, bit-error rates
and queue management, though in most cases wireless access links remain as the
bottleneck of the whole communication path [136, 261, 312]. Therefore, vertical
handovers may lead to abrupt changes in the link performance. Link character-
istics may also change considerably when the mobile node handovers between
links of the same type, due to the different traffic loads and radio conditions on
the old and the new link [185].
Current IP Mobility management protocols do not deliver link related informa-
tion or indications locally to upper layers. Some upper layer transport protocols
and services can adapt to the changed connection condition, however reactively
only after the network capacity misuse (over-utilization or under-utilization) has
taken place and has possibly been detected by e.g. some upper layer congestion
control mechanism. Thus those upper layer protocols, applications and services
may experience unnecessarily suboptimal performance during this period, and
often for a relatively long- lasting period even after detecting and responding to
the misuse.
6.4.2 Adaptive Application and Services
Adaptive applications and services can greatly benefit from a standardized mech-
anism that notifies abrupt changes of the link characteristics in a proactively man-
ner. That would allow applications and services to adapt to the new connection
conditions immediately instead of through some generally conservative adapt-
ing and error handling mechanisms. After all, these mechanisms are not capable
of reacting efficiently in the scenarios in question as they were not designed to
handle the situation discussed in this document.
One possible example of an adaptive application benefiting from link character-
istics information would be streaming services for mobile vehicles. Assume a
certain mobile vehicle can connect to the network using various access technolo-
gies – using macro cellular access when the vehicle is on move and using 802.11
WLAN access when the vehicle is not moving and within a hotspot coverage.
There are several scalable coding algorithms such as Scalable Video Coding (SVC),
H.264 Scalable Extension, Bit Sliced Arithmetic Coding (BSAC), etc. to support a
flexible control in terms of audio as well as video. There are, however, some
limitations to adjust the ongoing traffic volumes from the sender because of the
lack of dynamic signaling from the receiver while changing its link characteris-
tics. The adaptive application could then immediately scale the streaming service
content based on the mobile node’s reported link capabilities – without waiting
for the possible streaming protocol feedback mechanism to discover the increased
or decreased bandwidth of the link.
6.4.3 Traffic Shaping
In the case that some or all traffic destined to the mobile node goes through a
mobility anchor node (e.g., the home agent in Mobile IPv6 bi-directional tun-
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neling mode or previous access router in Mobile IP fast handover protocols), it
would be useful for the mobility anchor node to shape the traffic towards the
mobile node according to the current link characteristic information provided by
the mobile node. For example, if the mobile node has announced its current link
capacity as 64kbps, the mobility anchor node has no point forwarding more traffic
than the announced data rate to overflow the mobile node’s access link. Instead,
the mobility anchor node may limit the forwarding rate itself or notify the remote
peers (e.g. the correspondent nodes) to reduce their traffic by some means.
6.4.4 Delivering Cross Layer Information
A wireless access link in controlled operator network deployments is most likely
the bottleneck on the end-to-end communication path between the mobile node
and operator services, and often represents a significant portion of the end-to-end
delay. Sharing the local sub- path characteristics information with the remote end
allows the other end to detect and react much faster to the significant changes in
the end-to-end path properties. This is expected to reduce or even completely
avoid possible complications to the IP transport and service quality as many
applications and the congestion control algorithms of the transport layer may
often fail to respond fast enough to such changes or may react in a wrong way
when the path characteristics suddenly change [136].
Currently there is no standardized protocol for such link characteristic informa-
tion delivery. It is because existing mobility protocols do not provide a mecha-
nism to indicate which type of link the mobile node is currently attached to [233].
Therefore, some new signaling mechanism is needed in terms of peer-to-peer
communication. At the same time, the new signaling mechanism to be defined
should avoid significantly to increase the amount of signaling traffic load, espe-
cially over wireless links. Moreover, examining the tradeoff between the added
delivery and computation load of the new mechanism and gained advantage is
also an issue that needs serious considerations.
For the multiple wireless interfaces on the mobile node, there is a possibility that
the link characteristic information exchange can be carried over multiple links
simultaneously. It may be necessary for the new signaling mechanism to support
multiple connections per application as multi-homing scenarios. Protocols like
Mobile IP, SCTP, DCCP, RT(C)P, SIP, to start with, can be used for carrying link
characteristic information in their own extensions as new options or fields [189].
However, it might be more time consuming and complex to extend each of these
protocols instead of developing a generic signaling solution. Delivering cross
layer and link characteristics information between end nodes has been studied
further [260]. The initial results with TCP look promising [87,261] when combin-
ing link characteristics information and explicit signaling of it between commu-
nicating peers. From the industry point of view it is most likely that this kind
of information delivery will be done using IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Han-
dover framework functionalities. The industry has adopted IEEE 802.21 technol-
ogy and deployments will follow. The media independent handover framework
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is discussed in more detail in Section 6.4.5.
6.4.5 Media Independent Handover Framerwork
The IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handover (MIH) framework [155] provides ser-
vices and primitives to assist IP level mobility in a way that is not dependent on
any access technology. IEEE 802.21 MIH framework is primarily meant for verti-
cal handovers but can also be used for horizontal handovers. MIH framework is
typical client–proxy–server architecture. The framework consist of three main key
services:
Media Independent Information Service (MIIS) – provides, for example, infor-
mation of available networks, neighbor maps, roaming partners and network ser-
vices. Table 6.2 shows more detailed list of information provided by this
service.
Media Independent Event Service (MIES) – provides a number of triggers rela-
ted to changes in the network and the access link. These events may orig-
inate from a mobile node or from network side services nodes. Table 6.3
shows more detailed list of information provided by this service.
Media Independent Command Service (MICS) – provides primitives for initi-
ating handover procedures. The command may originate from a mobile
node or from network side service nodes. Table 6.4 shows more detailed
list of information provided by this service.
Each MIH service is realized in a Mobility Management Entity (MME). The MME
may be located in the access operator network, in the roaming and inter-connection
network or in the service operator network. Most of the MIH provided services
are best handled locally within the access network where the mobile node is
located or its close proximity. Having signaling go back to the service opera-
tor would just generate extra latencies for already time critical handovers (e.g.
for real-time services) and excessive inter-operator signaling.
The protocol for communication and information exchange between MMEs, and
between a MME and a mobile node has not been standardized yet. However, the
protocol for carrying MIH information over IP is under development [208]. It can
be argued, whether a completely new signaling protocol will be needed. Diame-
ter could be used on the network side between MMEs to carry MIH service infor-
mation. At minimum a new attribute value pair would be needed to convey MIH
information between MMEs. There are already several access specific MIH infor-
mation encapsulating solutions defined to deliver MIH information between the
”first hop MME” and the mobile node. For example IEEE 802.11u [153] defines
a MIH transport for IEEE 802.11 technology and IEEE 802.16g [156] defines the
equivalent for IEEE 802.16 technology. Also DHCP could be used, at least for
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Table 6.2: Media Independent Handover Information Service
Information Element Description Comments
List of available networks List all network types that are
available given client location
E.g., 802.11, 802.16, GSM,
GPRS/EDGE, UMTS, LTE net-
works
Location of Point of Attachment (PoA) Geographical Location, Civic
address, PoA ID
Geography Markup Language
(GML) format for Location
Based System (LBS) or net-
work management purpose
Operator ID Name of the network provider Could be equivalent to Net-
work ID
Roaming Partners List of direct roaming agree-
ments
In form of NAIs or Mobile
Country Code (MCC) +
Mobile Network Code (MNC)
Cost Indication of costs for ser-
vice/network usage
Free/Not free or (flat rate,
hourly, day or weekly rate)
Security Link layer security supported Cipher Suites and Authenti-
cation Methods, Technology
specific, e.g. Wired Equiva-
lent Privacy (WEP) in 802.11,
802.11i, Privacy Key Manage-
ment (PKM) in 802.16, etc.
Quality of Service Link QoS parameters 802 wide representation,
application friendly
PoA Capabilities Emergency Services, IP Mul-
timedia Subsystem (IMS) Ser-
vices, etc.
Higher Layer Services
Vendor Specific Information Elements (IE) Vendor/Operator specific
information
Custom information
Table 6.3: Media Independent Handover Event Service
Event Type Event Name Description
State Change Link Up L2 Connection established
State Change Link Down L2 Connection is broken
Predictive Link Going Down L2 connection breakdown imminent
State Change Link Detected New L2 link has been found
State Change Link Parameters Change Change in specific link parameters has crossed pre- speci-
fied thresholds (link Speed, Quality metrics)
Administrative Link Event Rollback Event rollback
Link Transmission Link SDU Transmit Status Improve handover performance through local feedback as
opposed to waiting for end-to-end notifications
Link Synchronous Link Handover Imminent L2 intra-technology handover imminent (subnet change).
Notify Handover information without change in link state
Link Synchronous Link Handover Complete Notify handover state
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Table 6.4: Media Independent Handover Command Service
Command Name MIHF – MIHF Description
MIH Handover Initiate Client – Network Initiates handovers and sends a list
of suggested networks and suggested
PoA (AP/BS).
MIH Handover Prepare Network – Network This command is sent by MIHF on
old network to MIHF on suggested
new network. This allows the client
to query for resources on new network
and also allows to prepare the new net-
work for handover
MIH Handover Commit Client – Network In this case the client commits to do the
handover based on selected choices for
network and PoA
MIH Handover Complete Client – Network
Network – Network
This is a notification from new net-
work PoA to old network PoA that
handover has been completed, new
PoA has been established and any
pending packets may now be for-
warded to the new PoA
discovering IS information servers [234]. Even IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Proto-
col (NDP) could be used as MIH transport. As the MIH information would be
encoded as a Type Length Values (TLV) in any case there seem to be little use of
defining a completely new transport protocol just for this purpose. If IP-based
end-to-end transport for MIH is desired, even HTTP [110] could be reused for
that purpose.
6.4.6 Signaling of Policies for Handovers and Roaming
The roaming model proposed in this dissertation requires significant amount of
signaling between different domains (i.e. operators with different roles). The
signaling consists of AAA, IP Mobility signaling (such as Mobile IP registra-
tions), IEEE 802.21 MIH services signaling, and moving of various policy infor-
mation between nodes and domains. Figure 6.2 illustrates an example architec-
ture, where the signaling relationship between a home service operator domain,
an access operator domain and a mobile node domain are shown. The access
network domain can actually be further divided to a network service provider (ISP
like function, e.g. Operator A) and to a Network Access Provider (NAP). A NAP
merely hosts only the last hop access infrastructure. Each of previously men-
tioned technical domains may belong to a different administrative domain. In the
figure dashed lines illustrate possible further division possibilities of the access
network operator domain. The MME (mobility management entity) in the figure
could mean a MIH service (IS/ES/CS), AAA node or policy entity.
There is one major issue with all these policy frameworks, cross domain signal-
ing and MIH frameworks. They need to work cross different domains and oper-
ators in order gain what they are designed for. It is hard to see why this would
ever work as envisioned, mainly because operators are being rather conservative
installing extensive policy rules that arrive over the inter-operator interface into
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Figure 6.2: Decomposition of Network Access and Intermediate Operators with respec-
tive control plane signaling between entities. Dashed lines represent the boundaries of
different administrative domains and arrows different signaling relationships between or
within domains. The signaling constitutes mainly on AAA signaling and moving policy
information between MMEs, and the whole process is eventually delegated from the con-
trolling home operator MME down as close as possible to access providers
their core network business critical routers and gateways. Especially, the roam-
ing model proposed in this dissertation assumes that, for example, access oper-
ators benefit more if their networks get used to access other operators’ services.
Based on this it is questionable that any access operator advertise or favor access
networks under the control of other access operators. Furthermore, any informa-
tion that would reveal anything from access operators’ infrastructure deployment
details or their parameters used to optimize the network are usually considered
as core business confidential information. It is hard to believe operators would
share this kind of information in the foreseen future. Also, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 6.2 any inter-operator traffic is hardly free of charge, thus operators tend to
minimize it.
We can conclude rather safely that most signaling should and will stay within
one administrative domain (i.e. within one operator) as long as possible, from
both seamless mobility (e.g. combined authentication and handover latencies
that meat real-time service requirements) and costs point of view. Operators are
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not willing to share (useful) information unless they really have to and at the
same time operators also strive to keep the inter-operator signaling at minimum.
Situations where the signaling is justified to reach the service operator are basi-
cally when administrative boundaries get crossed due to handovers (or a mobile
node attaches to a network for the first time). This is also the situation where the
service operator might want to affect the decision a mobile node made for the
target network selection, thus steering of roaming cases. Other network initiated
and assisted handovers will probably be handled internally within the adminis-
trative domain. Naturally, policies that get downloaded from the service operator
at least during the initial attachment steer the decision making and network side
assistance but it is not clear why those should be verified each time the mobile
node moves within the administrative domain. Also, these often mentioned poli-
cies are at minimum services related gating, filtering and marking information
that are rather far from anything that could be considered advanced policy con-
trol.
6.5 Summary
This chapter discussed enhancements that are important in the future operator
networks. We identified areas related to the network attachment (target network
selection and AAA procedures), agile configuration management especially in
roaming and inter-connection context, and cross layer and cross domain inter-
actions. For the network attachment we noted that providing a solid network
selection mechanism in a heterogeneous network environment is anything but a
trivial problem, although the Media Independent Handover framework tries to
provide unified solution for this problem.
For the agile configuration management we proposed that peer-to-peer overlay
network technologies could actually be the management layer solution in the
future inter-connection and roaming networks. We also promoted the idea of
adding some level of hierarchy to overlay networks. Hierarchical overlay net-
works would still allow to maintain administrative boundaries of operators join-
ing to the peer-to-peer overlay.
The cross layer and cross domain interactions mostly concentrated on the con-
cept of delivering various policy and network status related information between
administrative domains (i.e. operators), and eventually between the mobile node
and the network. There are newly specified powerful tools for this purpose such
as the earlier mentioned Media Independent Handover framework. However,
we identified that the cross domain information sharing suffers from the fact that
different administrative domains typically do not find information sharing bene-






Enhancing the Backend Support
for IP Access
This chapter presents deployment experiments of managed WLAN access net-
works. We describe challenges and their solutions that were faced when start-
ing testing IEEE 802.11 WLAN access deployments with IEEE 802.1X and EAP-
SIM/AKA based access authentication with inter-operator roaming support.
7.1 Charging with Subscriber Identity Privacy
During the first ever worldwide inter-operator EAP-SIM [141] based WLAN roam-
ing trials between GSM operators, it became quickly evident that existing RADIUS
attribute set did not satisfy operator requirements when it came to inter-operator
roaming charging. These trials were run by GSM Association during the year
2004. GSM operators who were looking forward into WLAN roaming business
had very little experience on IETF based AAA protocols. The AAA protocol of
choice was RADIUS.
7.1.1 Background
In a GSM community WLAN roaming existed prior to EAP-SIM based roam-
ing. That was normal RADIUS-based roaming with bi-lateral agreements bet-
ween operators. A web-login was typically used for an access authentication.
When shifting towards more telecom and GPRS like roaming deployments EAP-
SIM was introduced. EAP-SIM allowed mobile operators to re-use their existing
backend systems for subscription management and also at the same time lever-
age the use of the UICC outside 3GPP accesses.
A TAP-file format [133] is used in existing GSM roaming settlements to exchange
roaming charging information. Operators felt that the same mechanism should
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be maintained on a RADIUS-based accounting. Therefore, the TAP3.10 file for-
mat had to be upgraded to reflect the EAP-SIM based WLAN roaming. For the
roaming charging purposes, the home operator must provide a chargeable iden-
tity to the visited operator that fulfills the identity requirements described in the
TAP3.10. One of the requirements is the identity stability and traceability for a
known period of time (e.g., 30 days).
EAP-SIM EAP-method has a concept of inner and outer identities. Another rela-
ted concept in EAP-SIM is the identity privacy. The inner identity is used for the
subscriber authentication within the EAP-method and in case of EAP-SIM it is
cryptographically hidden during the EAP message exchange. The outer identity
is used for other purposes such as AAA message request routing. For example, in
case of IEEE 802.11i (WPA2) [150] with EAP-SIM authentication, the outer iden-
tity is extracted from the EAP-Response/Identity message sent from the mobile
node to the authenticator (e.g., WLAN base station). The identity is then copied
to RADIUS User-Name attribute [257] for RADIUS request message routing pur-
poses. This outer identity may not be the same as the inner identity that the
authenticating backend sees. Furthermore, if the outer identity is in form of NAI
(e.g., user@realm) it may not even contain the user-part of the NAI.
For inter-operator roaming purposes there was an evident need for a charge-
able user identity that would fulfill the requirements from TAP3.10 file format,
work with EAP-methods that could have different inner and outer identities and
also work when identity privacy was used. This led to a development of the
Chargeable-User-Id (CUI) RADIUS attribute [47]. We were the first to present
the CUI attribute in GSMA WLAN Roaming Guideline document PRD IR.61 [124]
as a vendor specific RADIUS attribute. It was then seen useful to standard-
ize the CUI in IETF. The IETF standardization process took over 20 months of
work to complete for a single attribute, mostly due to its controversial use cases
from IETF perspective. Later, Release-6 3GPP Interworking WLAN and Mobile
WiMAX R1.0 standards have adopted the CUI for their RADIUS interfaces for
exactly same reasons as the attribute was developed for.
RADIUS already had functionality that could have been used to implement proper
roaming charging. After careful studies the CUI still was considered as the best
solution. In Section 7.1.2 we discuss other considered RADIUS features.
7.1.2 Issues with Existing Methods
It was suggested that a standard RADIUS Class or User-Name attributes could
be used to indicate the CUI. However, in a global roaming environment with a
proxy network between the NAS and the home RADIUS server, the use of afore-
mentioned attributes could lead to problems described below:
RADIUS Class attribute – RFC 2865 [257] states: ”This Attribute is available to
be sent by the server to the client in an Access-Accept packet and should be sent
unmodified by the client to the accounting server as part of the Accounting-Request
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packet if accounting is supported. The client must not interpret the attribute
locally.” Thus, RADIUS clients or intermediaries must not interpret the Class
attribute, which precludes determining whether it contains a CUI. Typically,
when an Access-Accept traverses through a global roaming network, inter-
mediating proxies may add their own Class attributes. As a result, there
may be multiple Class attributes in a RADIUS message. Since the content
of a Class attribute is opaque to the clients, it is hard for the entities outside
the home network to determine which one contains the CUI. As a result,
the visited network in a roaming situations is not able to extract the correct
CUI e.g., for roaming charging.
RADIUS User-Name attribute – A User-Name attribute in an Access-Request
message may be used for the purpose of routing the Access-Request mes-
sage. Intermediating nodes may rewrite the attribute. As a result, a RADIUS
server receiving the Access-Request message relayed by a proxy cannot
assume that the User-Name attribute is unmodified. Currently RFC 3579
[42] is not precise enough how the User-Name attribute should be used with
EAP. It is not exactly mandated that the NAS must return rewritten User-
Name attribute (it received in an Access-accept) in subsequent accounting
messages.
On the other hand, rewriting of a User-Name attribute in an Access-Accept
message occurs more rarely, since a Proxy-State attribute can be used to
route the Access-Acceptmessage without parsing the User-Name attribute.
As a result, a RADIUS server cannot assume that a proxy stripping routing
information from the User-Name attribute within the Access-Request mes-
sage will add this information to the User-Name attribute included within
an Access-Accept message. The result is that the Access-Request message
and Accounting-Request messages may follow different paths. Where this
outcome is undesirable, the RADIUS client should use the original User-
Name in accounting messages. Therefore, another mechanism is required
to convey a CUI in an Access-Accept message for subsequent accounting
messages.
7.1.3 Proposed Solution
The CUI attribute provides a solution to the problems described in previous
sections and avoids overloading RADIUS User-Name attribute or changing the
usage of the existing RADIUS Class attribute. Therefore, the CUI provides a new
and a standard approach for charging and fraud prevention when EAP methods
supporting identity privacy are used.
The CUI attribute serves as an alias to the user’s real identity, representing a
chargeable identity as defined and provided by the home network (by the AAAH).
It is a supplementary or alternative information to the identity possibly provided
in the User-Name attribute. The CUI should remain the same during the whole
user session (including the initial authentication and possible re-authentications).
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The CUI remains the same even when the mobile node roams between base sta-
tions and even between administrative domains. The NAS must include the
received value of that CUI in all subsequent Accounting Messages after a suc-
cessful authentication.
Example 7.1.1 shows the RFC 4372 defined CUI encoding. The chargeable user
identity contained in the attribute is an opaque string without any defined for-
mat. However, from GSMA WLAN roaming and 3GPP Interworking WLAN
point of view this was not adequate. Thus GSMA defined formatting definitions
for the CUI [124]. Later on support for multiple chargeable identities within one
CUI attribute was added by GSMA to fulfill certain 3GPP Interworking WLAN
charging scenarios [134]. Example CUI encodings are illustrated in Example 7.1.1.
Example 7.1.1 Chargeable User Identity and GSMA defined format
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+




String: See examples of the Chargeable-user-id string below
IMSI: String = "01:214070123456789", Length = 20
NAI: String = "02:foo@bar.com", Length = 16
E.164: String = "03:+358405627015", Length = 18
Opaque: String = "05:1q2w3eazsxdc", Length = 17
Combined: String = "06:03:+358405627015,02:foo@bar.com" Length = 36
Upon receiving RADIUS accounting from the visited network, the home network
backend charging system can easily verify user sessions and concatenate them
based on the CUI. After all, it is the home network backend AAA system that
decides when the CUI changes.
The CUI also offers a solution for legacy TAP-based charging. Current TAP3.10
specification [133] states that either International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
or NAI can be used as a charging identity for WLAN roaming. If NAI is used and
IMSI is not available, TAP3.10 requires that the IMSI field in the TAP 3.10 record
to be populated with a valid Mobile Country Code (MCC) + Mobile Network Code
(MNC) of the receiving home network. It is recommended to use NAI format
with TAP3.10 records. The availability of a CUI fits well into these requirements.
It allows the home operator to provide a charging identity to the visited network
or to a 3rd party intermediary without necessarily disclosing the subscriber’s true
identify. A NAI can be constructed from the User-Name and the CUI attributes
found in the RADIUS accounting message. The charging identity conveyed in the
CUI forms the user-part of the NAI. The realm-part of the NAI can be extracted
7.2. AUTHENTICATION TO THIRD PARTY SERVICE PROVIDER 119
from the User-Name attribute. Combination of these two elements would result
in a valid NAI.
7.2 Authentication to Third Party Service Provider
3GPP Interworking WLAN [2, 3] adopted IKEv2 IPsec [171] as its security mech-
anism for WLAN 3GPP IP Access. The use of IKEv2 within 3GPP Interwork-
ing WLAN mimics the GPRS model of network access and service selection.
3GPP Interworking WLAN Packet Data Gateway (PDG) i.e., the IPsec gateway has
deliberately made to resemble a GGSN. (U)SIM based IKEv2 initiator authen-
tication toward the network is mandatory. The APN information is conveyed
from the mobile node to the PDG in the IKEv2 signaling (the IDr payload in the
IKE SA INIT message).
7.2.1 Background
3GPP Interworking WLAN architecture mandates an EAP-based IKEv2 initiator
(i.e., the mobile node) authentication. The supported EAP-methods are EAP-SIM
and EAP-AKA [58]. The authentication and the authorization of the access to the
desired destination network identified by the Access Point Name (APN) must be
under the same administrative domain (i.e., the operator). There are, however,
valid use cases where the APN and the offered service should be authorized by a
3rd party.
An example use case is where an operator hosts a PDG and acts as an access oper-
ator. The access operator only provides data connectivity to a 3rd party service
provider. The normal IKEv2 with EAP-SIM/AKA authentication is for verifying
that the mobile node is actually a subscriber of the access operator. After a suc-
cessful access authentication, the APN needs to be further authorized towards
the 3rd party service provider. The identities and credentials used for the 3rd
party service provider authentication and authorization may be different to the
first authentication and authorization towards the access operator. The access
operator is only interested in whether the 3rd party service operator authenticates
and authorizes the mobile node successfully. Similar functionality can be found
in GPRS [16].
The basic RFC 4306 IKEv2 does not support chaining of multiple authentications
within one IKEv2 negotiation. The lack of support for a 3rd party service pro-
vider authentication led to development of Multiple Authentication Exchanges in
the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol [104]. Figure 7.1 illustrates what the
desired solution is supposed to accomplish. During the IKEv2 negotiation, the
mobile node carries out two separate authentications and authorization steps to
different AAA backends and eventually gains access through an access opera-
tor to a service operator platform. The first authentication and authorization (1.
auth) is against the access operator. The second authentication and authorization
(2. auth) is against the 3rd party service provider. If both steps succeeded then the
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IKEv2 completes and an IPsec tunnel is created between the mobile node and the
PDG. The PDG further forwards the traffic towards the 3rd party service provider
network using either another IPsec tunnel (typically statically configured) or a
leased line.
The multiple authentication exchanges are disjoint from each other so that access
and service authentications can be completely separated. For example, a sub-
scriber to a service may use other users access subscription to successfully authen-
ticate towards the 3rd party services. Furthermore, the identities and creden-
tials used for each authentication within the IKEv2 negotiation can be different
allowing maximum deployment and configuration flexibility. Most essentially, it
allows the 3rd party service provider to deploy a basic PAP or CHAP type authen-
tication without any advanced AAA backend. Certificates and any EAP-method
are also possible. This IKEv2 enhancement was adopted by Release-7 3GPP Inter-
working WLAN as a basis for its Private Network Access (PNA) solution [3, 12].
IKEv2 IPSec
3rd Party









                 IPSec /         Leased line
for user            traffic
Figure 7.1: IKEv2 with multiple authentication exchanges to different AAA backends.
The AAA server in the access operator may also act as an AAA proxy and route AAA
traffic towards the 3rd party AAA server
IKEv2 with multiple authentication exchanges was not the only possible and pro-
posed solution. Other solution proposals included:
Modifying EAP-SIM/AKA in way that it would have been possible to execute
multiple EAP-exchanges in a row. The succeeding EAP-exchange would
have been done within the ’hosting’ EAP-SIM/AKA negotiation. When
all EAP-exchanges have completed, the ’hosting’ EAP-SIM/AKA method
would have returned an EAP-Success.
This solution would have been a new version of EAP-SIM/AKA with back-
wards compatibility issues. There could also have been side effects to the
EAP state machine [293]. The handling of an EAP-method inside another
EAP-method would have been rather odd from an EAP authenticator per-
spective. A better approach would have been using some tunneled EAP-
method such as EAP-TTLS. Alas, none of the existing tunneled EAP-met-
hods support EAP-SIM/AKA as the outer authentication method.
Adding new EAP-types to EAP-SIM/AKA that would indicate that a peer wants
to run another EAP exchange after the first one. These EAP exchanges
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would be completely separate. The downside of this solution proposal was
that it would be EAP specific.
Extending IKEv2 with new Notify payloads that carry information needed by
a PAP or CHAP before the IKEv2 negotiation completes. This solution was
rather straight forward but also had issues. First, it was only restricted to
PAP and CHAP. Second, although the notification exchange were protected
by IKE SA, the peers have not yet mutually authenticated each other. Thus
the solution was vulnerable to a man in a middle attack.
It appeared that a mechanism for 3rd party authentication should have the flex-
ibility IKEv2 already has when it comes to authentication. These include sig-
natures with public-key certificates, shared secrets, and EAP-methods. Further-
more, the solution should be backwards compatible. The extension to IKEv2 that
was developed in IETF and then adopted by 3GPP is described in the following
section.
7.2.2 Proposed Solution
We propose a solution for the multiple authentications that extends IKEv2 in a
backwards compatible manner. Either one of the peers announce a support for
the extension by including a MULTIPLE AUTH SUPPORTED notification payload in
the IKE SA INIT response (in case of responder) or in the first IKE AUTH request
(in case of initiator). If both peers indicate the support for the IKEv2 multiple
authentications extension, either one of them can initiate the second authentica-
tion by including an ANOTHER AUTH FOLLOWS notification in any IKE AUTH message
that contains an AUTH payload. The next IKE AUTH message sent by the same peer
will contain a second identity payload (IDi and optionally IDr) and start another
authentication exchange. The IKE AUTH phase is considered successful only if
all the individual authentication exchanges completed successfully.
It is assumed that both peers know what credentials they want to present; there
is no negotiation about, for instance, what type of authentication is to be done.
As in IKEv2, EAP-based authentication is always requested by the initiator (by
omitting the AUTH payload). In 3GPP Interworking WLAN choices are more lim-
ited though. The first authentication is always either EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA. The
second one has been limited to EAP. Support for EAP-methods that can be used
by the PDG to mimic either PAP or CHAP are specifically defined. EAP-MD5 [41]
can be used for CHAP and EAP-GTC [41] for PAP.
The AUTH payloads are calculated as specified in IKEv2 (see Sections 2.15 and
2.16), where IDi’ refers to the latest IDi payload sent by the initiator, and IDr’
refers to the latest IDr payload sent by the responder. If EAP-methods that do not
generate shared keys are used, it is possible that several AUTH payloads with an
identical contents are sent. When such EAP-methods are used, the purpose of the
AUTH payload is simply to delimit the authentication exchanges, and ensure that
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the IKE SA INIT request/response messages were not modified. Figure 7.2 illus-
trates an example of 3GPP Interworking WLAN and PNA authentication towards
3rd party, and associated IKEv2 and EAP protocol message exchanges. The sec-
ond round authentication method is a plain username/password (i.e., PAP).
Mobile 
node





[ ... DH-value, APN, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED) ]
EAP-SIM/AKA initiator authentication
IKE AUTH






[ EAP-GTC request ]
IKE AUTH









[ AUTH, CFGs, TSes, ... ]
Figure 7.2: A mobile node authenticates and authorizes for the Private Network Access
using EAP-SIM/AKA towards the access operator and EAP-GTC (i.e., simple PAP)
towards the 3rd party. The EAP-GTC related RADIUS negotiation between the access
operator NAS (i.e., the PDG) and the 3rd party AAA server is also shown. The picture
is modified from the original found in 3GPP TS 33.234 [11].
IKEv2 multiple authentications solution has almost the same security properties
as basic IKEv2. There is one more new consideration to take into account. In
normal IKEv2, the responder authenticates the initiator before revealing its iden-
tity (except when EAP is used). When multiple authentication exchanges are
used to authenticate the initiator, the responder has to reveal its identity before
all of the initiator authentication exchanges have been completed. Another secu-
rity consideration relates to a fact that there is no cryptographic binding between
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two separate AAA rounds during the IKEv2 negotiation, which could allow an
attacker to impersonate a subscriber or a PDG. However, in the latter case the
attacker should first be able to break into the communication between the opera-
tor AAA and the 3rd party AAA.
There has been some criticism toward RFC 4739 saying that it is too heavy in
cases where 3rd party authentications are frequent. The reason is that IKEv2
multiple authentications is only applicable when creating a new IKE SA and the
first implicit CHILD SA, not for the possible subsequent CHILD SA creations. Each
IKE SA creation involves computing new Diffie-Hellman [95] values and full IKEv2
protocol exchange, whereas for CHILD SA a computation of a new Diffie-Hellman
is optional. This issue was considered when developing IKEv2 multiple authen-
tications extension but at that time it was believed that a creation of a CHILD SA is
local to the security gateway and no one has interest in authenticating its creation.
However, these assumptions might have been too short sighted after all.
7.3 Bootstrapping of Mobile IPv6
The foreseen large scale Mobile IPv6 deployments have created an evident need
for a proper Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping and backend AAA functionality. Diame-
ter will be an obvious candidate for the selection of the AAA protocol.
7.3.1 Background
The Mobile IPv6 specification requires a mobile node to perform registration with
a home agent and inform its current point of attachment (CoA). As a result, the
home agent creates and maintains a binding between mobile node’s HoA and
mobile node’s CoA. The mobile node needs information such as the the home
link prefix, the home agent address and mobile node to home agent security asso-
ciation related information; otherwise registration is not possible. The aforemen-
tioned set of information could be pre-provisioned in mobile nodes. However,
pre-provisioning of this information will become an administrative burden for an
operator and is vulnerable for configuration errors. Moreover, pre-provisioning
does not address load balancing, failover, opportunistic home link assignment
and assignment of local home agents in a close proximity of the mobile node.
Also reacting to sudden environmental or topological changes is close to nonex-
istent. The experience among mobile operators has shown that pre-provisioning
should be avoided at any possible occasion.
Above Mobile IPv6 deployment challenges led to the development of two differ-
ent bootstrapping solutions: the split scenario and the integrated scenario. Both of
them were discussed already in Section 3.2.1. Large deployments serving mil-
lions of subscribers also need a functional AAA infrastructure support. Diame-
ter [71] was a natural choice for the future operator AAA backend solution. As a
result two Diameter interfaces have been proposed: Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support
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for Network Access Server to Diameter Server Interaction [188], and Diameter Mobile
IPv6: Support for Home Agent to Diameter Server interaction [186].
The initial part of the Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping takes place during the network
access authentication. Keeping in mind the requirement of locality and QoS sup-
port discussed in Section 5.3, the provisioning of subscribed QoS information
could also be easily piggy-backed during the access authentication. The simpli-
fied QoS information provisioning could later be extended to a larger QoS frame-
work. These ideas led to the development of AAA protocol independent QoS
information objects [194] and one mapping of them to Diameter AVPs reusing
existing Diameter applications [195].
Figure 7.3 illustrates Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping procedure from the initial net-
work access to the point when the bidirectional Mobile IP tunnel has been set up
between the mobile node and the home agent. The process involves both inte-
grated scenario bootstrapping and split scenario bootstrapping procedures. The
downloading of the subscriber QoS profile is also possible during the network
access authentication procedure. In the bootstrapping procedure we are most
interested in steps marked A) and B). Those are the steps where the NAS and
the home agent communicates with the operator AAA backend. Depending on
the location of the home agent the communication over the AAA interface may
traverse through the roaming and inter-connection backbone.
7.3.2 Proposed Solutions for Integrated Scenario
The solution developed in IETF for Diameter based Mobile IPv6 integrated sce-
nario bootstrapping is rather straightforward. The bootstrapping allows the mobi-
le node to discover a suitable home agent during the initial network attachment.
The information about a home agent is eventually delivered to the mobile node
using DHCPv6 (Figure 7.3 steps from 1 to 6).
In the case A) a NAS (also acting as a Diameter client) located in the visited
network announces its integrated scenario bootstrapping capability using the
MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP (see Example 7.3.1). An explicit announcement of
the bootstrapping support is needed because the signaling is completely piggy-
backed on top of the existing Diameter authentication applications (such as EAP
[103] and NASREQ [73]). The Diameter server notices the support for bootstrap-
ping from the MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP. In a case the Diameter server does not
have a support for integrated scenario bootstrapping, it silently discards all boot-
strapping related AVPs. Still, the network access authentication is allowed to
proceed normally. If the NAS does not support bootstrapping, it will not include
any bootstrapping AVP to the authentication requests in the first place.
The MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP also enables a simple capability negotiation bet-
ween the NAS and the Diameter server. The NAS sets those capability bits in the
feature vector bitfield that are supported and to be used. The Diameter server sets
those bits in the succeeding reply message and returned MIP6-Feature-Vector













2) Enforce policies, store bootstrapping info
4) Relay with  home agent info
5) Reply with allocated home agent
8) Start IKEv2 negotiation
12) Complete IKEv2 negotiation 
Authentication, AAA request/reply, Return HA
3) DHCPv6  Request
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11) AAA reply + HoA
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Figure 7.3: Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping using, Integrated and Split Scenarios, and QoS
policy download as a part of the authentication. 1) network access authentication coupled
Integrated scenario bootstrapping AAA interactions, 3-7) Integrated scenario bootstrap-
ping using DHCP to deliver the HA information to the mobile node, 8-13) Split scenario
bootstrapping using IKEv2 with the HA bootstrapped using Integrated scenario, and 14-
15) Mobile IPv6 binding registration
AVP that are mutually supported and allowed by the subscription profile. The
MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP fills a gap in the base Diameter protocol, which is the
lack of end to end capability exchange. There appears to be a general need for
such mechanism outside IP Mobility as well [195].
The visited network NAS may also propose an allocation of a local home agent.
The MIP6-Agent-Info AVP (see Example 7.3.2) may also be used to convey infor-
mation of the locally assigned home agent in the Diameter request message. The
Diameter server may deny the use of local home agent simply by clearing the
LOCAL HOME AGENT ASSIGNMENT bit in the reply message MIP6-Feature-Vector
AVP. The Diameter server returns its preferred home agent information in the
reply message using again the MIP6-Agent-Info. Zero or more MIP6-Agent-Info
AVPs may be included in Diameter request and reply messages.
In a scenario, where both local home agent in a visited network and a home agent
in the home network is assigned, the NAS is in charge of deciding which home
agent to advertise to the mobile node. Obviously the locally assigned home agent
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Example 7.3.1 MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP - Integrated scenario capabilities
The MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP is a 64 bit field. The following
capabilities are defined for integrated scenario bootstrapping:
MIP6_INTEGRATED (0x0000000000000001)
This flag is set by the NAS when Mobile IPv6 integrated
scenario bootstrapping functionality is supported. This flag
is set by the AAA server when Mobile IPv6 integrated scenario
bootstrapping is supported and authorized to be used.
LOCAL_HOME_AGENT_ASSIGNMENT (0x0000000000000002)
This flag is set by the NAS when a local home agent can be
assigned to the mobile node. This flag is set by the AAA
server when the use of a local home agent is authorized.
would be advertised.
The interface also allows assignment of Home Link Prefix during the network
access authentication using the MIP-Home-Link-Prefix AVP (see Example 7.3.3).
The allocated prefix may then be conveyed to the mobile node, for example, using
DHCP. Mobile WiMAX and 3GPP2 have chosen this approach for prefix delivery.
Example 7.3.2 MIP6-Agent-Info AVP - of type Grouped
<MIP6-Agent-Info> ::= < AVP Header: TBD >
[ MIP-Home-Agent-Address ] ; HA IP address
[ MIP-Home-Agent-Host ] ; HA FQDN
* [ AVP ]
MIP-Home-Agent-Address is of type Address. MIP-Home-Agent-Host is
of type Grouped. Both of them are already defined in RFC 4004.
The integrated scenario design has a slight flaw. It assumes that the local home
agent and the NAS are within the same administrative domain. That does not,
for instance, support Mobile WiMAX deployment model where the Access Ser-
vice Network (ASN) and visited Connectivity Service Network (CSN) may be differ-
ent operators. The situation can be circumvented by overwriting MIP6-Feature-
Vector in the visited CSN AAA proxy.
7.3.3 Proposed Solutions for Split Scenario
The solution developed in IETF for Diameter based Mobile IPv6 split scenario
bootstrapping is slightly more complicated than the integrated scenario. The
bootstrapping allows the mobile node to authorize to the mobility service and
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Example 7.3.3 MIP6-Home-Link-Prefix - of type OctetString
0 1 2 3
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MIP6-Home-Link-Prefix is of type OctetString and contains the Home Network
Prefix assigned to the mobile node.
set up the security association to the home agent using IKEv2 procedure (Fig-
ure 7.3 steps from 8 to 13). The IKEv2 procedure also involves authentication of
the mobile node and a dynamic assignment of the HoA or the HNP. The boot-
strapping procedure is considered rather heavy. Fortunately, the bootstrapping
is executed only on the activation of the network connectivity for the first time.
The AAA interface for the split scenario (see Figure 7.3 case B)) reuses commands
from EAP and NASREQ applications. The home Diameter server must be able
to distinguish between a normal authentication and Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping,
thus a new application is needed for split scenario bootstrapping. The Mobile
IPv6 split scenario bootstrapping Diameter application is able to authenticate
and authorize the mobile node using IKEv2 with EAP, IKEv2 with subscriber cer-
tificates and IKEv2 with pre-shared secrets. In addition to original goals, Mobile IPv6
Authentication Protocol [237] support had to be added by requests from 3GPP2 and
Mobile WiMAX, although it actually deviates greatly from IKEv2-based boot-
strapping. For the Authentication Protocol bootstrapping we defined two new
messages: MIP6-Request-Message (MRM) and MIP-Answer-Message (MAM). Due
to the existing legacy regarding the Authentication Protocol, the AAA interface
had to be made compatible with 3GPP2 use of the Authentication Protocol [32].
The Mobile IPv6 split scenario bootstrapping application messages are exchanged
between the home agent (in IKEv2 IPsec gateway and Diameter client roles) and
the home Diameter server. Either the home agent or the Diameter server can
assign the HoA to the mobile node. The MIP6-Feature-Vector (see Example
7.3.4) can be used to carry various subscription related policy informations. One
potential policy (or capability) to be used by operators is the control over Router
Optimization per subscription basis (see Example 7.3.4). The home agent is in
a position of controlling the Mobile IPv6 route optimization as it can easily fil-
ter HoT and HoTI messages during the return routability procedure. There are
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operator business reasons, typically related to charging or regulation, where the
operator might explicitly want to prohibit route optimized communication out-
side an administrative domain.
Example 7.3.4 MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP - Split scenario capabilities
The following additional capabilities are defined for split
scenario bootstrapping:
RO_SUPPORTED (0x0000000800000000)
This flag is set by the HA when Route Optimization feature is
supported. This flag is set by the AAA server when Route
Optimization is authorized for the subscriber.
7.3.4 Use of Bootstrapping in Wireless Architectures
Both Mobile IPv6 integrated and split scenario bootstrapping have an intended
use in the forthcoming 3GPP Release-8 architecture (see Figure 4.3). In the Evolved
Packet Core for the 3GPP access we have two central nodes with a home agent
functionality (a SGW and a PDN-GW) and one NAS (the MME). During the net-
work attachment and access authentication the MME needs to bootstrap a PDN-
GW for the mobile node based on the subscriber’s realm and possibly based on
the APN. Mobile IPv6 integrated scenario bootstrapping would fit here. How-
ever, the bootstrapping is slightly different from a ”pure” IETF approach as the
MME needs to know more than just a Mobile IPv6 home agent. The MME also
needs to know the GTP tunnel endpoint for both user and control planes. Fur-
thermore, the MME needs to know the LMA for Proxy Mobile IPv6. The required
PDN-GW identities can be generated from subscribers IMSI and selected APN
information, and represented in a FQDN format. Similar approach was already
used in 3GPP Interworking WLAN [6]. The split scenario AAA functionality can
be used as a basis for the interfaces between the SGW and the HAA, and between
the PDN-GW and the HSS.
7.3.5 Selection of the Mobility Service
Mobile IPv6 can identify mobile nodes in various ways, including home addres-
ses, NAIs, and credentials suitable for IKEv2. In some Mobile IPv6 deployments
identifying the mobile node or the mobility service subscriber via a Proxy Mobile
IPv6 client (hereafter the mobile node and the Proxy Mobile IPv6 client are used
interchangeably) is not enough to distinguish between multiple services possibly
provisioned to the said mobile node and its mobility service subscription.
The capability to specify different services in addition to the mobile node identity
can be leveraged to provide flexibility for mobility service providers to provide
multiple services within the same mobility service subscription. In 3GPP mobile
operator deployments the use cases are for example:
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Provide an enterprise data access for which the mobility service provider
hosts connectivity and mobility services on behalf of the enterprise.
Provide access to extern network that are otherwise not accessible from
public networks because of some mobility service provider’s business rea-
sons.
Provide simultaneous access to different external networks that are sepa-
rated based on policies of the mobility service provider.
Enable easier policy and quality of service assignment for mobility service
providers based on the subscribed services.
Obviously the above list of use cases and requirements can be used to implement
Mobile IPv6 and Mobile IPv4 versions of the GPRS Access Point Name (APN). This
has led to the development of the service selection mobility option (see Exam-
ple 7.3.5) [192] for Mobile IPv6 and its Mobile IPv4 equivalent [191]. The option
is intended to assist home agents on making specific service selections for the
mobility service subscription during the binding registration procedure. The ser-
vice selection may affect home agent routing decisions, HoA or HNP assignment
policies, firewall settings, and security policies. The service selection option sho-
uld be used in every Binding Update that makes an initial registration to the home
agent. The first real deployment case for the service selection is the Release-8 EPC
and its way of using Proxy Mobile IPv6 as a GTP replacement. Both Mobile IPv6
and Mobile IPv4 options have already been included in 3GPP Release-8 stan-
dards.
The identifier conveyed in the service selection mobility option is the APN. In
order to mimic GPRS APN functionality accurately, there might be a need to
include additional information. For instance, cases where a Secondary PDP Con-
text is activated, identification of this could be encoded into the APN name. The
additional information could take a form of APN name decoration. The APN
string could be appended with a terminal assigned session identifier that indicate
a creation of a secondary context under the same APN. The lack of session iden-
tifier could indicate to the home agent that the terminal wishes to create another
Primary PDP Context using the same APN name. Example 7.3.5 shows one way
of decoration using a comma separated fields.
The decoration could also take a more general format using comma separated
type-value pairs e.g., ”name=foo,id=42,type=bar”. Similar approach was earlier used
with Identity Selection Hints for the EAP [48]. It could be that service names need
an unknown number of additional parameters in the future network architectures
and deployments.
At most one service selection mobility option may be included in any (Proxy)
Binding Update message. If the (Proxy) Binding Update message includes any
authorization related options (such as the Binding Authorization Data option)
or authentication related options (such as the Mobility Message Authentication
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Example 7.3.5 Mobile IPv6 Service Selection Mobility Option
0 1 2 3
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Identifier: A variable length UTF-8 encoded service identifier
string used to identify the requested service.
’ims’, "ims,1", "ims,2", ’voip’ and ’voip.companyxyz.example.com’
are valid examples of Service Selection option Identifiers. At
minimum the Identifier must be unique among the home agents the
mobile node is authorized to register to.
option), then the Service Selection option must appear before any mobility mes-
sage authorization or authentication related options. The service selection option
should not be sent to a correspondent node. The mobile node cannot assume
that the correspondent node has any knowledge about a specific service selection
made between the mobile node and the home agent.
7.4 Summary
This chapter presented several IETF standardization contributions that were de-
veloped based on the deployment experiments in AAA-based roaming, 3rd party
service provisioning, and attempts to automate IP Mobility service bootstrap-
ping. The solutions presented in this chapter are already widely accepted by the
industry for the next generation of the wireless network architectures.
We described the Chargeable-User-Id attribute that, for example, provides a solu-
tion for AAA-based inter-operator charging systems in the case when an identity
hiding is used. The extension to the IKEv2 protocol described in this chapter
allows multiple independent authentications inside the IKEv2 negotiation. This
feature is useful in deployments where both access provider and 3rd party ser-
vice provider want to authenticate the peer before allowing an access to the ser-
vice. We also presented AAA backend solutions for both Mobile IPv6 Integrated
and Split scenario bootstrapping. Finally, we described an extension to (Proxy)
Mobile IPv6 binding registration signaling that allows a mobile node to indicate
a desired service. Subsequently, a home agent can apply a different processing of




This chapter contains experimentations in a real mobile operator network deploy-
ments and introduces an experimental solution for operator managed network
access. We mainly concentrate on the IEEE 802.11 WLAN as the access technol-
ogy and study how mobility and handovers behave in operator grade access net-
works with strong EAP-based access authentication and air link ciphering. We
also study the impact of inter-operator roaming realized using RADIUS. The test
application of choice is VoIP in majority of cases.
8.1 Introduction and Testing Environment
We measured EAP-based access authentication and RADIUS-based roaming in a
partly commercial network. The access points were in a laboratory environment
but everything else was a part of an existing commercial and operational operator
network infrastructure. Figure 8.1 illustrates the used network set up.
The access points (AP) were typical off-the-shelves Cisco Aironet IEEE 802.11bg
capable WLAN hardware configured into hard access points mode (i.e., there was
no centralized WLAN switch controlling a number of light weight access points).
All access points were under the same IP subnetwork and configured either with
WPA or WPA2 security. In TeliaSonera’s network an EAP-based authentication
is always required and the EAP authentication is conveyed over RADIUS proto-
col to a commercial combined RADIUS and EAP-server. EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA,
EAP-TLS and EAP-TTLS are supported by the EAP-server. The EAP-server is
connected via a standard SS7 interface to TeliaSonera’s HLR, that again has SS7-
based roaming connections enabled to all TeliaSonera’s roaming partners.
The WLAN hotspot was part of the commercial TeliaSonera proxy network and,































Figure 8.1: WLAN hotspot testbed architecture for EAP-based access authentication with
inter-operator roaming capabilities
for instance, each RADIUS message had to traverse through two proxies before
reaching the EAP server. We do not have exact information of the number of
proxies in roaming partners’ networks. For RADIUS based roaming signaling
traffic there was two choices, either through an inter-operator GRX IP backbone
network or over a dedicated connection directly with the roaming partner (typi-
cally a site to site IPsec VPN).
The WLAN hotspot infrastructure was also connected to a network that provided
SIP enabled VoIP gateway for our use. Using this commercial VoIP platform we
were able to initiate and receive VoIP calls using WLAN enabled mobile phones.
The VoIP gateway also allowed us to connect to existing GSM and PSTN infras-
tructure. Thus, making a call from a WLAN VoIP terminal to a GSM mobile
phone was possible.
Inter-operator roaming could be arranged in two ways in the network architec-
ture illustrated in Figure 8.1. A roaming WLAN terminal could authenticate
against TeliaSonera EAP-server and the HLR would take care of finding roamer’s
home HLR over the SS7 roaming network. Alternatively, the RADIUS roam-
ing proxy could forward the WLAN terminal initiated EAP-based authentica-
tion over the IP inter-connection network to roamer’s home network EAP-server.
Technically the choice of which path to select is done using realm based AAA
routing in the visited network. The roaming proxy in our example makes the
decision where to forward RADIUS request messages. The AAA realm based
routing was already deployed using Release-6 3GPP Interworking WLAN defined
realm formats [6] (e.g., user@wlan.mnc008.mcc214.3gppnetwork.org). The local
VoIP gateway was used in all scenarios, regardless whether the user was roaming
or not.
With the test environment described earlier and illustrated in Figure 8.1 we were
able to measure latencies caused by inter-operator AAA signaling, impact of
the backend AAA configuration choices and latencies during layer-2 handovers
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caused by strong security. The experimentations also served as an excellent testbed
for EAP-SIM implementations and inter-operability testing.
8.2 Inter-operator WLAN Roaming Measurements
Understanding the impact of the access authentication in a roaming environment
is essential knowledge for operators when they start to deploy mobile VoIP access
infrastructure over short range radio technologies, such as IEEE 802.11 WLAN.
Our live network testbed architecture is illustrated in Figure 8.1. It makes exten-
sive use of locality when it comes to user plane traffic. The VoIP gateway is
located in the visited network for roaming VoIP users. The ’voice’ roaming uses
the circuit switched network when the other end is either a GSM mobile phone
or a fixed line phone.
8.2.1 Experimentation Setup
We ran a series of experiments using Nokia E60 WLAN capable multi-radio ter-
minal with a commercial SIP capable Cisco VoIP client. The Nokia E60 was
equipped with foreign roaming partners’ SIM cards and the access authentica-
tion method was EAP-SIM. The other end was a GSM mobile phone (equipped
with TeliaSonera’s SIM) in a close proximity of the WLAN phone. Our deploy-
ment allowed optimal routing of the voice traffic for the roaming VoIP users. Thus
the roaming WLAN phone and its user plane VoIP traffic was always handled
locally in the visited network. The VoIP was conventional bi-directional Real Time
Protocol (RTP) [262] traffic with a 50 packets per second G.729 [158] voice codec.
We measured several deployment scenarios that are considered realistic. The
wide range of possibilities in terminals, in the access network infrastructure and
in the home operator AAA backend made scoping difficult and therefore we
neglected most of the WLAN migration mode scenarios. We only concentrated
on WPA and WPA2 based security. One particular area of interest was what hap-
pens in the event of handover between access points. In our case all the han-
dovers were intra-operator, however, some of the scenarios were directly valid in
inter-operator cases as well.
We had three different roaming partners involved: one from southern Europe,
one from China (Hong Kong) and one from Indonesia1. Selecting such roam-
ing partners would demonstrate the real world AAA roaming infrastructure and
round-trip delays. All backend AAA servers had the EAP-SIM fast re-authentication
feature enabled and the WLAN phone also had the equivalent support for it.
In the case of the WPA2 security, the caching of the Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
i.e., the PMKSA CACHING [150] feature was enabled. When enabled and used
the authentication is completely local between the mobile node and the access
point without initiating an EAP negotiation and involving the backend AAA
1Unfortunately it is not possible to reveal roaming partner operator names
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server. The operation is essentially the same as after a successful EAP authen-
tication but instead of receiving a new Pairwise Master Key from the EAP-server,
a cached key from the previous authentication(s) is used to derive all needed
cryptographic keying material. Each access point was responsible for its own
authentication and accounting RADIUS signaling. The access network did not
have any kind of centralized access point management functionality. Because of
the nature of these roaming experiment TeliaSonera’s EAP-server or HLR were
not used; only the local AAA proxy and the roaming proxy. The test scenarios
are listed below:
Case 1 – Roaming with an European operator. No accounting messages were
sent as a result of a handover when WPA2 & PMKSA CACHING was used.
The backend AAA server always accepted (i.e., trusted to) the identity pro-
vided in the EAP-Response/Identitymessage, which reduced one message
exchange during the EAP-SIM negotiation. The fast re-authentication fea-
ture of the EAP-server was enabled.
Case 2 – Roaming with an Indonesian operator. No accounting messages were
sent as a result of a handover when WPA2 & PMKSA CACHING was used.
The backend AAA server never accepted (i.e., trusted to) the identity pro-
vided in the EAP-Response/Identity message. Therefore the mobile node
had to provide its identity explicitly in an additional EAP-SIM message
exchange. The fast re-authentication feature of the EAP-server was enabled.
Case 3 – Roaming with a Chinese operator (in Hong Kong). Accounting start &
stop messages were sent after a successful authentication when WPA2 &
PMKSA CACHING was used. The accounting messages do not contribute
to the handover latencies. The backend AAA server always accepted (i.e.,
trusted to) the identity provided in the EAP-Response/Identity message,
which reduced one message exchange during EAP-SIM negotiation. How-
ever, the AAA server offered EAP-PEAPv0 with MS-CHAPv2 as the first
preferred EAP-method. The mobile node then had to request EAP-SIM
using the NAK procedure. The NAK procedure adds at least one more EAP
message exchange. The fast re-authentication feature of the EAP-server was
enabled.
Figure 8.2 shows generic examples of a WPA2 access authentication procedure
without PMKSA CACHING (on the left hand side) and with PMKSA CACHING
(on the right hand side). We use EAP-SIM as the example EAP-method. Assum-
ing that the AP/Switch is always local to the access network and the AAA back-
end is behind a roaming network, we can immediately see why inter-domain
or any signaling should be avoided. Accounting signaling is started only after a
successful authentication and does not contribute to authentication or attachment
latency.
The measurements were executed by walking around in the indoor office space
while the VoIP call was active. The time between each handover is approxi-


































(b) With a cached PMKSA
Figure 8.2: Example authentication signaling using WPA2, EAP and AAA backend
mately 30 seconds. Out of measurement data we selected example traces that
are shown in this dissertation. The selected measurements and traces represent a
general trend and show the expected performance, behavior, immediate deploy-
ment related issues and the volume of expected signaling traffic. The traffic mea-
surement point was connected to a Hub behind the WLAN access points. The
Hub could see all user plane traffic and RADIUS traffic coming from or going to
access points. We measured only the uplink RTP traffic, which is enough to indi-
cate when the mobile node is able to get IP packets through. The used logging
mechanism does not include the airlink round-trip time, which was not of inter-
est in our measurements anyway. We are also not interested in RTP traffic delay
variations because our focus in on signaling and roaming.
8.2.2 Results and Analysis
Figures 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 illustrate the measurement results of experimentation
cases 1 to 3. The measurement results are also summarized in Tables 8.1 to 8.6.
The graphs on the left side show the effect of authentications that require inter-
operator signaling on the RTP traffic. The packet rate drops to zero in the major-
ity of handover cases. The graphs on the right side show the benefits of the key
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caching. The packet rate does not drop drastically, except on the first authentica-
tions when the key material is retrieved from the AAA server and cached locally.
In the experimentation case 1 the average round-trip time for an AAA message
to traverse through the RADIUS proxy chain from the visited network authenti-
cator (i.e., the access point) to the home operator AAA backend server and back
was 0.14 seconds. The average round-trip time for AAA messages was 0.5 sec-
onds for the experimentation case 2. Finally, the average round-trip time for AAA
messages was 0.5 seconds for the experimentation case 3. The round-trip latency
measurements were done separately during the verification of the roaming con-
nections.
The summarizing tables have total eight fields. The ’HO’ means a handover
number under a specific measurement case. 0 marks the initial attachment to
the network and odd numbers indicate a handover to the access point #2 and
even numbers indicate a handover to the access point #1. The ’Auth Type’ has
three values: Full indicates that the access authentication requires an EAP-SIM
full authentication, FA-RA indicates an EAP-SIM fast re-authentication procedure
was used and PMKSA indicates the use of the PMKSA CACHING feature.
The ’Total Latency’ shows the total length of the handover in seconds as expe-
rienced by the user. This time includes a mobile node discovering that it is about
to lose the connectivity to the current access point, scanning and the discovery
of a new target network, authentication and setting up the networking interface.
The ’AAA Latency’ shows the time spent on the EAP-SIM authentication, includ-
ing required RADIUS protocol communication between the authenticator (i.e.,
the WLAN access point) and the backend AAA server. The ’Lost UL Pkts’ just
show the number of dropped uplink direction RTP packets during the handover.
The ’RTT % of AAA’ shows the percentage of the message round-trip latency
contribution of the total AAA delay. Similarly the ’AAA % of Total’ shows
the percentage of the time spent on the AAA part of the total handover time.
The complete AAA time include both message exchange, processing of the key
material and such. Finally, the ’Number of Msgs’ shows the number of required
RADIUS (i.e., AAA) messages during the authentication procedure. The addition
of RTs means that there were retransmitted packets. The addition of NAK means
the EAP NAK procedure.
The results in Tables 8.1 to Table 8.6 are in most cases straightforward. There
are some interesting results especially in Table 8.5 and Table 8.6. First, the nota-
tion ’6+2 NAK’ in the number of exchanged messages column mean that 6 EAP-
related RADIUS authentication messages got exchanged during the authentica-
tion procedure and 2 RADIUS accounting messages got exchanged. The NAK
procedure triggered message exchange is already included in the EAP authenti-
cation exchange number. After the authentication the authenticator sends either
Accounting-Start or Accounting-Stop and receives subsequent reply messages
depending on whether the mobile node attached to or detached from the access
point. The accounting was enabled only in one access point by purpose.








































(b) WPA2 with EAP-SIM








































(b) WPA2 with EAP-SIM








































(b) WPA2 with EAP-SIM (& accounting)
Figure 8.5: Test case 3 – Chinese (Hong Kong) roaming partner
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In Table 8.5 we can see that after two successful EAP-SIM fast re-authentications
a full authentication is triggered. This is normal behavior as the operator can
limit the number of successive fast re-authentications. Here the limit has been
set to 2. The number of allowed successive fast re-authentications is a balance
between the load towards the HLR and the freshness of the key material. Each
full authentication generates a new fresh set of cryptographic key material but at
the same time increases the load in a mobile operator’s HLR. In practice we have
observed values from 0 to 8 for the number of allowed fast re-authentications in
live roaming networks.
Table 8.1: Results for Case 1 from Figure 8.3(a) – WPA-based security












0 Full 6s 6s – – – 8 RTs
1 FA-RA 1.26s 0.31s 64 90% 25% 4
2 FA-RA 1.06s 0.36s 55 78% 34% 4
Table 8.2: Results for Case 1 from Figure 8.3(b) – WPA2-based security












0 FA-RA 0.35s 0.35s – – – 4
1 FA-RA 1.04s 0.31s 56 90% 30% 4
2 PMKSA 0.26s – 16 – – –
Table 8.3: Results for Case 2 from Figure 8.4(a) – WPA-based security












0 Full 3.9s 3.9s – – – 7 RTs
1 FA-RA 3.77s 2.7s 198 56% 72% 6
2 FA-RA 3.39s 2.6s 170 58% 77% 6
Table 8.4: Results for Case 2 from Figure 8.4(b) – WPA2-based security












0 FA-RA 1.7s 1.7s – – – 6
1 FA-RA 2.48s 1.8s 123 83% 73% 6
2 PMKSA 0.27s – 17 – – –
3 PMKSA 0.26s – 12 – – –
From the measurements we can deduct several obvious conclusions. Clearly
EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA alone are not suitable for deployments where real-time traf-
fic requirements are to be met during handovers. Even the fast re-authentication
takes too long to complete in all our test cases, assuming that 300 milliseconds
minus possible VoIP codec inherent interleaving delay is the threshold for an
acceptable delay [160]. We also realize that the signaling round-trip delay is the
8.2. INTER-OPERATOR WLAN ROAMING MEASUREMENTS 139
Table 8.5: Results for Case 3 from Figure 8.5(a) – WPA-based security












0 Full 6.6s 6.6s – – – 8+2 NAK
1 FA-RA 2.47s 1.8s 125 83% 73% 6+2 NAK
2 FA-RA 2.49s 1.8s 124 83% 72% 6+2 NAK
3 Full 7.4s 6.7s 170 30% 91% 8+2 NAK
4 FA-RA 2.55s 1.9s 128 79% 75% 6+2 NAK
Table 8.6: Results for Case 3 from Figure 8.5(b) – WPA2-based security












0 Full 6.7s 6.7s – – – 8+2 NAK
1 FA-RA 2.9s 1.8s 142 83% 62% 6+2 NAK
2 PMKSA 0.1s – 5 – – 2
3 PMKSA 0.2s – 18 – – 2
4 PMKSA 0.08s – 3 – – 2
dominant factor of the EAP-SIM authentication time, especially in the case of the
fast re-authentication. In the case of the EAP-SIM full authentication the domi-
nant factor is the mobile node side SIM algorithm processing. Unfortunately, we
do not have an access to the mobile node EAP-SIM implementation, thus we can-
not point out the exact bottle neck. It could be the slow communication interface
between the terminal and the UICC (9600 bps only) or just a lack of computing
power in the mobile node or in the UICC. In general the processing time with the
full authentication is three times longer than with the fast re-authentication (that
is a simple hashed message authentication code).
The access authentication delay is also the dominating factor of the whole han-
dover delay, especially when signaling round-trip delays are long. The remaining
time of the total authentication delay is divided among network discovery and
selection, IEEE 802.11 open authentication and association, initial IEEE 802.1X
signaling, calculation of the new keying material, 4-way handshake, group key
delivery and configuring the network interface. The PMKSA CACHING feature
reduces steps during IEEE 802.1X negotiation, skipping all EAP-related message
exchanges and corresponding RADIUS message exchanges. Also the derivation
of the new keying material from the cached keys is much less time consuming
than running a full SIM algorithm. The WPA2 results with PMKSA CACHING
indicate that if we are able to skip some of steps during the access authentication,
total handover latency is reduced dramatically. RADIUS accounting is done after
a successful authentication, thus it does not affect the general AAA delay shown
in Table 8.6, just increases the signaling load in the network.
The locality and reduced signaling aspect of the IEEE 802.11i PMKSA CACHING
is definitely worthwhile and allows us to meet the seamless handover require-
ments for real-time traffic. Unfortunately, there are a few architectural issues
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related to that. First, the caching feature does not respect administrative domains.
Once the keys are cached handovers between access points belonging to differ-
ent administrative domain are treated similarly to handovers within the same
administrative domain. Of course we are able to generate RADIUS accounting
based notification even when the PMKSA CACHING is used. Alas, one miscon-
figured access point that refuses to send anything in the event of handovers may
ruin the whole AAA backend logic. Furthermore, the AAA-server does not have
a way to deny access from a mobile node when PMKSA CACHING is used (there
is no such feature in RADIUS accounting).
Second, each access point is responsible of its own signaling with the AAA back-
end. It will eventually lead to considerable management overhead and the prob-
ability of misconfiguration increases. Also the operator might not even be inter-
ested in mobility and local communication between the mobile nodes within the
access network under the same administrative domain. The operator is prob-
ably more interested in situations where the mobile node enters or leaves the
access network, and when administrative domains get crosses. Handling signal-
ing whenever possible within the access network would significantly reduce, for
example, signaling over potentially delay prone and costly roaming connections.
Finally, the current IEEE 802.11i security model does airlink traffic ciphering bet-
ween the mobile node and the access point. It means that every access point must
have adequate hardware and software support for all required security and AAA
features. In the WPA2 context that even means hardware acceleration for cipher-
ing. This approach allows distributing the computationally expensive ciphering
operations. However, it at the same time poses excessive demands on the access
points’ hardware requirements and complexity of the embedded software. Fur-
thermore, cryptographic key distribution and AAA infrastructure generate more
network management and complicate rolling out new features to access networks
(i.e., access point software or hardware upgrades). The airlink security does not
address anything beyond the access point. The security between the access points
and the edge of the hotspot must still be solved using other mechanism, which
again increases the complexity of the access points. The more intelligent access
points, the more they cost and require management. Access points tend to be
those networking elements that get deployed most. Therefore their direct pur-
chase and indirect management costs are of great interest.
8.3 Host Identity Protocol Based Network Access Pro-
tocol
The experimentations on roaming and WLAN access network deployments led
us to think of new types of solutions. We came up with a possible solution that
has the following characteristics:
Centrally managed access network deployment with light weight and low
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cost access points,
No restriction for communication within the access network as long as mobile
nodes do not want to communicate outside the administrative domain defined
boundaries,
All security is moved up from layer-2 to IP layer, thus offloading most of
the complexity away from the access points.
Handovers within the same administrative domain do not require mobile
nodes to re-authenticate,
Network assistance for network discovery and selection; mobile nodes may
easily discover networks that are optimal for them from services continuity
point of view,
One central node communicates with the AAA backend, and
Possibility to bootstrap several networking services during the access authen-
tication. The author is working on this concept for QoS [194, 195] and
Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping [188] where bootstrapping information is piggy-
backed as part of the access authentication AAA signaling.
We implemented a prototype of our desired solution with centralized network
access control using HIP. Our HIP-based network attachment protocol implemen-
tation [190] is described in detail in this section.
8.3.1 Background
Recent development in numerous wireless networking technologies and multi-
radio terminal device capabilities have given operators new alternatives in design-
ing their networks. Traditional cellular mobile operators are also seeking for alter-
native and cost effective ways to expand their networking coverage and provide
IP networking services outside cellular networks. However, security require-
ments, dynamically bootstrapping various IP services in heterogeneous environ-
ments and the need for seamless handovers for realtime IP services have become
a pressing problem area to be solved in a feasible way. Furthermore, in heteroge-
neous networks the target network discovery and selection problem [53] rapidly
becomes an issue, which also needs to be addressed before the secure seamless
mobility requirements can be met.
Large networking architectures are upgraded incrementally, which means that
the legacy and the new functionality need to coexists for a considerable amount
of time. This effectively prohibits radical advances in the architecture and pro-
tocol design. Networking protocols have traditionally a layered design where
each layer is functionally independent. The demand for security in wireless com-
munication and the current layered design has created a situation where, in the
worst case, each networking layer executes similar authentication, authorization
and configuration steps independently of each other [57,184]. This is clearly inef-
ficient, especially in managed operator networking environments where all sep-
arate authentications, and authorizations tend to end up in the same AAA back-
end. Furthermore, each layer typically needs to bootstrap and configure their
142 CHAPTER 8. ROAMING AND NETWORK ATTACHMENT EXPERIMENTS
connectivity services. The same applies to application level services if they also
require authentication and authorization each time a new service session gets
established. All this combined with the mobile node making frequent handovers
between different access networks can greatly impact handover latencies and also
increase the load of the AAA backend.
This section concentrates on access authentication in wireless access networks
(namely IEEE 802.11 WLANs), and how to secure the communication between
a mobile node and an access network. Furthermore, we propose a solution and
experimental implementation on how to expand the network access authenti-
cation further to a generic services and IP connectivity bootstrapping. We also
investigate a centralized access network model where a number of WLAN base
stations are connected to a central controller that takes care of all computation-
ally heavy processing. The solution allows deployment of low cost hardware
for WLAN base stations and reduces handover latencies due to the network side
assistance. All these are based on leveraging the HIP Base Exchange [217, 228]
having mobile operator’s managed network deployment architecture in mind.
We also present initial measurement results of the HIP-based network access
authentication.
8.3.2 Bootstrapping and Managed Deployment Model
Bootstrapping in IP networking is defined as the process where a host, without
any initial configuration or knowledge of the network, gains enough knowledge
to begin communicating. However, since this information can only be delivered
by the network itself, bootstrapping relies on some static, globally known con-
stants. In IP networks, for a node to begin communicating outside its local link,
it generally has to know:
Its globally routable IP address including the subnet prefix,
The default gateway, and
DNS server(s).
Our work extends the HIP Base Exchange to a generic bootstrapping of a HIP
capable mobile host in a WLAN environment. The HIP base protocol is easily
extendable by introducing new Type Length Value (TLV) triplets whenever there
is a need to pass new configuration information to the HIP-I (a HIP node initi-
ating the Base Exchange). Our reference wireless technology is a 802.11 WLAN
deployment, that requires authentication, data security (ciphering) at least over
the wireless part of the link, possibly assignment of services level configuration
information and services level SAs between the HIP-I and the entity authenti-
cating the HIP-I. The goal of including generic bootstrapping into the HIP Base
Exchange is to reduce the amount of signaling required on each layer before the
end host is ready to start IP communication. For example, a Mobile IPv6 mobile
node in current WLAN networks needs to first run a link layer security protocol,
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where the WLAN base station authenticates the mobile node with an AAA server,
then run a protocol to obtain an IP address and other configuration parameters,
and only after that send Mobile IPv6 binding update messages to home agent
and corresponding nodes. This easily sums up to a number of round-trips over
the radio link before the applications in a mobile node can proceed communica-
tion [57]. It is also possible that the HIP-based bootstrapping is the only method
for the HIP-I to learn and configure its globally routable IP address.
Managed networks usually have a set of business driven requirements. In com-
mercial operators’ networks these requirements typically include the following:




Robust authentication of subscribed user against the subscriber database
Interoperability and scalability, and
A feasible subscriber and security credential management.
8.3.3 Reference Architecture
Figure 8.6 illustrates the reference model of our network architecture contain-
ing four nodes: HIP-I (a WLAN Station (STA) - a node joining to the network),
WLAN access point (AP), HIP-R (a HIP node at the receiving end of the Base
Exchange) and a backend home AAA (AAAH - for authenticating nodes). The
interaction starts with HIP-I joining the WLAN network. After link layer con-
nectivity has been set up and the HIP-I has configured its link-local address, the
HIP Base Exchange begins. Normally, HIP messages are only sent after IP con-
nectivity is already up. However, since we are using HIP for bootstrapping, HIP
messages have to be sent without any knowledge of the network. One possi-
bility is to use well-known link-local address spaces (fe80::/10 for IPv6 and
169.254.0.0/16 for IPv4) or known multicast address spaces (ff00::/8 for IPv6,
and 224.0.0.0/4 or 255.255.255.255 ’limited broadcast’ for IPv4) for HIP-R.
8.3.4 Prototype Implementation
Data traffic between the HIP-I and the HIP-R is protected by ESP [174] at IP layer.
The reference model described in this dissertation advocates deployments, where
one centralized master node (HIP-R) in a hotspot manages a number of simple
low-cost pass-through (layer-2 bridge) access points. In our case these pass-
through access points provide only access to network without any lower layer
support for security or any IP layer functionality other than bridging IP packets.
HIP related and NAS functionality is completely delegated to the central master
node (HIP-R) in the access network.
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Figure 8.6: HIP based network access architecture in an operator like deployment
with AAA backend
The architecture and deployment model described in this dissertation has several
advantages:
Use of simple and low-cost 802.11 access point technology without any
layer-2 security solution.
No need for secure key distribution protocol deployment.
Fast handovers between access points are easily made possible.
Only one node (HIP-R) interacts with the AAA backend, which simplifies
the access network deployment and management greatly.
The only requirement for access points is that they act as pass-through between
HIP-I and HIP-R. Optionally, they may be extended to advertise the HIP Net-
work Access Protocol (NAPHIP) service and the address of the HIP-R. Without
the extension, HIP-I could opportunistically send the I1 to a well-known multi-
cast address and try to initiate the HIP NAPHIP exchange.
Our HIP-I and HIP-R implementations were based on FreeBSD 6.1 with modified
hip4bsd2 HIP distribution. The HIP-R and the AAAH used standard RADIUS
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8.3.5 Capability Advertisement
Our access point implementation consists of FreeBSD 6.1 system in Host APmode,
with extended 802.11 beacon frames. We added one additional Information Ele-
ment (IE) to all beacon frames sent by the access point. The IE is illustrated in
Table 8.7. This IE has a tag number 0x63 (reserved), and consists of 8 octets of
data. The first 2 octets contain a Service Type. At the moment only two bits are
used: Bit 0 (’H’) informs that the capability for HIP-based access exists, and Bit
2 (’V’) informs about IPv6 capability. Reserved bits are marked as ’r’. Other bits
can be assigned for example to advertise Proxy Mobile IP support in the access
network. The remaining 6 octets contain the MAC address of the HIP-R. Imme-
diately when a HIP-I, running our modified wpa supplicant4, detects a BS with
a desired set of capabilities (including the HIP access), the following procedure is
executed:
1. wpa supplicant performs IEEE 802.11 open authentication and association.
2. wpa supplicant passes the IE to hip daemon.
3. hip daemon constructs the link-local IPv6 address of the HIP-R using EUI-
64 address derivation. In case of IPv4 Reverse ARP [111] could be used to
resolve the HIP-R address
4. HIP-I’s hip daemon contacts the HIP-R’s hip daemon.
5. hip daemons perform an opportunistic HIP Base Exchange.
6. hip daemons set up ESP SAs with each other’s HITs.
7. User plane traffic can flow between HIP nodes.
Our solution is actually IP version agnostic. The implementation used IPv6 due
to the well-known method for deriving link-local IPv6 addresses from MAC add-
resses and the simplicity of including HIP-R’s MAC address in a beacon. The bea-
con information could have easily been replaced with, for example, IPv4 address
from 169.254.0.0/16 space.
Table 8.7: HIP Bootstrapping Information Element in Beacons
Tag Len Service Type – bit 0 MAC Address
0x63 0x08 r r r r r r r r r r r r r V r H nn nn nn nn nn nn
8.3.6 Network Access Protocol
The HIP-based bootstrapping mechanism was briefly described in Section 8.3.2.
The centralized model of our deployment is shown in Figure 8.7. Each access
4wpa supplicant is a WPA Supplicant for most Unix systems and Windows. Available at:
http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa supplicant/
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point advertise the same HIP access information. A handover between access
points under the management of the same HIP-R does not cause invalidation of
the HIP level SA and the associated key material. This is a result of not including
any kind of channel binding between HIP peers and the access point into the HIP
Base Exchange. As a result a new HIP Base Exchange is only required when the
























(b) Handover under one HIP-R
Figure 8.7: Centralized management of the access network
After initiating the opportunistic HIP Base Exchange (I1 and R1 message exchan-
ge) the HIP-I continues by sending the I2 message. The I2 message contains a
HOST ID field [217] that is used to convey HIP I’s domain identifier in a NAI [40]
form (user@realm). After receiving I2 message, HIP-R forwards the identifier and
the required credentials to the AAA backend. The routing of AAA traffic makes
use of realm-based routing. The HIP-R is considered as a trusted party by the
AAA infrastructure. The AAA returns either Access-Reject or Access-Accept
with possible additional bootstrapping information. Upon receiving an Accept,
the HIP-R completes the Base Exchange by sending the R2 message including any
additional received bootstrapping information. Once the HIP Base Exchange has
completed there are SAs between the HIP-I and the HIP-R. In essence this is what
HIP-based network access protocol is about.
Two STAs under the same HIP-R may well communicate directly with each other
using link local addressing. The centralized model does not restrict that in any
way. This is beneficial in a sense that local traffic within the access network does
not load the HIP-R or the AAA backend unnecessarily. Only when a STA needs
to communicate outside the local access network (e.g., in order to access certain
services) the HIP-based access needs to be run.
8.3.7 Security Associations and Keying Material
Section 8.3.2 described the general managed AAA framework for the HIP-based
network access protocol solution. From Figure 8.6 we can see that a number of
SAs are required between different entities. First, the terminal (referred as HIP-I
or STA) and the home network AAA (referred to as AAAH) share a long lived
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SA and credentials. We call this the STA-AAAH SA. The STA and the AAAH
use this SA for mutual authentication. The authentication procedure is conveyed
over the HIP and AAA protocols between the STA and the AAAH. As a result
of a successful authentication both the STA and the AAAH are able to create a
master session key (MSK) material that can be used for subsequent service level
authentications for 3rd parties. The service level authentication is not discussed
further in this dissertation. Second, the HIP-I and the HIP-R will dynamically
create SAs after a successful HIP Base Exchange. We call this the STA-HIP-R SA.
Third, the HIP-R and the AAAH must also share a long lived SA and required
credentials. We call this the HIP-R-AAAH SA.
The details of the STA-AAAH and HIP-R-AAAH SAs are not handled in this
dissertation. The required provisioning of the security related data is also out of
scope of this dissertation but could be done out-of-band between the STA and the
AAAH, and between the HIP-R and the AAAH. In mobile operator deployment
scenarios it is highly probable that the STA also contains some secure tamper
proof smart card media such as a UICC [23]. This media could be used to store
HIP HI, corresponding private key, HIP-I identities, and the credentials needed for
the STA-AAAH SA.
8.3.8 Experimentation Setup
Our experimentation setup is similar to the topology illustrated in Figure 8.7 and
was deployed as a part of the networking architecture illustrated in Figure 8.1.
All nodes were Compaq Armada laptops with 500MHz Pentium II CPUs running
FreeBSD 6.1. For WLAN access we used D-LINK’s 802.11bg PCMCIA cards. The
AAAH was TeliaSonera’s commercially used RADIUS server. The access points
were set to the same channel because that allowed easier monitoring of WLAN
traffic over the air. Unfortunately, overlapping channels also interfere with each
other, which may increase packet loss. The experimentation premises had 22
other discoverable active WLAN networks on other channels.
We ran three series of experimentations aiming to measure how well our imple-
mentation performs in our deployment scenario. The first one included the HIP-
based access, selection of the access point, running the HIP Base Exchange, authen-
tication of the HIP-I to the RADIUS server and a series of 30 script generated
handovers. The second experimentation was essentially the same as the first
one but only using a basic IEEE 802.11 open authentication without any secu-
rity or RADIUS backend involvement. The third experimentation was again the
same as the earlier ones but this time the security was based on WPA2 and EAP-
TLS [45] authentication. EAP-TLS authentication was terminated to the same
RADIUS server as in the first experimentation. The PMKSA caching feature of
IEEE 802.11i was enabled. In all our experiments the background traffic was nor-
mal once a second initiated ping echo request-reply. ping traffic was considered
good enough for initial testing of our implementation, although we realize that it
does not represent any realistic application or user traffic scenario.
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8.3.9 Results and Analysis
The results of the first handover experiment are shown in Table 8.8. We measured
handover (HO) latencies in both downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) directions. In the
table the Probe delay means the time it takes for the STA to realize it has lost the
connectivity to the previous access point and done the probing of access points
it knows. The Probe+Association means the time the STA broadcasts a Probe to
find any new access point that supports the HIP-based network access, receives
replies, selects the access point that advertises the support for HIP-based network
access and completes the IEEE 802.11 authentication and association to the new
access point. The Hi means highest value in the whole test set and respectively the
Lo means the lowest value. We also show the 80% percentile of the measurements.
The initial attachment took a total of 1,45s out of which IEEE 802.11 association
contributed 0.61s, the HIP Base Exchange processing 0.82s and the RADIUS nego-
tiation 0.01s. The HIP Base Exchange is run only during the initial attaching to a
HIP-R or when there is a need to rekey an existing HIP SA. The units in all tables
are seconds.
Table 8.9 shows the results of the IEEE 802.11 open authentication tests with-
out any security or authentication involving the AAA backend. We can see that
the open authentication does not do much better than our HIP-based solution,
which indicates that the overhead of our approach is negligible. The HIP-based
solution actually outperforms the IEEE 802.11 in uplink handover tests. Our
HIP-based solution implemented a cross-layer trigger to initiate the HIP Base
Exchange immediately after the layer-2 handover had completed. After the initial
attachment, when there was no need to initiate the HIP Base Exchange anymore,
a trigger was still delivered on each handover. This caused the HIP-I IP stack
recover slightly faster than in an unmodified IEEE 802.11 STA after each layer-2
handover.
Table 8.10 shows the results of tests using WPA2 security and EAP-TLS authen-
tication. The initial authentication to a new access point includes also RADIUS
negotiation with the AAA backend. The RADIUS negotiation with the first access
point took 0.39 seconds and with the second one 0.48 seconds respectively. The
subsequent authentications made use of the IEEE 802.11i Pairwise Master Key SA
(PMKSA) caching functionality, thus the authentication was completely local and
between the STA and an access point. The functionality of the PMKSA caching
resembles our HIP-based solution in a sense of reducing the AAA backend load.
However, attaching to a new access point requires involving the AAA backend
even if access points were in the same administrative domain, where as the HIP-
based solution requires only involvement of the AAA backend when crossing
administrative domains.
From the results in Table 8.10 we can see that our HIP-based solution competes
evenly with a state of the art industry solution and even outperforms it time to
time. However, IEEE 802.11i requires extensive software, layer-2 security and
hardware ciphering support for WPA2 security and PMKSA caching feature. On
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the other hand, our HIP-based solution operates on top of simple low-cost and
inherently insecure IEEE 802.11 system.
When extending the measurement setup to include all necessary functions to
support inter-domain mobility, the benefit of the HIP NAP should be more vis-
ible. We believe that the current layer-2 security+IP configuration+IP mobility
sequence can be replaced with a single HIP Base Exchange, thus shortening the
messaging sequence considerably. Also, if in the future internetworking nodes
have HIP or similar protocol installed anyway, then using it for several layers
and purposes could reduce the complexity (amount of code) of the nodes, e.g.,
layer-2 can be kept simpler.
Table 8.8: HIP NAP
HO Latency DL HO Latency UL Probe delay Probe + Assoc.
Hi 7.01 3.62 3.21 0.62
Lo 2.70 2.66 2.25 0.21
80% 4.71 3.48 3.05 0.41
avg 3.93 3.17 2.74 0.43
Table 8.9: IEEE 802.11 Open
HO Latency DL HO Latency UL Probe delay Probe + Assoc.
Hi 3.63 4.5 3.22 0.61
Lo 2.67 2.67 2.05 0.21
80% 3.38 3.49 2.90 0.61
avg 3.12 3.19 2.59 0.53
Table 8.10: IEEE 802.11i + EAP-TLS
HO Latency DL HO Latency UL Probe delay Probe + Assoc.
Hi 7 7 4.22 3.31
Lo 3 3 2.06 0.23
80% 5.2 5.2 2.93 0.63
avg 3.93 3.93 2.67 0.72
In our HIP-based implementation the access authentication does not contribute
to the handover latencies after the initial authentication. As long as the STA stays
under the same HIP-R there is no need to re-establish the IP level security associ-
ation.
Considerable amount of handover latency originates from the scanning and prob-
ing phase when the STA discovers it has lost the connectivity to the previous
access point and tries to find a new target access point [211]. For example, in
the experiment 1 approximately 74% of the downlink direction handover latency
was contributed by the scanning and probing. In addition, our testing environ-
ment with multiple BSes probe responses could get lost, thus causing additional
random time for each handover. Since our handover script was forcing attach-
ment to a specific BSS IDs, if the specific probe response was lost due to col-
lisions, probing had to be repeated. This causes additional 0.2s delay for each
lost probe response. It turned out that the real source of the latency in our case
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were the WLAN driver and the wpa supplicant implementations for FreeBSD.
The handover latency could possibly be significantly reduced by dropping the
wpa supplicant from the handover decision process and leaving all that to the
WLAN driver implementation. Also the impact of modifying the WLAN driver
aggressiveness on handovers should be investigated but is out of scope of this
work. The current implementation was notably conservative on initiating a han-
dover.
This dissertation described an experimental implementation of an enhanced HIP-
based Network Attachment Protocol and a bootstrapping solution using IEEE
802.11 WLAN as the example wireless technology. We showed that its central-
ized deployment model with AAA backend subscriber management has poten-
tial in managed operator WLAN networks. The proposed IP layer approach
allows deploying notably low cost base station hardware solutions with minimal
management overhead and AAA backend load. The HIP-based solution itself is
access technology agnostic except for the capability advertisement that this par-
ticular experimental implementation used, for example, to discover the central
HIP-R node. The capability advertisement also helps a STA to find and select
quickly a target network that supports our HIP-based solution. Table 8.11 shows
the summary of the HIP-based Network Attachment Protocol compared to IEEE
802.11 with open authentication and WPA2 based security.
Table 8.11: Summary of experimentations and comparison of technologies

























The handover experiments showed that the experimental implementation does
not at its current state meet real-time applications’ requirements. The latencies are
just too big. However, the experiments also showed that the handover latencies
are not caused by the HIP-based Network Attachment Protocol and its security
solution but rather due to the used WLAN driver implementation. It is expected
that once a proper optimized WLAN driver is applied the results would be sig-
nificantly better accordingly. The HIP-based solution has no additional overhead




In this chapter we presented results from VoIP handover measurements in a man-
aged WLAN access network. We also studied the impact of delays caused by the
AAA traffic traversing across the inter-connection and roaming network. The
handover performance was significantly improved by localizing the AAA inter-
actions in the visited network in a roaming case.
We also presented the results of our experimental HIP based network access pro-
tocol implementation that operates completely at IP layer (thus being decoupled
from the access technology). The proposed solution makes extensive use of cen-
tralized management in a local access network and also provides means for intel-
ligent target network selection using pre-attachment network capability adver-
tisements. The HIP based solution also supports bootstrapping and configuration
of networking information during the HIP based network access authentication,
thus we can at the end reduce signaling significantly. The measurements showed
that our initial implementation competes evenly with the state of the art industry
solutions, even when implemented using general purposed low cost hardware.




This chapter presents results of horizontal IP Mobility handover experimenta-
tions. The experiments concentrate on transport layer implications caused by IP
Mobility and implications of access authentication to IP Mobility.
9.1 Introduction
Existing wireless networks offer to a mobile user a trade-off between connection
bandwidth, coverage, quality and cost. The user can utilize the most suitable
wireless network at a given time and location, for example, by switching bet-
ween WLAN, GPRS, and UMTS links. IP Mobility support is actually becom-
ing an integral part of the wireless IP data communication, for example through
the recent standardization efforts. In a multi-access networking environment the
mobile node often needs to reconfigure its IP addresses after changing the point
of attachment to the network, or when performing an IP level handover between
IP subnetworks. Mobility between access networks may involve both horizontal
and vertical handovers. A typical simplification of vertical handover involves a
change of network interface when the access technology changes, thus also pos-
sibly changing the IP address. However, cases where the access technology char-
acteristics change considerably even with a single multi-radio capable network
interface can be considered a vertical handover. An example of such situation is
the GPRS 2G to 3G handover using a single radio.
Depending on the network environment, mobile nodes may be reachable through
multiple network interfaces simultaneously or through a single interface at a
time, swapping the active interface every once in a while. It is also common that
one of the network interfaces maintain a stable connectivity to the same point
of attachment in the Internet, for example, through Wireless WAN (WWAN) sys-
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tems like GPRS and Enhanced GPRS (EDGE). At the same time the other network
interfaces may change their point of attachment (and the IP address) quite fre-
quently, for example, when attached to short range systems like WLAN. A han-
dover is challenging to end-to-end transport protocols (such as TCP), because
packets often get lost, delayed or reordered during a handover. The situation is
not that much better for real-time traffic (such as RTP-based VoIP [262]) that is
very sensitive to packet losses and delayed delivery of packets.
In a multi-access environment the make-before-break approach is an inherent
choice, provided that the applied mobility solution supports using multiple link
interfaces simultaneously and the link-level connectivity can be maintained dur-
ing the handover. Obviously make-before-break handovers are not trivial to
implement for horizontal handovers using a single radio interface. Issues like
access authentication latency and target network discovery before the handover
are essential in case of horizontal handovers. The recent interest has mainly been
on improving the vertical handover case. However, the evident need for build-
ing additional network capacity and bettering the indoors coverage in hotspots
with short range radio technologies has made horizontal handovers an important
topic again. Yet horizontal handovers between different administrative domains
(e.g., operators) tend to resemble vertical handovers in a sense that IP addresses
typically change, the new access link characteristics may be totally different and
there is no direct connectivity between the old and the new access routers on the
access links.
Different access networks often represent disparity in link characteristics. For
example, link bandwidth, latency, bit-error rate and the degree of bandwidth
asymmetry may differ considerably. Therefore, sudden changes in the access
link characteristics due to vertical or horizontal handovers may interfere with
the transport layer protocols and with the applications that base their protocol
behavior on the measured end-to-end path conditions. Estimators used by the
end-to- end transport protocols to control the amount of outstanding data in the
network and the rate of transmission are likely to be significantly off after a han-
dover. As a result, overshooting or underutilization of the available bandwidth
becomes likely. In the Internet, TCP is the dominant transport protocol that serves
well many applications requiring reliable data delivery. However, for real-time
applications, such as streaming video or any application that cannot benefit from
excessive content buffering on peers, a highly variable transmission rate of TCP
is problematic.
One of the problems with most existing IP Mobility protocols is that they mainly
concentrate on fixing the IP routing and reachability. There are protocol enhance-
ments for reducing the number of packet losses during a handover that were
discussed during the background information part of this dissertation. How-
ever, these solutions still neglect the transport and application layer needs during
handovers. Furthermore, protocol enhancements at the IP Mobility level are not
enough to address issues that are inherent for horizontal handovers in mobile
operator deployments where access authentication is a mandatory part of the
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deployed system. In those cases IP Mobility solutions must also consider issues
that need to be solved more at system level in architectural design.
In this chapter we experiment and evaluate the implications of network access
authentication to IP Mobility and respectively to transport layer during horizon-
tal handovers. Mobile IPv4 in FA-CoA mode is used for mobility and WLAN
with WPA2 security and EAP-SIM authentication for the security. We have earlier
studied transport performance during mobility and effect of change of through-
put within one access technology [185]. However, these handovers were trans-
parent to IP layer.
9.2 Experimentation Setup
Figure 9.1 shows the network architecture that was used for horizontal handover
measurements. Mobile nodes can connect to the testbed using 54 Mbps 802.11abg
WLAN. The round-trip delay between the mobile node and the home agent was
at most 1ms. The Cisco Aironet IEEE 802.11bg capable WLAN access point used
in measurements are connected to TeliaSonera live AAA backend using RADIUS.
The SIM-based authentication, when required by EAP-SIM, is computed in Telia-
Sonera’s live network HLR (Nokia). The mobile node is a DELL laptop with
1.2GHz Dual-Core CPU, the correspondent node is a high performance multi-
CPU web-server operated by FUNET1, the home agent & foreign agent #1 is Cisco
2821 router running IOS version 12.4(11)T2 and the foreign agent #2 is Cisco 3260
router running IOS version 12.3(21). The mobile node has Windows XP Profes-
sional operating system and using a commercial SecGo Mobile IPv4 installation
for Windows. The SecGo Mobile IPv4 implementation is functionally equivalent
to Linux version. The EAP-SIM client in the mobile node is a commercial Odyssey
Access Client Manager Enterprise Edition version 4.60.49383.0. The EAP-SIM
client uses a SIM-card placed in mobile node’s internal smart card reader slot.
In horizontal handover tests we used a FA-CoA mode exclusively at the mobile
node. We forced reverse tunneling of all traffic from the mobile node to the home
agent, which is a common practice in mobile operator deployments. Forcing
reverse tunneling gives an operator possibility to enforce policies on IP flows
and collect exact traffic information for charging purposes. Reverse tunneling
between the foreign agent and the home agent also simplifies firewall configura-
tions. The Mobile IPv4 registration authentication method for MH-HA authen-
tication extension is standard HMAC MD5, which is considered computationally
lightweight algorithm. The home agent authorizes each registration in the back-
end RADIUS server (AAA server, the same is also used to proxy EAP-SIM net-
work access authentications) based on the MN-NAI [72]. We advisedly neglected
MN-AAA [246] authentication extension due to its deployment complexity. We
did not use MN-FA authentication as EAP-SIM based network access authenti-
cation provides similar functionality with better security. Furthermore, we did
1http://ftp.funet.fi



















Figure 9.1: Test network architecture used to experiment with Mobile IPv4 in FA-CoA
mode and transport layer implications. The architecture is a modification of the architec-
ture illustrated in Figure 8.1
not enable FA-HA security, although it might have been another delay source.
We considered that firewall rules in the home agent router were enough to filter
Mobile IP registration messages from possibly hostile foreign agents in our closed
access network deployment. The processing delay of IP Mobility registrations
and especially the computation of required cryptographic security verifications
may be extensive and contribute large part of the total cumulative registration
delay [167].
The access network authentication uses WPA2 with EAP-SIM authentication. The
PMKSA CACHING feature is enabled in WLAN access points. The backend
RADIUS server is queried only during the initial authentication and subsequent
authentications use cached PMKSAs. During testing we made sure that the mobile
node had earlier been authenticated to the network through both access points
and thus cached the PMKSA. On each handover RADIUS accounting messages
get sent by WLAN access points. We also enabled foreign agent router adver-
tisements with minimum allowed interval (3 seconds). We also provide equiv-
alent measurements using WPA with EAP-SIM authentication for comparison
purposes (with WPA EAP-SIM authentication needs to communicate with the
backend AAA on each authentication).
During a horizontal handover, the mobile node discovers a new target access
point and executes the access authentication as defined for WPA2 in IEEE 802.11i
with EAP-SIM. After a successful access authentication the mobile node solicits
for foreign agent on the new link without even trying to first acquire and com-
plete the IP address configuration (i.e., the DHCP procedure). After receiving a
foreign agent router advertisement (either sporadically or due to the solicitation)
the mobile node sends a Mobile IPv4 registration request message immediately
to the foreign agent. Subsequently the foreign agent relays the registration to
the home agent. The new and old links are not simultaneously active, not at the
layer-2 or layer-3. Therefore, the layer two handover delay may be significant and
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impact negatively to the delays at the layer-3. Handovers were natural (all 15 of
them shown in this dissertation) in a sense that they were generated by walking
around the office space. For the user plane traffic there is no tunneling overhead
between the mobile node and the foreign agent.
Again we concentrated on downlink bulk data transfers from the server to the
mobile node. TCP traffic, or more precisely HTTP traffic is generated by down-
loading large files off the web-server. Packet traces were forwarded at the home
agent using a dedicated monitor port and captured using tcpdump in a Linux PC
connected to the monitor port. Furthermore, we captured all WLAN traffic at
IEEE 802.11 level using a FreeBSD laptop with its WLAN card in monitor mode.
The office premises used for handover testing has good 20 active and overlapping
WLAN networks, that add factors of annoying unknowns to WLAN traffic but
also at the same time make the environment realistic when it comes to popular
public hotspot locations.
9.3 Mobile IPv4 with Access Authentication
Figure 9.2 shows results of Mobile IPv4 horizontal handover measurements with
a single bulk TCP download transfers in a WLAN network. The downloaded
file was long enough to last the whole experimentation (i.e., over 500 seconds).
Each measurement has 15 handovers, approximately one in every 30 seconds.
The WLAN network uses WPA2 security with PMKSA CACHING and EAP-SIM
authentication. Figure 9.2(a) graph shows time sequence graphs from the TCP
sender side. Figure 9.2(b) shows a detailed graph of one specific handover, which
represents a typical handover behavior in our measurements. Figure 9.3 shows
an equivalent measurement using WPA security with EAP-SIM authentication
as a comparison. Table 9.1 summarizes the horizontal handover measurement
results. In this analysis we focus on the factors that form the handover delay.
We selected these two network setups because they resemble Mobile WiMAX
deployments. The WPA2 setup represents a handover between ASN-GWs under
the management of the same ASP. The WPA setup represents a handover between
ASN-GWs under the management of different ASPs.
Table 9.1 lists a number of measurements that need more explanations. WLAN
Latency means the time in seconds a handover takes to complete at the link
layer. The time includes also access authentication and four way handshake. Dur-
ing this period all uplink and downlink packets are typically lost. TCP Latency
means the time during the handover when no new data is delivered to appli-
cations. WLAN-MIP Delay is the delay time before Mobile IPv4 module initiates
the Mobile IPv4 registration procedure after the link layer handover completed.
Finally, MIP Registration Delay is the time it takes for Mobile IPv4 registration
to complete. This time includes also home agent and AAA server processing.
The average handover delay experienced at the transport layer (i.e., TCP) was









































(b) Handover #15, a typical case
Figure 9.2: Measured behavior of a TCP flow during a Mobile IPv4 horizontal












































(b) Handover #5, a typical case
Figure 9.3: Measured behavior of a TCP flow during a Mobile IPv4 horizontal
handover in the testbed with foreign agents, WPA security and EAP-SIM authen-
tication with fast re-authentication
2.04 seconds, excluding the first handover that was over 17 seconds (obviously
due to complications at WLAN radio level). At the same time the average han-
dover delay at the link layer level including the network access authentication
and 4-way handshake for the key distribution takes 0.11 seconds. After the link
layer handover has been completed a host needs to re-configure its networking
interface and routing tables. On the average, Mobile IPv4 module does not initi-
ate re-registering with a home agent until after 0.23 seconds. This delay would be
only 0.04 seconds if we were to exclude one delay measurement (2.7 seconds) that
significantly differs from the other values. Mobile IPv4 registration takes average
0.01 seconds, which also includes home agent processing time and querying an
AAA server.
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Lost Pkts DL RTOs
1 0.06 17.16 8.74 0.019 10 3
2 0.04 1.7 0.05 0.004 24 2
3 0.4 1.57 0.00 0.002 7 2
4 0.04 0.57 0.04 0.014 0 1
5 0.03 4.01 2.70 0.004 10 3
6 0.08 1.7 0.02 0.013 0 1
7 0.02 1.56 0.07 0.004 8 2
8 0.07 1.91 0.03 0.013 16 1
9 0.03 2.68 0.08 0.004 29 2
10 0.07 1.97 0.04 0.012 12 1
11 0.02 2.43 0.12 0.004 0 2
12 0.05 1.62 0.02 0.012 13 1
13 0.03 1.13 0.05 0.004 11 2
14 0.66 4.21 0.01 0.012 21 1
15 0.06 1.48 0.04 0.004 27 2
The WLAN-MIP Delay originates from Router Solicitation and Router Advertise-
ment exchange delay. The mobile node solicits for foreign agents immediately
when the link comes up, receives a reply and then initiates the registration pro-
cedure. The WLAN-MIP Delay is zero when the mobile node happens to receive a
periodic foreign agent advertisement (the minimum interval was configured to be
3 seconds) before starting the solicitation. In cases where the WLAN-MIP Delay is
long, order of hundreds of milliseconds, either the solicitations (the mobile node
may send three initial solicitations at a maximum rate of one per second while
searching for a foreign agent) or advertisements are lost. The Lost Pkts DL is
the number of lost downlink packets and the RTOs is the number of TCP RTOs
during the handover.
In our measurements the home agent and the AAA server processing times are
close to insignificant. Mobile IPv4 has only one round-trip re-registration pro-
cedure and the cryptographic algorithms used in our measurements are light-
weight. Chatty mobility management protocols with heavy per message compu-
tation tend to increase the overall handover latency [167]. Furthermore, in our
measurements the signaling plane is shared with the user data plane. In an event
of congestion mobility management messages are also in danger to get lost and
in that way contribute to the overall handover latency [167].
The main handover delay contributors during the mobility management are the
network attachment latency and the network interface re-configuration latency.
However, even together they contribute only 7% to 17% of the total handover
delay. During the period when the mobile node is losing the radio connectivity
and searching for a new target access point, basically all uplink packets get lost.
The loss of data packets in the downlink direction stops transmission of acknowl-
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edgments in the uplink direction. That in turn causes the TCP sender to time-
out and retransmit the first unacknowledged packet, which then in turn gets lost
because the handover is still in progress. After the mobile node has re-registered,
the TCP sender is still holding back to retransmit due to the exponential back-off
retransmission policy. This TCP behavior results to unnecessary retransmission
timeouts in 9 out of 15 cases. Although the mobile node would be ready to trans-
mit and receive IP traffic on the average 0.04 seconds after the link layer handover
has completed, it still has to wait a minimum of 1 second for the TCP sender to
timeout again. An example handover case is shown in Figure 9.2(b).
The measurements shown in Figure 9.3 have significantly longer handover laten-
cies. Contrary to the measurements shown in Figure 9.2 this setup used different
authentication and key management approach. During each handover the AAA
server needs to be queried without making any use of locality in the access net-
work. At minimum 3 AAA round-trips are needed to authenticate the mobile
node for the network access. In this case the access authentication delay is a
significant delay factor for the total handover latency. We already got similar
results with VoIP traffic as discussed in Section 8.2. Furthermore, the WPA2 based
security is completely implemented using dedicated crypto hardware, where as
WPA based security is implemented using the host software. This also affects the
results showing the superiority of WPA2 performance over WPA.
9.4 Handover Improvement Proposals
A vertical handover taking an advantage of simultaneous access is able to per-
form a make-before-break handover, if multiple networking interfaces may be
active simultaneously. The delay of attaching and authenticating to a new net-
work can be eliminated. However, if vertical and/or horizontal handovers take
place between links with different link characteristics and significantly different
bandwidth-delay product, the transport layer typically experiences difficulties to
adapt to the new conditions [136,261,312]. The size of the link buffer is commonly
set to the bandwidth-delay product of the link. When roaming from a network
with a high bandwidth-delay product to a low one, some data can be lost because
the buffer space is insufficient to hold all packets. When roaming from a low
bandwidth-delay product network to a high one, the number of buffered packets
may not be enough to utilize the new link. It could be possible to configure the
buffer of all links to the maximum bandwidth-delay product of any link. This
approach would require the network operator to know the type of links that the
mobile node can attach to and deployment of additional buffer space in network-
ing nodes, which is impossible in commercial network deployments.
Overbuffering is known to have three negative aspects. First, interactive applica-
tions can suffer from the increased response time because of the queuing delay.
In EDGE, the round-trip time is approximately 2 seconds with a buffer size of
50 kilobytes [261] and is increasing by approximately 0.04 second per additional
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kilobyte. Second, the increased round-trip time causes the retransmission time-
out value at the sender to be very high, thus delaying the loss recovery. Third,
when a data transfer is aborted, packets buffered in the network are unnecessarily
delivered to the receiver.
In a highly dynamic network environment it is challenging for end-to-end proto-
cols to estimate end-to-end path characteristics based on the local link character-
istics accurately. Feedback from link layers that have local knowledge of the link
conditions can be helpful to transport protocols. To improve TCP performance
for vertical handovers it can be helpful to artificially change the transmission rate
of the sender. The TCP receiver is able to control (i.e., to reduce) the transmission
rate of the TCP sender by manipulating the advertised window.
In the case of horizontal handovers between links with the same bandwidth-
delay product, as studied in Section 9.3, we can conclude on few discoveries. The
access authentication delay may have a significant impact and should be carried
out locally without any signaling outside the administrative domain, whenever
possible. Even locally handled authentications with minimal delay, the explicit
notification to the transport layer after a handover could expedite the recov-
ery of transport layer protocols [87]. Our previous work on explicit handover
notifications with transport layer protocols (e.g., TCP) supports this observa-
tion [136, 261]. For example, a ”TCP Extensions for Immediate Retransmissions”
could be used [101]. In our horizontal handover case we could possibly avoid the
majority of unnecessary spurious TCP retransmission timeouts.
9.5 Summary
This chapter presented measurement results of Mobile IPv4 handovers in a man-
aged WLAN network with a strong network access authentication. We showed
that the network access authentication has a significant impact on the handover
performance. We concluded that localized management of the network access
authentication is one key enabler for seamless handovers.
We also studied transport layer implications during horizontal handovers in a
managed WLAN network with a strong network access authentication. We dis-
cussed general improvement proposals regarding the transport layer implica-
tions during handovers. In the case of TCP we found out that the major source
of the delay experienced at the application layer is a result of waiting for the TCP
retransmission timeout. An explicit handover notification at the transport layer
would allow triggering the TCP sender to retransmit lost data immediately with-
out waiting for a timeout. This enhancement would significantly expedite the
transport layer protocol recovery after a handover.






This chapter closes the dissertation by presenting the summary of the work and
describing the key discoveries. We also identify and describe possible future
work.
10.1 Summary of the Dissertation
This dissertation presented challenges of IP Mobility in a mobile operator wire-
less network and proposed enhancements to the overall multi-operator network-
ing architecture. The dissertation was comprised of five parts. The first part was
a general introduction and a problem statement. The second part presented the
state of the art of existing and near future IP Mobility technologies. We also gave
an overview of existing wireless architectures that deploy Mobile IP. In order to
develop the next generation mobile operator wireless architecture that is heavily
biased towards multi-access and IP-based mobility, the knowledge of the existing
technologies and how the mobile operator ”community” functions is essential.
The third part described and defined requirements for a new mobile operator
architecture and inter-operator roaming arrangement. The requirements can be
deployed in an evolutionary manner from the existing GSM/GPRS deployments
and architecture. The architectural changes that are proposed in this dissertation
actually depend more on business role decisions than technical advancements.
The fourth part presented results of various measurements, experimentations
and standardization work. The last part presented the conclusions.
IP Mobility in mobile operator networks requires extensive backend support func-
tions. These include AAA, service provisioning, and arrangements for inter-
working and inter-operator roaming. Most of the early stage IP Mobility proto-
col development tend to neglect these functional requirements originating from
commercial multi-operator deployments. Occasionally, these requirements may
cripple some of the novel ideas of the original protocol design. Strict traffic fil-
tering resulting in walled gardens, intentionally disallowing direct host to host
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communication, network access authentication prior allowing any IP communi-
cation and costly inter-operator roaming arrangements are just some examples
of a normal operation in managed networks. These are existing facts in the com-
mercial world that need to be considered when developing the next generation
of the IP-based wireless network architecture. In a commercial world revolution
seldom works for existing global deployments. Therefore, the next generation
architectures must provide a clear and a cost efficient evolution path from the
existing infrastructure.
Based on our hands-on knowledge of the existing mobile operator wireless net-
work architectures and inter-operator roaming arrangements, this dissertation
proposed an evolutionary model for the future wireless architecture. Our model
does not require revolutionary changes in technology and it can deployed with-
out unnecessary complexity. This was an intentional choice to aim evolutionary
approach of the architecture and ease the deployment in an inter-operator roam-
ing environment. The basic idea is the clear separation of roles of different types
of operators: (i) access operator, (ii) service operator, and (iii) inter-connection and
roaming provider. A clear separation allows each type of an operator to have their
own development path and business models without artificial bindings with each
other. We also proposed a set of minimum requirements for the new architecture
model. Based on the model we also discussed a number of enhancements in the
future operator networks.
The experimental part of this dissertation can roughly be divided into three parts:
Enhancing the backend support for IP access presented results of a research and
development work on essential AAA support functions for IP based ser-
vices. The results materialized to a number of IETF standards. Several of
them have already been adopted into forthcoming telecom standards from
GSMA, 3GPP and WiMAX Forum. The important discovery was that allow-
ing some level of telecom influence on IP-based backend systems provides
a smooth transition towards all IP based next generation mobile operator
networks.
Roaming and network attachment experiments presented measurement results
of WLAN VoIP handovers in an inter-operator roaming cases with a strong
layer-2 access authentication. Based on these roaming measurement expe-
riences we developed a HIP Based Network Attachment solution. Our
solution made extensive use of locality within a well defined administra-
tive domain with a centralized management function. We also promoted
deployment of a simple low-cost access network infrastructure by moving
all layer-2 complexity, including the security, to IP layer. The key discovery
was that the proposed low-cost IP-based solution competes equally with
the complex state of the art industrial solutions.
Handover experimentations in operator networks presented live network exper-
imentation of the break-before-make horizontal handover measurements.
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Our main interest was on the affect of the access authentication on Mobile
IP handover smoothness and implications of handovers on the transport
layer. The key discovery was that the access authentication latency and
abrupt changes in the link characteristics caused unwanted misbehavior on
the transport layer. As a solution to the transport layer issues we proposed
cross-layer information exchange between the mobility and the transport
part of the IP stack.
10.2 Future Work
This dissertation looked into several areas in IP Mobility and deployment related
backend functionality in wireless mobile operator networks. There are still areas,
where further work is required. We can argue that the end-to-end approach of
deployment and communication does not provide rapid enough rollouts of new
protocols and features, and lacks insurance that all peers (e.g., in an inter-operator
roaming cases) upgrade their infrastructure at the same time. Furthermore, when
the traffic crosses the network provider’s edge, there is typically no guarantee
that intermediating networks or middleboxes treat the traffic as the sender or the
receiver expects.
One possible solution and an area for further research is the concept of local-
ized well defined administrative domains. Localized well defined administra-
tive domains as such are not a completely new area. However, their deployment
within commercial operator world has been almost non-existent due to the lack of
trust between roaming partners, and technical issues on service provisioning and
reachability. Once a host gains an access to a local administrative domain, a num-
ber of optimizations are valid and applicable as long as communicating nodes
are within the same domain. We can apply cross-layer, security and mobility
related optimizations that do not necessarily hold if the end-to-end path crosses
networks with unknown characteristics. Such solutions, however, require effi-
cient mechanism to distribute network status information between various net-
working hosts, independent of hosts being stationary or mobile.
Another interesting area to explore within localized administrative domains is
the inter-domain communication and roaming aspects. It is open how to achieve
efficient and minimal signaling, and setting up needed inter-domain trust rela-
tionship without requiring extensive pre-configuration and legal process between
all possible roaming partners. A possible development in the future builds the
whole roaming and inter-domain infrastructure as a managed and a clustered
peer-to-peer overlay. The goal is to gain configuration agility and independency
of the underlying physical network infrastructure.
Finally, the mobility as such could be rethought. Maybe solving the paradigm of
mobility at the application and at the session level is the right approach. Another
potential area for further research on mobility is the impacts of physical node
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movement in peer-to-peer overlay networks, which might become topical when
wireless devices start to increasingly utilize peer-to-peer application solutions.
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